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ABSTRACT
This study examines new administrative reforms in Whitehall and 
Canberra in the 1980s. More particularly it compares and contrasts 
two programmes of managerial change which were central to the British 
and Australian governments' drive to introduce a more managerially 
oriented administration. Whitehall's programme was the Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) which, later in the decade, was succeeded 
by 'The Next Steps'. Canberra's initiative was the similarly 
entitled Financial Management Improvement Program (FMIP).
The study has three purposes:
(i) To describe and analyse the progress of the two reform 
programmes during the 1980s.
(ii) Through a comparison between the experience of the two, to 
illuminate those factors which were critical in advancing the cause 
of reform and those which retarded it.
(iii) On the basis of this analysis, to develop a deeper theoretical 
understanding of the process by which administrations are changed.
Each of these purposes was informed by one more fundamental question. 
Why is it that administrative reforms seem so often to fail ? This 
dissertation is devoted to an examination and extrapolation of that 
basic inquiry.
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I I
Our Task
... In my more extravagant/romantic moments I think of us 
as carrying the torch for change, but modestly, as befits 
the immensity of the task. Whitehall is littered with 
attempts at rational, informed management and supporting 
information systems. Typically, management consultants 
have played a part, sometimes a large part (I toy with a 
catalogue of vintages - Couloirs du Tresor, Chateau 
Arthur Andersen, 1976...). Maybe they have 
underestimated the complexity of Ministers' motives when 
taking decisions; maybe they have overestimated the pace 
at which a bureaucracy can absorb new ideas; maybe civil 
servants have been disinclined - for whatever reason - to 
change even where change is feasible.
But the Fulton Report was published 14 years ago, in June 
1968...We share subsequent experiences of management 
reviews and new management styles; and of all the 
attempts to evolve the whole process of public 
expenditure planning, control and execution, however 
often patient progress has been subordinated to IMF cuts 
or change of government or whatever. The Rayner spirit 
is now three years old. It has sharpened perceptions of 
the need for and scope of change...
So I think there should be a better chance this time, if 
we are patient and careful and as helpful as our combined 
wits can make us. "
(Memorandum from a Treasury Under Secretary to colleagues,
18 May 1982)
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INTRODUCTION
1. The Problem
"Smiley had watched Whitehall's skirts go up and come 
down, her belts tightened, loosened, tightened. He had 
been a witness, or victim, of such spurious cults as 
lateralism, parallelism, separatism, operational 
devolution and now...integration. Each new fashion had 
been hailed as a panacea...Each had gone out with a 
whimper, leaving behind it the familiar English 
muddle..." (Le Carre, 1980, p.138)
Administrative reform has not had a notable history of success in 
Whitehall...or elsewhere for that matter for it can clearly be argued 
that the familiar administrative "muddle" is not restricted to 
Britain alone. But, as Smiley so clearly recognised, the failure of 
one or even many reforms has not daunted the efforts of those 
determined to impose new order on what they have perceived as the 
inefficiencies of conventional public administration.
However, if British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand experience 
is taken as a guide, it would seem that it is far easier to be 
critical of the muddle than to find a novel and lasting order to 
impose upon it. .At the beginning of the 1970s major inquiries were 
conducted in each country. They all concluded that the practice of 
management in government should be transformed (Cmnd 3638, 1968 (The 
Fulton Report); Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, 1976 (The Coombs Commission); Royal Commission on 
Government Organisation, 1969 (The Glassco Commission); State 
Services in New Zealand, 1962 (The McCarthy Commission). Yet nowhere 
had significant progress been made (see Chapman 1978, p.295; Caiden, 
1982, p.86; Greenaway, 1985, p.14; Gray and Jenkins, 1985, p.103; 
March and Olsen, 1989, pp.70-71). Despite this and only a few years 
later, rational management, which had suffered so unmercifully at the 
hands of its academic critics and which had appeared to produce so 
little which endured, re-emerged to provide a new banner around which 
the adherents of reform could rally. As is usually the case with a 
new fashion its attraction spread fast and wide (Spann, 1981, p.14). 
Soon, the civil service in each of the Westminster countries was 
caught up in the new rush by government to remake the public sector 
in a more managerial image (Hood, 1991, p.6). Hence, when this 
research began in 1983, it seemed an opportune moment to look again 
at the process of reform; to track the development of the new 
initiatives; to see whether this time their outcome might be 
different or whether they, like so many previous "fashions", would 
fade from sight, and, if so, to explain why.
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This study, then, examines new administrative reforms in Whitehall 
and Canberra in the 1980s. More particularly it compares and 
contrasts two programmes of managerial change which were central to 
the British and Australian governments' drive to introduce a more 
managerially oriented administration. Whitehall's programme was the 
Financial Management Initiative (FMI) which, later in the decade, was 
succeeded by 'The Next Steps'. Canberra's initiative was the 
similarly entitled Financial Management Improvement Program (FMIP).
The study has three purposes:
(i) To describe and analyse the progress of the two reform 
programmes during the 1980s.
(ii) Through a comparison between the experience of the two, to 
illuminate those factors which were critical in advancing the cause 
of reform and those which retarded it.
(iii) On the basis of this analysis, to develop a deeper theoretical 
understanding of the process by which administrations are changed.
Each of these purposes was informed by one more fundamental question. 
Why is it that administrative reforms seem so often to fail ? This 
dissertation is devoted to an examination and extrapolation of that 
basic inquiry. The specific purposes of the study are now introduced 
in more detail.
2. The Aims of the Research
(i) To describe and analyse the progress of the two reform
initiatives during the 1980s.
The description and analysis of administrative reform may proceed 
from a number of different standpoints (Pollitt, 1984, pp.2-3). I 
have approached the problem phenomenologically (Quinn Patton, 1990, 
pp.68-71). That is, I have presumed that the best way both to 
understand and record the changes which took place in Whitehall and 
Canberra is to see them, as far as possible, through the eyes of the 
participants. A programme of administrative reform is not, in my 
view, a unitary or self- evident phenomenon. Its key components may
be capable of reduction to paper but its essence lies not in this
formal statement of intent but in how the relevant organisational 
actors perceive and interpret it. Consequently, my research method 
was qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. I became both 
participant and observer in the processes which I studied (See 
Appendix A). The research focused heavily on eliciting from the 
participants not only a clear view about what they thought of 
management reform but also their perceptions about their own role and 
that of others in its pursuit. In this way I sought to obtain not
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only a factual but also a political and intuitive understanding of 
reform's dynamics.
Such an approach has its dangers. The researcher's position may be 
skewed where he or she relies too heavily on the opinions of others 
to found his or her own. Too close an identification with one or
other of the actors or groupings may engender bias whether conscious
or unconscious (Nachmais and Nachmais, 1981, pp.172-176). I was, 
however, fortunate to obtain access to all but the most confidential 
of relevant departmental files. These acted on many occasions as an 
edifying corrective to some of my more far-fetched hunches and
presuppositions. I freely acknowledge the dangers which remained.
Nevertheless, I hope that my explicit acknowledgment of them and my 
very conscious efforts to reflect upon and understand my personal 
reactions to events has served to minimise their impact.
There is also another corrective embedded in the text. I want, very 
much, to engender in the reader an appreciation of what managerial 
reform looks like from the inside. To serve this end I have made 
extensive use in the case study chapters of direct quotations drawn 
from interviews and from internal working documents. By presenting 
and juxtaposing the perceptions of the actors in the words which they 
themselves have used I wish to communicate some of the 'excitement of 
the chase' and by doing so to bring the superficially uninteresting 
* subject of management reform to life. The use of quotations also 
. serves another purpose. By presenting research material in its 
\ original and unadulterated form, readers can more readily make their 
own judgements as to the validity of my understanding of events. In 
short, the description and analysis in this study has proceeded from 
my attempt to enter the assumptive worlds of the actors in the 
reformist play (Young and Mills, 1980, pp.6- 10). The degree to 
which this attempt has been successful will now have to be judged by 
others.
(ii) Through a comparison between the experience of the two, to 
illuminate those factors which were critical in advancing the cause 
of reform and those which retarded it.
In the public administration literature, the analysis of 
administrative reform has generally proceeded through an examination 
of the individual case. A reform programme is described, its 
progress dissected and reasons for its success or failure advanced 
(see, for example, Kellner and Crowther Hunt, 1980; Gray and Jenkins, 
1982; Metcalfe and Richards, 1987a). Occasionally, the analysis is 
extended over time. The factors which were considered relevant to 
judging the progress of an earlier programme of reform are re-applied 
to its successors in order to consolidate our understanding of the
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process (see, for example, Plowden, 1983; Pollitt, 1984; Wilenski,
1986, pp.166- 202; Gray and Jenkins, 1986, 1990). However, the
comparative analysis of reform programmes is a much rarer event (see,
for example, Arnold, 1988;^ 0lsen, 1988, 1991; Pollitt, 1990). In
part its rarity is*<Sie?Ee the logistical difficulties and financial
obstacles inherent in undertaking any international study. In part,
Xv
too, it is due to the simple fact that it is unusual to find reform 
programmes simultaneously undertaken in different countries which are 
sufficiently similar to permit a ready and useful comparison to be 
made. The emergence of the FMI and the FMIP, however, provided just 
such an opportunity.
There were three factors in particular which made the comparison of 
these two programmes feasible and attractive. First, the content of 
the programmes was almost identical. Their close affinity ensured 
that like would be compared with like. Secondly, both programmes 
operated within Westminster systems of government. This avoided some 
of the methodological difficulties which inevitably emerge when 
similar programmes are considered in <3u.ita different governmental 
contexts. Thirdly, the reforms were introduced by governments of 
different political complexion. This fact provided an opportunity to 
examine what influence, if any, competing political perceptions of 
the civil service and of the appropriate strategies for its reform 
would have on the outcomes of the programmes in question.
In theory, similar reforms should proceed in similar fashion to 
similar conclusions. Where differences occur, the comparative method 
permits their causes to be examined and conclusions with respect to 
the determinants of programme success and failure more readily to be 
drawn.
(iii) On the basis of this analysis, to develop a deeper theoretical 
understanding of the process by which administrations are 
t rans f orm ^ 0
Since ther mid f97Qs a procession of authors has lamented the absence 
of an adequate literature on administrative reform (see, for example, 
Self, 1978; Caiden, 1982; Ridley, 1982; Halligan and Power, 1990).
The literature, they argued, has been tom between that of the 
management reformers whose personal interest in the outcomes of 
reform can blind them to its defects and that of critical academic 
analysts who, by focusing so intensively on the many obstacles to 
change, concentrate too little attention on the fact of its existence 
(Self, 1978, p.312; March and Olsen, 1989, pp.74-76; Halligan and 
Power, 1990, p.279). This cleavage is but one symptom of a broader 
division which has developed between the practitioners of public 
administration and its academic observers. Academics, as outsiders,
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have been prone to misunderstanding and generalisation.
Practitioners, as insiders, have viewed their practice selectively 
and subjectively. No effective method appears to have been devised 
to bridge the two perspectives, although participant observation has 
shown some promise in this regard (Ridley, 1982, p.9).
Practitioners, have increasingly vacated the sphere of commentary. 
Academics, while dominating it, have fallen prey to excessive 
specialisation (Johnson, 1981, p.136). The quality of observation 
has suffered substantially as a result (Spann, 1979, p.505; Chapman 
and Greenaway, 1980, p.189; Caiden, 1982, p.192). This study makes a 
conscious attempt to bridge the gap. By working beside 
administrators as they went about thei^ r tasks, I sought actively to 
understand the pressures and constraints under which they operate.
By taking the time to reflect more deeply on the processes in which 
they were involved, I hoped to cast a keener, more conceptual light 
upon the nature of administrative innovation.
The limited nature of the literature on public sector change is not 
reflected in the private sector. In recent years there has been a 
line of impressive research devoted to the examination of change in 
large private sector corporations (see, for example, Quinn, 1980;
Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; Ranter, 1983; Pettigrew, 1985; Toffler,
1985; Johnson, 1987; Mangham, 1988; Mangham and Pye, 1991).
Combining case study method with the conceptual tools provided by 
organisational theory, these private sector studies appeared to me 
considerably to advance our understanding of the nature and dynamics 
of organisational reform. Yet this methodological and conceptual 
combination had been used much more sparingly to explain innovation 
and change in central government. Certainly considerable work had 
been done in applying contingency theory and its variants (See in 
particular Greenwood and Hinings, 1976; Pitt and Smith, 1981; Hood 
and Dunsire, 1981). But this theorising was neither designed nor 
equipped to facilitate our comprehension of the very political >
processes of change which constitute the internal fact£of .
bureaucratic life (Pollitt, 1984, p.174). Beyond this, there had 
been other sporadic and introductory attempts to apply the insights 
of organisational theorists to the problems of change and reform in 
government (see, for example, Brown, 1965; Smith, 1971; Arnold, 1974;
March and Olsen, 1983; Jenkins and Gray, 1983; McCulloch, 1988). But 
a more detailed theoretical survey based upon original case study 
material had yet to emerge. In this study, I seek to employ just 
such a combination.
3. The Study Outline
The study is divided into three parts which correspond broadly to the 
study's three purposes. The first part consists of the case study
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material. Here, the progress of the FMI and the FMIP is examined in 
detail. The part consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 examines the 
context of the reforms. It sketches the economic, social, political 
and administrative factors which together combined to revive the 
managerial cause both in Britain and Australia. The chapter then 
outlines the Thatcher and Hawke Governments' public sector reform 
agendas and situates the FMI and the FMIP within them. The argument 
advanced in the chapter is that contextual factors play a critical 
role in determining the shape and establishing the momentum of 
administrative reform.
Chapters 2 and 3 look closely at the FMI. The initiative is 
scrutinised first through the governmental reports and evaluations 
devoted to it. These paint a generally positive picture of the FMI's 
progress, although by 1986, towards the end of its tenure in 
Whitehall, cracks have already begun to appear. I then open the 
curtains on the inner life of the reform programme. I explore the 
dynamics surrounding each of its three component elements - top 
management systems, delegated budgetary control and policy evaluation 
- revealing the reciprocal misunderstandings, conflicting priorities 
and sometimes bitter internal disputes which characterised its 
development. These, in turn, serve to explain why it was later 
discarded in favour of the more radical approach embodied in 'The 
Next Steps.'
Chapter 4 considers 'The Next Steps'. While considerably more 
radical in approach, the Next Steps programme had its roots in the 
same managerial philosophy which underpinned the FMI. Consequently, 
it was not surprising to find the same problems which beset that 
initiative re-surfacing in relation to its successor. The politics 
of administrative reform in Whitehall are arcane and entrenched. To 
these the Next Steps also succumbed. Nevertheless, it had 
demonstrated by the end of the J^8^s^an^uncharacteristic if still 
flawed resilience. This was dee not least to the fact that its 
designers had learnt importaht—lessons from the implementation of the 
FMI. These lessons too constitute useful source material for the 
comparison which follows.
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to the examination of the FMIP. Again,
I observe the Canberra programme first through the public reports. 
These applaud its direction but are, at the same time, somewhat more 
candid about the difficulties experienced in its execution. I look 
then inside the administration at how corporate planning, delegated 
budgeting and performance measurement progressed. A remarkably 
similar pattern of mismatch, misinterpretation and conflict to that 
present in Whitehall emerges. Yet unlike the FMI, the FMIP is not 
cast aside. Rather, the Department of Finance redoubles its efforts
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to implant the new managerial thinking and its associated techniques. 
In this it achieves partial but not inconsiderable success. The 
different outcomes in Britain and Australia provide a rich source of 
contrast which is explored in more detail in Part II.
Part II of the study consists of two chapters. In Chapter 7 I 
develop a practical framework for analysing the process of 
administrative reform drawn both from my experience of the phenomenon 
and from my consideration of the relevant literature. In the 
chapter, I propose that administrative reform may be considered as 
consisting of four discrete but interconnected aspects. These are 
its environment, content, strategy and dynamics. Each of these 
aspects and the interaction between them is of major importance in 
determining the outcome of any new reform initiative. I consider 
each aspect in turn and draw in the findings of previous research to 
demonstrate its salience.
In Chapter 8 I compare and contrast the experience of the FMI and the 
FMIP in accordance with the framework developed in the previous 
chapter. It is in this chapter that the principal findings of the 
study are contained.
Part III consists of the final chapter. It takes a more theoretical 
look at the phenomena which have been observed and discussed in Parts 
I and II. In this chapter I present three competing models of 
administrative reform. These models I term 'purposeful 
intervention', 'institutional negotiation' and 'appreciative shift'.
I then examine the evidence adduced in the study in relation to each. 
I conclude that no one model provides a complete explanation of the 
process of administrative reform. Each, however, can make a 
distinctive contribution to deepening our understanding of it.
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PART I :
THE CASE STUDIES
8
CHAPTER 1
AN ENVIRONMENT FOR CHANGE
In the 1980s, the British and Australian governments were subjected 
to intense pressure to reform the management of their public sector 
institutions. Economic, social, political and administrative forces 
combined to persuade the two governments that wholesale changes to 
public administration were necessary. On coming to office the 
Thatcher and Hawke administrations embarked upon programmes of 
administrative reform of almost unparalleled breadth and intensity. 
The central objective of each was to improve the way in which 
government was managed. The power and coherence of the pressures 
placed on government does much to explain why the managerial reform 
movement arose when it did and why its influence remained unabated 
throughout the decade. In this chapter the pressures for change in 
the two countries are considered as a prelude to a more detailed 
examination of the FMI and the FMIP.
SECTION ONE: BRITAIN
1. The Economic Context
The economic situation which prevailed in Britain in the 1970s was
fifth' te unlike that in the previous decade. The 1960s had been
/
characterised by a 'treble affluence' - gross domestic product 
increased continuously, public expenditure and public services 
expanded and personal income rose (Wright, 1981, p.3). Inflation was 
low and under control, there was full employment and the economy was 
growing steadily albeit slowly. The 1970s witnessed a reversal of 
these trends. Inflation increased dramatically, unemployment reached 
levels unseen since the Great Depression, the balance of payments 
situation worsened and the dollar value of the pound declined 
significantly (Wright, 1980, p.110).
The Keynesian paradigm which had prevailed for several decades was 
confounded by stagflation, paving the way for the ascendancy of the 
monetarist alternative (Wright, 1981, p.10; Ham, 1981, p.130; 
Pliatzky, 1982a, p.178). This upheaval set the scene for the 
concerted attack on public expenditure which followed. Influenced 
heavily by monetarist economists at home and abroad the Conservative 
Party concluded that government should no longer engage actively in 
demand management. Rather, the market economy was best left to 
correct itself. The process of self- correction could only be 
distorted by active governmental intervention in the economy since 
public sector growth 'crowded out' private sector investment, thereby
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reducing the capacity of the economy to re-establish its equilibrium 
(Bacon and Eltis, 1976, pp.110-111; Heald, 1983, pp.38-41).
The Government's first expenditure White Paper was a clear embodiment 
of these beliefs (Cmnd 7866, 1980) Inflation, it announced, would be 
attacked by controlling the rate of monetary growth and reducing the 
public sector borrowing requirement. Taxes would be reduced to 
restore individual and corporate incentives for investment. Public 
expenditure would be cut to accommodate reductions in borrowing and 
taxation. There were no measures proposed to secure full employment 
marking, perhaps, the decisive departure from the post war Keynesian 
consensus (Gamble, 1985, pp.192-197; Keegan, 1985, p.138).
The Government's economic policy had substantial implications for the 
level and composition of public expenditure. Describing public 
expenditure as being at the heart of the country's economic 
difficulties, the Government announced its intention progressively to 
reduce public spending in volume terms for the following four years. 
The reduction in expenditure was necessary to decrease the rate of 
growth in money supply in the same period (HC 500, 1980/81, pp.16-19; 
Thain, 1985, p.271). The Government did not reach its expenditure 
targets (Pliatzky, 1982a, pp.184-185; Riddell, 1983, pp.70-71; 
Riddell, 1989, pp.32-34). Nevertheless, its attempts to cut 
expenditure were strenuous and included substantial reductions in 
education, housing, environment and social security. These cuts were 
supplemented by more general measures instituted to increase control 
of public spending. The Government imposed cash limits, made 
substantial cuts in civil service personnel and launched a concerted 
attack on levels of public sector pay. It was these changes, more 
than reductions in programme expenditure, that contributed to a 
feeling amongst civil servants that they too were under attack.
2. The Social Context
The decline in Britain's economic fortunes was accompanied by 
increasing criticism in the community regarding the size and role of 
government. As the recession grew worse and Britain's economic 
standing deteriorated relative to other major industrialised nations, 
the search for a scapegoat began. Government provided a ready and 
easily identifiable target (Gamble, 1986, p.48).
Within the Keynesian paradigm, government had been regarded as a 
force for economic and social advancement. Fiscal policy provided 
the essential means through which cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activity could be moderated. The higher the level of public 
expenditure the greater the leverage which fiscal policy could 
exercise. Keynesians believed it proper for the state to intervene
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in the market to provide public goods and to mitigate the effects of 
unbridled market power on the poor and the disadvantaged. Given 
these beliefs, there had been a consistent propensity for state 
expenditure to grow as a proportion of gross domestic product and, 
while economic growth had been strong and standards of living had 
continued to rise, the community's faith in the right and the 
capacity of government to rectify economic and social problems had 
remained unshaken.
However, with the reversal in economic fortunes the critics of 
government became more numerous and their tone more strident. In the 
intellectual arena the most potent were Hayek and Friedman. Both
were economists. Both had a grand vision for society. Hayek
believed that central planning was both politically dangerous and 
economically inefficient (Hayek, 1988, pp.85-88). It was politically 
dangerous because it reduced individual liberty, increased the power 
of the state, weakened the role of Parliament and undermined the rule
of law by investing government officials with considerable
discretion. Planning was economically inefficient because it 
dampened competition, increased the prevalence of monopolies and 
stifled entrepreneurialism. Friedman too attacked the 'deadening 
effects of government control.' He argued that slow growth and 
declining productivity called for a fundamental reassessment of the 
role of government in economic activity. Continued governmental 
intervention at the expense of market competition threatened not only 
to destroy economic prosperity but also to reduce human freedom 
(Friedman and Friedman, 1980, p.25)
These ideas were embraced enthusiastically by policy institutes and 
politicians alike. Through its Hobart series the Institute of 
Economic Affairs introduced Hayek's and Friedman's ideas to a wider 
audience. It popularised Niskanen's work on the pathology of 
bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1973) and held several symposia on the role 
^nd size of government. The Centre for Policy Studies took a similar 
stance. It had been established in 1974 by Sir Keith Joseph.
Margaret Thatcher later became its President. Both Joseph and 
Thatcher cited Hayek and Friedman with approval (Bosanquet, 1983; 
Leach, 1983, p.158) and it was Joseph who later assumed primary 
responsibility for carrying the arguments of the New Right from the 
academic into the political arena (Keegan, 1985, pp.80-81; Young,
1989, p.102). The Centre had also acted as the intellectual home of 
other prominent Thatcher advisers such as Sir Alan Walters and Sir 
John Hoskyns. Politicians, advisers and analysts alike believed that 
the responsibility for the decline in British fortunes should be laid 
squarely at the feet of government. Only if government strictly
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limited its interventions in market, economy and society could 
Britain's economic decline be reversed (Littlechild, 1979, p.12).
Just as the role of government was attacked so also was that of the 
civil service. From a theoretical perspective, public choice 
theorists such as Tullock (1965, 1983) and Niskanen (1973) argued 
that bureaucrats should be regarded as self- serving, their principal 
objective being to maximise their budgets and increase the influence 
of their bureaus. These theorists proposed that, unlike private 
entrepreneurs who would not supply goods beyond the point at which 
their price equalled their cost, the welfare of bureaucrats rose 
continuously as agency budgets increased. Hence, individual 
bureaucrats had little incentive to restrain their output even where 
the marginal value of providing a service exceeded its marginal cost 
(Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, pp.117-119; King, 1987, pp.102-104;
Lane, 1987, p.30; Dunleavy, 1990, pp.154-173). Consequently, 
bureaucrats themselves were central to explaining why government had 
grown significantly. These anti-bureaucratic views found a ready 
audience in the Conservative political leadership (Dunleavy, 1986, 
p.363).
Public sector management was also subjected to sustained criticism. 
Influential business writers compared management in the public sector 
unfavourably with that in the private sector (see, for example, 
Drucker, 1977, p.131) They believed that the problem with public 
sector institutions was that they were rewarded not for effective 
performance but for honouring their promises. Hence, there was an 
inbuilt tendency for expenditure to grow and for delivery to take 
precedence over productivity. In the policy sphere, public sector 
management relied too much on ad hocery and pragmatism and too little 
on science, planning and rational analysis (see Johnson, 1985, 
p.418). The management theorists argued that governmental affairs 
would be conducted more effectively if the tenets of private sector 
management were adhered to. As this view gained currency, techniques 
developed in the private sector, such as zero-based budgeting, 
programme budgeting and cost benefit analysis, were tried in 
government but without notable success (see Self, 1975; Wildavsky, 
1979). Politicians too picked up the thread berating the civil 
service for its inefficiency and lauding the productivity of private 
entrepreneurial initiative. Both the Heath and Thatcher governments 
employed private sector managers as consultants on civil service 
efficiency on the premise that their diagnosis would be both sharper 
and more relevant than that developed by the civil service itself.
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3. The Political Context
The Conservative Government entered office in 1979 with a manifesto
commitment to reassert political control over the civil service,
reduce its size, improve its management and eliminate its waste and
inefficiency (Conservative Manifesto, 1979, p.9). Economic reform
had to be supplemented by administrative reform if its budgetary
strategy was to succeed. The commitment of the Prime Minister to
this objective was particularly in evidence (Young, 1989, p.154).
Her attitude to the civil service was described by one of her
colleagues as ferocious (Cosgrave, 1985, p.170). She disliked its
reserve, was annoyed by its obstruction and opined against its lack
of commitment to governmental purposes. She came to office
determined to tackle and subdue it. This would be done by cutting
its staff and resources, appointing livelier officials, rooting out
wasteful practices, improving systems of management and recasting it
in the private sector mould:
"Firm cash limits and manpower ceilings are essential 
external disciplines. But we must also ensure that 
departments' internal systems for controlling resources 
are effective including arrangements for scrutiny and
audit  Getting the right people for top jobs is vital.
In considering appointments to be made in the future, I 
have very much in mind the need for excellence in 
managing central government which I see as an important 
policy in its own right...I shall be looking for an 
increased proportion of candidates with business 
experience amongst those selected for the Civil Service."
(Prime Minister's letter to 
Timothy Eggar MP, 4 August 1982)
In developing her views of the service Mrs Thatcher had been strongly 
influenced by a number of close advisers. In 1978 Leslie Chapman, a 
disgruntled former official of the Property Services Agency, wrote a 
book entitled 'Your Disobedient Servant' in which he made scathing 
criticisms of civil service organisation and management. Providing 
practical gist to the public choice mill he argued that almost every 
pressure in the public service was directed towards increased 
expenditure (Chapman, 1978, pp.48-55). His arguments were greeted 
sympathetically in opposition circles and he was appointed as Mrs 
Thatcher's adviser on civil service matters during the 1979 election 
campaign (Hennessy, 1990, p.592). Chapman was passed over following 
the election in favour of Sir Derek Rayner. Rayner, the head of one 
of Britain's most successful retailing organisations, brought with 
him a wealth of managerial experience from both private and public 
arenas. Less punitive in his attitude to the civil service than 
Chapman, he devised, with the Prime Minister's strong support, an 
efficiency strategy which used civil servants themselves to identify 
areas of waste and duplication and to make recommendations for change 
(see generally Metcalfe and Richards, 1984; Metcalfe and Richards, 
1987a, pp.1-21). Late in the first term of the Thatcher Government,
13
Sir John Hoskyns, the head of the Prime Minister's policy unit, also 
weighed in to the civil service debate. Whitehall, he believed, 
lacked strategic direction, a deficit which should be considered 
particularly severe in the light of Britain's economic decline 
(Hoskyns, 1983, 1984). He argued that civil servants had lost the 
heart for national revival. This problem was exacerbated by their 
political neutrality which made it necessary for them to withdraw the 
'last five per cent of commitment' to governmental objectives. 
Neutrality, he believed, should be abandoned and Whitehall peopled 
with individuals willing to commit themselves wholeheartedly to 
change.
From these sources a number of clear threads in the Government's 
policy towards the civil service emerged. First, the power of the 
civil service would be moderated. In pursuit of this objective the 
Government proceeded with great determination to attack the influence 
of civil service unions, to decrease the rights of civil servants to 
engage in politically related activity and to introduce measures 
designed to decrease civil servants' privileges (Ponting, 1986, 
pp.216- 218). Second, the service's commitment to the achievement of 
governmental purposes would be increased. While not going so far as 
Sir John Hoskyns in advocating the politicisation of the service, the 
Prime Minister soon made it clear that she was willing to 'skip a 
civil service generation* in order to promote those whom she believed 
would pursue government policy with vigour and enthusiasm (Hennessy, 
1990, p.634). Third, the size of the civil service would be cut.
The cuts were necessary not only to assist with the economic 
imperative of decreasing public spending but were also symbolic of 
the Government's determination to decrease the influence of the 
state. Fourth, private sector solutions would be adopted to deal 
with public sector inefficiencies. Privatisation would be pursued 
with considerable vigour. Fifth, non departmental bodies whose 
primary rationale was deemed to be survival rather than productivity 
would be shut down (see Cmnd 7797, 1980).
4. The Administrative Context
Ever since the Fulton report (Cmnd 3638, 1968), the civil service 
itself had been grappling with the problems of managerial 
modernisation. Fulton, echoing criticisms made even earlier by Lord 
Plowden (Cmnd 1432, 1961), argued that in its structures and methods 
of operation the civil service had placed too great an emphasis on 
the provision of policy advice. As a result, it had neglected the 
task of effectively managing governmental business. This was a 
serious problem given that the administration's predominant activity 
was not in fact policy development but service delivery. To meet 
this concern, Fulton made a wide-ranging series of recommendations
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for change. The most relevant of these for present purposes was that 
'accountable management1 should be introduced throughout the civil 
service.
Accountable management, a technique borrowed from General Motors, 
involved the designation of discrete units in governmental 
departments whose outputs could be measured against costs and other 
criteria and whose performance could effectively be assessed. Fulton 
argued that wherever measures of achievement could be established in 
quantitative or financial terms and where individuals could be held 
responsible for output and cost, accountable units should be 
established (Cmnd 3638, 1968, p.52). Once established these units 
would be linked into commands each of which would be responsible for 
the achievement of clearly specified programme objectives. Programme 
objectives in turn would be related to corporate and governmental 
objectives through a process of strategic planning (Garrett, 1980,
In ensuing years not all went well for the managerialist cause. The 
newly created Civil Service Department took responsibility for 
initiating Management by Objectives (MBO). It did so by establishing 
a number of experimental projects. These, however, did not meet 
their designers' expectations. This was because the information 
systems necessary to support managerial decision- making were either 
absent or inadequate, advice from MBO specialists had not always been 
available and lack of commitment from senior staff had dented morale 
and enthusiasm (Hancock, 1976, p.16; Garrett, 1980, p.136). MBO soon 
ceased its formal existence but the technique survived on a more 
random basis in several parts of the administration. In the 
Department of Social Security, for example, MBO was still widely 
practised at operational levels throughout the 1970sC P c I *
The next major attempt to introduce managerially focused reform was 
the Heath Government's Programme Analysis and Review (PAR). This was 
a programme which focused on policy evaluation rather than managerial 
improvement. Nevertheless, it shared much in common with accountable 
management. PAR's proponents sought to make policy formulation more 
rational (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981, p.280). Each year every 
department would, under the supervision of an interdepartmental 
committee, evaluate specific blocks of policy. The evaluation would 
then form the basis for future policy directions.
PAR too ran aground (see Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981, pp.lxii- lxiii; 
Gray and Jenkins, 1982; Heald, 1983, pp.187-188). Insufficiently 
appreciating the differences between 'running the country and running 
a company', the technique never successfully melded policy review and 
political decision making. Consequently, it was pushed aside as the
p.130).
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Government became ever more preoccupied with managing economic
decline (Pliatzky, 1982a, p.104). Similarly, the review cycle was
established independently from the budgetary cycle. This
considerably reduced its practical relevance:
"It was a highly intelligent concept but it was not made 
an integral part of the decision-making process...a 
typical PAR exercise would look at a programme 
irrespective of departmental budget so the whole thing 
was guaranteed to turn it into a task that was pushed 
aside by the more urgent operational tasks until it just 
became a burden and was dropped."
(Treasury Under Secretary)
The demise of PAR did not, however, mark the end of attempts to 
improve civil service management. Accountable management, for 
example, continued to emerge in other guises. Pressure was exerted 
by the House of Commons Expenditure Committee to improve the 
presentation of public expenditure to Parliament by classifying it in 
terms of the objectives it was to meet and by developing tangible 
measures of performance. The Civil Service Department launched a 
wide-ranging series of departmental management reviews. These 
examined the operation of departmental units, subjecting their 
performance to critical scrutiny in the light of their stated 
managerial objectives.
Thus, while the programmes which had acted as the standard-bearers
for managerial reform faltered and died, each left its mark and
slowly the managerial ethos began to trickle through Whitehall's
linoleum passages. The steady and uninspiring progress merited
little attention in the academic and popular media. It was, however,
sufficiently significant later to form the foundation for Whitehall's
response to the Thatcher Government's strident demands for greater
managerial competence. That response was the formulation of the
Financial Management Initiative:
"There was a shift in perceptions on the part of 
government departments themselves over quite a long 
period. I mean clearly what the FMI displays is pretty 
much displayed wisdom...and the civil service has been
shifted its perceptions and stance and practices over
quite a time too. Progress was slower than you might 
like to see but it would be quite a mistaken view of the 
matter to see the FMI as something which was 
intrinsically new. What it was a coming together of the 
feelings within the service that the time for these ideas 
had come. There were certainly powerful impulsions from 
the Government and the PM in particular. Then there was 
Sir Derek Rayner and his lasting reforms without which I 
don't suppose the FMI would have taken the form it 
did...But, as it were, I think that they were pushing an 
open door " (Treasury Deputy Secretary)
5. The Government's Response
The Government responded to the many forces for change with a two 
part programme of management reform. First, it wished to create a
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general incentive towards efficiency and economy. This it did by 
initiating heavy reductions in civil service personnel, by 
cash-limiting government expenditure and by attacking civil service 
pay. Secondly, it aimed to increase civil service efficiency (Cmnd 
0293, 1981, p.2).
(i) Tightening control
The first step the Government took was to introduce cash planning. 
This meant that the size of a government programme would in future 
depend on the amount of cash allocated to it and how much that amount 
would purchase at prices then prevailing. If, therefore, the actual 
rate of inflation exceeded the rate assumed for the purpose of making 
cash estimates, a real reduction in public expenditure would occur 
(Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981, p.xxvii; Likierman, 1981 p.1; Likierman, 
1988, p.72). The Government took advantage of this by incorporating 
inflation and pricing assumptions which were much below actual 
inflation rates. It was then able to squeeze public expenditure 
without having to specify where cuts would fall (Pliatzky, 1982b, 
p.16; Pliatzky, 1983, p.326; Heald, 1983, p.176) Cash planning 
provided the means through which continuous downward pressure could 
be imposed on costs, particularly those associated with pay and 
employment. In so doing it advanced its commitment to cutting back 
public sector size and reducing the influence of civil service unions 
(Thain and Wright, 1989, p.160).
Cash limits were complemented by personnel reductions. Following its
freeze on public sector recruitment the Government announced in July
1980 that major cuts in civil service numbers would be made. In a
civil service which numbered approximately 732,000 the Government
achieved cuts of 100,000 in four years. By 1986 the size of the
service had been further reduced to 594,000, making it smaller than
at any time since the Second World War (Drewry and Butcher, 1988,
p.201). The effect of these cuts on the operation of the civil
service was mitigated by the cosmetic nature of some of the
reductions (Dunsire and Hood, 1989, p.152). Nevertheless, their
effect on civil service attitudes to managerial improvement would
prove profound (Johnson, 1985, pp.422-423):
"What were the main incentives [for administrative 
reform] ? There is no doubt in my mind that manpower 
cuts was the main one. They showed the Government was 
serious about reducing public spending and forced us to 
consider how we could do more with considerably less."
(Departmental Under Secretary)
The Government also launched a frontal attack on civil service pay.
It withdrew unilaterally from pay negotiations and refused to agree 
to any form of arbitration. These actions resulted in a major but 
unsuccessful civil service strike. The strike left a bitter legacy.
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Although the Government was better able to control the level of 
public sector wages, this came at the cost of considerable resentment 
and civil service morale plummeted (Ponting, 1986, p.217).
(ii) Promoting efficiency
Not content with cutting the size and power of the civil service, the 
Government wanted to increase its efficiency. Following the Heath 
Government's precedent of inviting private sector consultants to 
advise on public sector management, Mrs Thatcher appointed Sir Derek 
Rayner to head her efficiency unit. Sir Derek, the joint managing 
director of Marks and Spencer, had been successful in reducing costs 
and increasing profitability in his home company and Mrs Thatcher 
doubtlessly hoped that he could achieve similar results in Whitehall. 
Rayner commenced a series of reviews which he styled 'scrutinies'. 
Their purpose, he explained, was to examine a specific policy or 
activity with a view to achieving savings or increasing 
effectiveness; to propose solutions to the problems identified; and 
to implement agreed solutions within a strict time-scale. Where 
scrutinies unearthed institutional rigidities which impeded effective 
management, proposals were made for their removal and lessons were 
drawn for departmental management more generally (See Allen, 1981; 
Beesley, 1983). The individual scrutinies were supplemented by a 
series of multi departmental reviews. These involved inter 
departmental comparison of managerial methods (Metcalfe and Richards, 
1987a, pp.132-133). The Efficiency Unit's 1985 study, 'Making Things 
Happen' (Efficiency Unit, 1985), reported that from 1979 to 1984 
there had been 176 departmental scrutinies and 90 more had been 
conducted as part of multi- departmental reviews. These had 
identified savings and extra income worth £600 million and 
once-for-all savings of £67 million. However, of the total figure, 
only £300 million of savings had actually been achieved.
£145 million had been rejected as impractical or unacceptable and the 
remainder either awaited final decision or had yet to be implemented 
(see further Collins, 1987, pp.12-13).
Rayner sought consciously to overcome many of the difficulties which 
had beset his scrutinies' closest predecessor, PAR. PAR topics had 
been generally delineated. Scrutinies focused on the assessment of 
specific and observable activities. PAR's methodology had been ill 
defined. The Rayner methodology was limited and clear. Officers 
conducting PAR reviews had remained embedded in existing departmental 
structures. Rayner scrutineers reported directly to the central unit 
and to the Minister concerned. PAR reports had been secret.
Scrutiny results were made public. PAR had lost the support of the 
Prime Minister. Sir Derek Rayner and his successor, Sir Robin Ibbs,
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obtained access to the Prime Minister and possessed her unwavering 
confidence (Gray and Jenkins, 1985, pp.132-135).
Rayner's efficiency agenda went considerably wider than his scrutiny
programme. He wished not only to change the practice of management
in Whitehall but also to change its managerial culture (HC 236-11,
1982/83, p.88). He believed that there were a number of central
principles which should dictate the direction of administrative
reform. Ministers should be made to feel responsible for the
efficiency of their departments. The work of officials should be
governed by clear objectives. As far as possible, responsibility
should be pushed down the management line. Efforts to improve
efficiency should be tailored to the specific context in which they
were effected. In these principles the skeletal outline of the FMI
could be discerned. However, it was left to the Treasury to put the
flesh on the bones. The Thatcher Government did not enter office
with a clear and coherent programme of management reform. Its
primary objective was simply to reduce civil service numbers and
remould civil service management in the image of the private sector.
This it did through its twin strategies of slashing services and
lopping heads (Cooper, 1987, p.120). Beyond this, it had little idea
about the precise shape which management reform should take.
Treasury officials were quick to take advantage of this lacuna:
"We then had a visit one day from the PM and over 
luncheon at the top of the office she made it perfectly 
plain that something was going to happen about survey 
prices rather quickly. That precipitated the change to 
cash planning. We then said now we've got cash planning 
but it has become a very blunt instrument. There's not 
much intelligence left in it...And of course there was 
Rayner going on about efficiency and effectiveness and 
defining objectives and measuring outputs and all the 
rest of it. And so everything sort of crashed together 
into a realisation that somehow Treasury had got to take 
an initiative in order to get its status back up, in 
order to get the initiative over spending departments and 
to fend off the criticisms of Rayner. So through from 
November 1981 and early 1982 there was awful perpetual 
drafting and redrafting trying to produce a paper and 
what was finally issued by the PM in May bore all the 
marks of its rather shambolic origin."
(Treasury Under Secretary)
Thus, in May 1982, the Financial Management Initiative was bom and 
accountable management re-entered the administrative arena.
SECTION TWO: AUSTRALIA /
In Australia, the public service was subject to remarkably similar 
pressures to alter its traditional patterns of management. Events 
fell together to create a seemingly irresistible impulse for 
administrative reform. The Hawke Labor Government took up the 
cudgels for managerial change just as the Thatcher Government had
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done before it. Yet there were important differences between the 
British and Australian experience in this regard. These are 
significant in explaining why reform in Australia took hold more 
rapidly than it did in Britain.
1. The Economic Context
In common with other Western nations, Australia was subjected during 
the 1970s to a protracted period of stagflation. The OPEC oil 
crisis, the impact of the Vietnam war and a sharp increase in 
Commonwealth spending during the Whitlam Government combined to 
produce higher inflation, higher unemployment and a significant 
decline in economic growth (Walsh, 1979, pp.213- 215). The effects 
of these recessionary trends was lessened for a time when the second 
OPEC price rise in 1979 sparked a 'resources boom'. This, however, 
was shortlived. In the two years immediately preceding the election 
of the Hawke Government the Australian economy crashed. Unemployment 
increased to 10.3 per cent, inflation to 11.2 per cent and, fuelled 
by a severe drought, the nation's first negative growth outcome was 
recorded.
From mid-1983 until 1985/ the economy experienced a mild recovery due- 
to expansionary budgets brought down by both the Fraser and Hawke 
governments, the ending of the drought, and strong investment in 
housing and stock (Davis, 1989, p.79). Inflation declined and 
employment increased, mirroring changes elsewhere. However, the 
difficulties with the budget deficit continued unabated. Then, in 
the mid 1980s, the terms of trade moved sharply against Australia 
(Gruen, 1986, p.31). Export prices declined sharply^ relative to 
import prices. The price for world and hence Australian oil 
collapsed. Foreign indebtedness increased and the repayment of debt 
became more onerous as the Australian dollar depreciated 
considerably. Australia's manufacturing industry, which had been 
strongly protected, still lacked the capacity to compete effectively 
on foreign markets, thus denying Australia an alternative source of 
export growth. Taken together these factors prompted the then 
Treasurer, Hr Keating, to warn of the danger of the nation becoming a 
'banana republic'.
Despite these difficulties, public spending increased as a proportion 
of GDP in the Hawke Government's first two years. However, as the 
balance of payments situation worsened, the Government decided to cut 
back on spending in order to reduce the public sector borrowing 
requirement and provide an example of restraint. Therefore, in March 
1984, the Prime Minister announced his now famous trilogy of promises 
- that tax revenue would not increase as a proportion of GDP, that 
government expenditure would not increase as a proportion of GDP and
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that the budget deficit would be reduced as a proportion of GDP over
the life of the Parliament. Following the deterioration in the terms
of trade in 1985-1986, the Government took more drastic action. It
established a 'razor gang' the purpose of which was to cut $1000m
from public spending within a year. The razor gang adopted a
targeted approach to cuts, with areas of activity likely to advance
economic development hit less hard than others (Considine, 1990,
p.182). In addition, the Government pressed on quickly with its
plans to rationalise the public sector. In the Prime Minister's
mind, the need for public sector reform was linked directly to the
nation's economic difficulties:
"These decisions are an essential part of the
restructuring of the Australian economy, whieh^has been
made necessary by the decline of intematitmal commodity 
prices and their consequent effects on our economic 
circumstances. That restructuring must involve all 
sectors of the Australian economy including the public 
sector...The Australian Public Service must be able to 
take its place in the rebuilding of our manufacturing and 
industrial sectors required by Australia's current 
economic and social circumstances and our national 
aspirations."
(Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, Ministerial Statement 
on the Reform of the Australian Public Service, 
Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. vol. 150, p.1448)
The size of the Commonwealth's share of public sector spending as a 
proportion of GDP shrank dramatically from 31.1 per cent to 28.9 per 
cent by the end of the decade (Commonwealth of Australia, 1991a). As 
in Britain, the strong downward pressure on public expenditure in 
turn exerted heavy pressure on the administration to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency.
2. The Social Context.
The protracted economic downturn prompted Australians to reconsider 
the size and role of government at all levels. Traditionally, 
Australia had looked to government to stimulate its growth and 
development - to roll back its frontiers. But with economic 
deterioration and the break in faith with Keynesian prescriptions, 
Australians' attitude to the state began quickly to change. The 
collectivist values which had predominated in the past gave way, 
under the influence of monetarist doctrine, to individualist values 
of the market place. Australia's folk heroes changed from visionary 
social reformers to swashbuckling entrepreneurs. In intellectual 
circles the views of Hayek and Friedman quickly gained currency 
(Sawer, 1982, p.2). As in Britain, a clutch of right wing think 
tanks emerged in their wake. These published Hayek and Friedman's 
work, adding to it some notable Australian variants. The think tanks 
produced a torrent of material and, through journals such as
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'Quadrant,' progressively stole the march on Australian intellectual 
and economic debate.
Government was subjected to increased if ill-informed and
ideologically motivated criticism (Wilenski, 1986, p.26). Leviathan,
the Centre for Independent Studies argued, was out of control and
required restraint (James, 1987). The fact was that Australian
government did not take a large proportion of GDP by international
standards. Neither had the size of government increased
dramatically, as some critics implied (Freebaim, Porter and Walsh,
1987, p.41). Nevertheless, the small-government lobby became
increasingly influential. Economists argued that government was
crowding out the private sector and impeding economic growth (Emy and
Hughes, 1988, p.159). Management experts lauded the virtues of the
private sector and drew unfavourable, if often misguided, comparisons
with the public sector (see Wilenski, 1988, pp.218-221). These
currents, which first emerged in the pages of economic journals,
moved swiftly to capture attention in news periodicals and press
editorials. By the mid 1980s their influence was such that leaders
of both Conservative and Labor parties had been persuaded that the
public sector was too large, too costly and had to be reduced in
order to return economic prosperity.
"The country faced substantial economic problems and we 
just had to tackle them. The problems also took place 
against a background of concern with big government, 
whether our programmes had got to the stage of being 
beyond any control at all. So you can't isolate the FMIP 
and similar developments from prevailing ideological 
trends which we just had to respond to. Things like 
privatisation etc. are other attempts to solve what is 
now widely seen as the problem of big government."
(Deputy Secretary)
3. Political Pressures
Economic and social factors in turn shaped the political agenda for
administrative reform. The Labor Government in Australia pursued
reform with a zeal equal to that present in Britain under Margaret
Thatcher. But whereas the Thatcher reform programme was driven
principally by an ideological commitment to reducing the size of the
state, the Hawke Government's agenda, at least in the first three
years of the administration, was informed by a technocratic concern
for more effective administration:
"We are not tinkering with the government machine for the 
sake of it, or because other governments are doing it, or 
because of narrow political interests that might be 
defined as the need to be seen to be doing something. We 
are striving to improve the workings of the Canberra 
system and the quality of its outputs to the benefit of 
the whole Australian community... Equally we do not seek 
to make distinctions between a productive private sector 
and a non- productive public sector. The sectors just 
cannot be characterised in this way. So, as we are
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concerned about the state of the economy and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of private organisations, 
then we must be interested in the efficiency, 
responsiveness and effectiveness of public sector 
organisations."
(Dawkins, 1985, p.60)
Labor entered office with a comprehensive policy for public sector
management reform. In its policy statement, Labor and the Quality of
Government (Australian Labor Party, 1983), it proposed a
comprehensive set of measures for reforming the Canberra bureaucracy.
At the same time it sought to reassure the administration that its
intentions were benign not confrontational. The relationship between
the public service and the conservative Fraser Government had
deteriorated substantially as Fraser became increasingly strident in
his attacks on the public sector and adopted harsh measures to cut
back its growth. The Labor platform, by eschewing the use of staff
ceilings amongst other things, projected both a concern for the
traditions of the administration and a commitment to its improvement
(Weller, 1983, p.319):
"The major factor [promoting reform] was the change in 
the attitude of the Labor Government to the public 
service. There had traditionally been a lot of antipathy 
between Labor parties and the public service. The 
suspicion between them in the Whitlam times was seen by 
more thoughtful people in the party as being destructive.
In the period of the late 70s and early 80s, there were 
those in the party who realised they needed to have a 
rather more sophisticated approach, a strategic approach 
to how the public service should be managed to achieve 
political objectives."
(Departmental Secretary)
The Thatcher Government's reform agenda had been fashioned by 
individuals with close links to business and to right wing think 
tanks. The foundations for the Hawke Government's programme were 
laid by trusted and social democratically oriented advisers 
(Warhurst, 1988. p.344). Principal amongst these was Peter 
Wilenski, a former private secretary to Prime Minister Whitlam. 
Wilenski conducted a comprehensive review of the public 
administration in New South Wales in the late 1970s and Labor's 
policy was derived in large part from the recommendations of that 
review. Soon after the Government took the reins of administration, 
Wilenski was appointed by Hawke as Chairman of the Public Service 
Board. In another crucial appointment, Hawke appointed John Dawkins 
as Minister for Finance. Dawkins brought intelligence and energy to 
public service reform. The heads of the Departments of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, and Finance resigned during Hawke's 
first term. They were then replaced by officials with considerable 
sympathy towards the Government's administrative reform agenda. The 
new head of the Department of Finance, Dr. Michael Keating, had 
written previously on the problems of governmental overload (Keating,
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1984). He, in particular, was to have a very significant influence 
on the later course of managerial change.
The Hawke programme drew further inspiration from apparently 
successful attempts by recently elected Labor Governments in New 
South Wales and Victoria to modernise their administrative machinery 
(see Halligan and O'Grady, 1985; Considine 1990, p.174; Halligan and 
Power, 1990, pp.286-268). Reacting to the mistakes and excesses of 
the Whitlam era (see Thompson, 1979, p.70; Wilenski, 1986, p.117), 
State Labor governments had been at pains to present themselves to
the public as effective and prudent managers of the community's
resources. In this they had largely succeeded and their example was 
followed with alacrity by the Commonwealth (Wilenski, 1986, p.190).
The Government's reforms were brought down in an atmosphere of 
bipartisan support. David Connolly, the opposition spokesman on 
public service affairs, and himself the author of an influential
parliamentary report on civil service restructuring, reacted
favourably to the Government programme (Connolly, 1984; Thompson, 
1988, p.221). The public service also reacted positively regarding 
it as a generally sophisticated response to political and managerial 
difficulties (see Tange, 1984; Bailey, 1984; Caiden, 1990, p.13).
Four central themes dominated the Government's reform agenda (see 
Codd, 1991). First, a reduction in public expenditure had to be 
achieved. The Government therefore imposed cash limits and made deep 
but selective cuts to staff and programme expenditure. Second, the 
Government acted to reinforce ministerial control of departments 
(Dawkins, 1985, p.64; Wilenski, 1986, p.169). It strengthened the 
strategic capacity of the Cabinet, appointed consultants to 
ministers, increased governmental flexibility in the appointment of 
departmental secretaries and strengthened the role of Ministers in 
the allocation of departmental resources (see Hawke, 1989). Third, 
the Government wanted the administration to act more fairly towards 
its employees and the public. Consequently it introduced equal 
opportunity, industrial democracy and merit protection reforms. 
Finally, the management of the public service would be improved.
The structure of the budgeting process was overhauled and corporate 
management became the catchword of the eighties (Considine, 1988).
4. The Administrative Context
The Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration was 
established by the Whitlam Labor Government in 1974 and reported to 
the conservative Fraser Government in 1976. The five volume report 
examined almost every aspect of Commonwealth administration and in 
183 recommendations set down a blueprint for administrative reform
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(Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, 1976, 
pp.413-435). Like Fulton, the Commission, chaired by H.C. Coombs, 
argued that the substantial extension in the role of government as a 
provider of services to the community had made it essential that the 
quality of public management be improved. The structure and 
organisation of the administration was excessively centralised and 
hierarchical. Managerial responsibility in administration needed to 
be devolved and decentralised in order to increase managerial 
efficiency. Efficiency, Coombs believed, could be improved 
substantially if the principles of accountable management were 
adopted (Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, 
1976, p.36).
The Fraser Government did little to implement the Commission's 
recommendations. It preferred instead to concentrate its attention 
on cutting services and personnel and drawing the administration to 
account by developing Commonwealth administrative law (Thompson,
1979, pp.80-81). However, late in the Fraser Government's 
administration several factors contributed to a re-emergence of 
interest in public sector reform. The Government's image as a 
competent administrator was badly dented by a series of 
administrative scandals (Dickenson, 1984, p.44). The Labor Party 
attacked, turning administrative reform into an election issue 
(Nethercote, 1984b, p.31). To limit the damage, the Fraser 
Government established the Review of Commonwealth Administration, 
chaired by a businessman John Reid, to make recommendations to 
achieve a more efficient and effective public administration. In 
Reid's view, the service needed to upgrade the quality and experience 
of senior management, to grant greater independence to line 
departments and to engage in a concerted drive to improve personnel 
and financial management (Commonwealth of Australia, 1983a, pp.xvi- 
xvii). The Report recommended the establishment of a financial 
management improvement programme through which accountable management 
was to receive its reincarnation. In the same year the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Public Accounts published its report on the 
selection and development of senior managers in the Commonwealth 
public service (Joint Committee on Public Accounts, 1982; Self, 1983, 
pp.21-23; Wettenhall, 1986, pp.121- 123). Its principal 
recommendation was that a Senior Executive Service should be 
established. In this service a much higher priority should be given 
to the acquisition of skills in the management of large 
organisations.
In the administration too the first stirrings of reform had become 
evident. In part these were encouraged by a belated but timely 
recognition that Coombs' managerial recommendations now deserved more 
serious consideration-
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"You need to be careful about the FMIP because it didn't 
come solely out of the Labor reform movement. The reform 
movement had already begun. There had been Coombs and a 
series of other inquiries between 1976 and 1982 which had 
bred a concern here about the quality of financial 
management and the pressures on government to perform and 
to manage better and we realised that we'd have to 
respond. We were also concerned about big government, 
the tax revolution and other similar trends and in this 
context, the FMIP type initiatives fell quite easily."
(Deputy Secretary)
Senior officials also picked up quickly that the political
environment had changed, that the administrative scandals had
battered their reputation and that management, therefore, would need
to be lifted up the agenda. Many had also realised that existing
management practices had become anachronistic, falling behind
developments at State level and overseas. Problems of overload, a
lack of responsiveness to ministerial demands and the mismatch
between the demand for services and the resources available to meet
them had forced senior officials to rethink traditional methods of
public service organisation (Considine, 1990, pp.180-181).
"The other push was from the people in the service 
themselves who saw the current arrangements as stopping 
things being done. It was part of a trend towards 
clearer lines of control, rationalising the roles of 
central agencies and departments and loosening up the 
system. There was, in other words, a rationalist 
approach coming from within the service itself."
(Departmental Secretary)
5. The Government's Response
In December 1983, the Hawke Government released its White Paper 
entitled 'Reforming the Australian Public Service'. In it, the 
Government made plain its plans for the public sector. These were to 
develop an administration that was more responsible to Ministers and 
the Parliament; more efficient and effective; and fairer in the 
recruitment and management of its personnel (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1983b, p.1). The principal elements of the paper were 
embodied in legislation in June 1984. The Public Service Reform Act 
1984 strengthened the Government's hand in the appointment of 
Departmental Secretaries, established a Senior Executive Service, 
appointment to which would be by open competition and enshrined the 
merit principle. The Act also embraced the equity agenda. It 
provided that departments should formulate equal employment 
opportunity plans to promote the employment opportunities of 
designated groups and prohibited unjustified discrimination. The 
accompanying Merit Protection (Australian Government Employees) Act 
1984, established a merit protection agency to hear appeals against 
promotion and generally to oversee the fairness of the personnel 
management process.
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The improvement of efficiency through better resource allocation and 
priority setting formed the third component of the reform portfolio.
A new strategy review process was instituted for the Cabinet, the 
control of staffing and finance was integrated under the umbrella of 
the Department of Finance and departmental secretaries were required 
to prepare annual management improvement plans to facilitate 
ministerial involvement in departmental management.
The Government issued a second White Paper in 1984 entitled 'Budget 
Reform'. The paper announced that the budgetary process would be 
completely overhauled. The purpose of the overhaul was to ensure 
that budgetary priorities and governmental objectives coincided, to 
focus attention on the goals and objectives of particular programmes, 
to apply specific techniques aimed at improved performance and to 
establish machinery to ensure that programmes were regularly reviewed 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1984, pp.1-2). Soon after, Government 
introduced a new system of forward estimates, provided the Parliament 
with much more detailed management information, established programme 
budgeting, imposed cash limits and then implemented the Financial 
Management Improvement Program (see generally Howard, 1986a, 1986b; 
Halligan, 1987).
This first stage of reform was well received. There was bipartisan 
political support, with the conservative opposition applauding in 
particular measures to increase the accountability of the 
administration to both government and parliament (Connolly, 1984, 
pp.13-15). It was also greeted with approval by existing and former 
senior officials who compared it favourably with the negative and 
indiscriminate exhortations to do better with less which governed the 
management of the service in the Fraser period (Tange, 1984, 
pp.10-13).
The second phase of reform, which coincided with the Government's 
second term in office, was narrower in focus and more confrontational 
in style. Against a deteriorating economic background its principal 
agenda was economy. It began with a freeze on staff numbers and the 
creation of the razor gang. It continued with an attack on a civil 
service pay claim for an 8 per cent increase in wages. This resulted 
in a half-day public sector strike and the granting of minimal 
concessions by the Government preceding a radical alteration to the 
terms and conditions of public sector employment (Dickenson, 1986).
In November-December 1986, the Public Service Legislation 
(Streamlining) Act was introduced. The Act contained new provisions 
for the redeployment and retirement of staff. It gave departmental 
secretaries greater powers to reduce the classification of 
inefficient staff and to retire officers from the service because of
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inadequate performance. It withdrew rights of appeal over promotion. 
The legislation was supplemented by a number of administrative 
measures. The Government introduced an efficiency dividend of 1.25 
per cent per year on administrative expenditure. It also established 
an efficiency scrutiny unit on the Rayner model and employed a 
merchant banker and management consultant to run it. Introducing 
these measures the Prime Minister observed that the first stage of 
public service reform had provided considerable flexibility, 
independence and professional opportunities to the senior echelons of 
the public service. In the second stage, characterised by restraint, 
the Government expected a return on the initial investment.
Three days after its re-election in 1987, the Government invoked a 
third round of reform. This time it focused on the machinery of 
government. The twenty eight departments in existence before the 
election were collapsed into sixteen. A two tier system of ministers 
was created for the first time since Federation. The Public Service 
Board was abolished with most of its former functions being 
transmitted to the Department of Industrial Relations and the 
Department of Finance. Its reduced personnel and staffing 
responsibilities were vested in a much smaller office of Public 
Service Commissioner.
In the Prime Minister's view this rationalisation was required in 
order to effect administrative savings and efficiencies, better 
policy co-ordination and improved budgetary processes (Codd, 1988, 
p.25; Hamilton, 1990, p.64). However, the abolition of the Public 
Service Board and the concomitant increase in the power of the 
Department of Finance prompted one respected commentator to conclude 
that personnel management had not so much been streamlined as 
eclipsed (Nethercote, 1988, p.17). In one important respect, 
however, the commentator was wrong. Quite dramatic personnel changes 
had begun to occur during the Hawke administration.
To begin with the Prime Minister appointed John Dawkins, a 
technocratically oriented, politically skilled and visibly 
enthusiastic Minister to lead the reform endeavour. Dawkins then 
established and led a Public Service Support Group, the membership of 
which included the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and the Chairman of the Public Service Board to effect the 
programme set down in the party platform. Soon after, Peter Wilenski 
was appointed as the new Chairman of the Public Service Board, 
placing him in a pivotal position to chart the changes. Then, in 
1986, Michael Keating took over at the Department of Finance. 
Politically and administratively the balance of power had been tipped 
in favour of the reformers (Nethercote, 1984b, p.31; Warhurst, 1988, 
p.335; Caiden, 1990, pp.11-12).
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In the first years of the Hawke administration, a substantial number
of senior administrators chose to retire. The Government replaced
them with a younger, more managerially oriented cadre:
"There was a demographic shift. By the late 1970s the 
older guard had moved on and a lot of younger secretaries 
were coming on with economics training in particular.
There were also lots of efficiency types with commerce 
and accounting degrees emerging at the same time and 
this, combined with ...a general pressure on public 
expenditure, contributed to a feeling that the old days 
had gone."
(Deputy Secretary)
In five short years, the face of Canberra's administration was 
altered. Through the judicious use of its increased powers to 
appoint Departmental Secretaries, with the advent of the Senior 
Executive Service and with new powers to redeploy and retrench staff 
the Hawke Government effected a wholesale change in the composition 
of the senior Commonwealth bureaucracy. In 1988, of a sample of half 
of the administration's senior executives, 44 per cent were found to 
hold degrees in economics and commerce. The figure rose to 54 per 
cent when those with economics- accountancy backgrounds were 
included. It rose again to 72 per cent in the influential central 
departments (Pusey, 1991, p.59). The bias towards economics-business 
training contrasted strongly with the position in other OECD 
countries and particularly with Britain where a liberal education was 
still the preferred qualification. The new officials were much 
younger than their predecessors, most departmental secretaries, for 
example, being appointed in their mid-forties (Pusey, 1991, p.132). 
They brought with them an 'economic rationalist' outlook which 
inclined them to greater economic de-regulation, privatisation, 
smaller government and less welfare spending (Pusey, 1991, p.135). 
They were drawn to business culture (Pusey, 1991, p.115). Most 
importantly for present purposes they were enthusiastic about the 
Government's programme of administrative reform (Pusey, 1991, p.117).
Summary and Conclusion
The severity of the economic downturn which had begun in the late 
1970s provided the British and Australian governments with a very 
powerful incentive to rein in public expenditure and maximise public 
sector productivity. Further, their determination to reform their 
administrations was fuelled by a substantial change in the 
intellectual climate. With a decline of faith in Keynesian 
prescriptions, economic thinkers advocated market solutions to 
national economic problems. They saw government as a hindrance to 
the effective working of markets and argued, therefore, that state 
intervention in the economy should be minimised. The Thatcher and 
Hawke governments soon embraced the new orthodoxy. Consequently,
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they both set in place a wide-ranging series of reforms whose primary 
purpose was to make government smaller, leaner and more efficient.
The external stimuli for administrative innovation were similar in 
both countries. There were, however, some notable differences in the 
two governments' approaches to administrative reform. When 
the Hawke Government assumed office, it brought with it a detailed 
plan for civil service reorganisation. The Thatcher Government's 
proposals were cast much more generally. The Australian reform 
portfolio was more comprehensive than the British. Because it 
embraced a concern for democracy and equity as well as efficiency, 
the Hawke Government's agenda was accepted more readily in Canberra 
than the Thatcher Government's more punitive measures were in 
Whitehall. Mrs Thatcher's style was combative, Mr Hawke's was 
collaborative. Initially, therefore, less antagonism was generated 
to reform in Canberra. The Thatcher Government had no ready 
constituency within the civil service to activate change. Hawke 
quickly appointed political and administrative associates to 
positions of influence, thus establishing a strong coalition to 
promote the Government's programme. Each of these differences worked 
to the Hawke Government's advantage. Each played its part in 
creating an administrative environment which, both internally and 
externally, was conducive to change.
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CHAPTER 2
THE FMI, MINISTERS AND MANAGEMENT
In 1982, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee tabled its report 
on efficiency and effectiveness in the civil service (HC 236-1, 
1981/82). It made a number of significant recommendations. In the 
Committee's view, it was important that ministers should assume 
greater responsibility for the management of their departments. The 
effective management of departmental programmes, it believed, was at 
least as crucial to the country as the performance of ministers on 
the floor of the House. To assist ministers in the performance of 
their new managerial role, the Committee recommended that top 
management information systems such as MINIS be introduced in all 
departments.
Next, the Committee argued that line managers in the civil service 
should have increased power over the allocation of their resources. 
Therefore, it recommended that managerial authority should, as far as 
possible, be delegated from the centre of departments to operational 
managers. Then, it turned its attention to policy and programme 
expenditure. In this area it recommended that there should be an 
annual cycle of departmental programme reviews. The performance of 
each programme should regularly be evaluated and the results of the 
evaluations should be reported to the Management and Personnel Office 
and the Parliament. All these changes, the Committee believed, 
should be welded together through changes to personnel policy 
designed to encourage the promotion of good managers and the 
enhancement of their managerial skills.
The Financial Management Initiative (FMI) was the Thatcher
Government's response to these recommendations. The aim of the
Initiative was to:
"promote in each Department an organisation and system in 
which managers at all levels have:
1. a clear view of their objectives; and assess and 
wherever possible measure outputs or performance in 
relation to those objectives;
2. well defined responsibility for making the best use 
of their resources including a critical scrutiny of 
output and value for money; and
3. the information (including particularly about costs), 
training and access to expert advice which they need to 
exercise their responsibilities effectively."
(Cxnnd 8616, 1982, p.21)
The approach embodied in these principles differed markedly from 
traditional management in the civil service. This had been 
characterised by methods of organisation in which managers were 
encouraged to concentrate almost exclusively on the quality of
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service they were providing; to be relatively indifferent to the 
costs of providing that service; and to spend little time on weighing 
costs against results (Wilding, 1983b, p.6).
In summary, the FMI prescribed a system of management in which:
(i) Objectives are set and ranked at the apex of a department and 
framed in terms sufficiently specific to provide concrete guidance 
for action.
(ii) The department is divided into coherent managerial blocks or 
businesses, each of which is responsible for the achievement of 
specific objectives.
(iii) Each manager's objectives are clarified as is the extent and 
limits of his/her responsibilities. With that goes the definition of 
the manager's authority to take decisions about the use of resources 
he/she consumes in order to achieve them.
(iv) A chain of accountability is defined in which each manager is 
made responsible to the one person for his/her use of resources and 
programmatic performance.
(v) The manager's authority to take decisions is commensurate with 
his/her responsibility for action.
(vi) Information systems are established to permit Ministers, senior 
and junior managers alike to monitor their performance against 
targets and adjust their activities and resources accordingly.
(vii) Cost and programme information is brought together at the top 
of the department to enable consistent decision-making about future 
priorities and resource allocation (See similarly Hunt, 1986, p.170; 
Gray and Jenkins, 1988, p.171).
The new system could not be introduced overnight. A staged approach 
was necessary. Therefore, the Financial Management Unit (FMU), which 
had been created to steer the initiative, devoted its attention to 
three specific areas of development (see Financial Management Unit, 
1983, p.51; Cmnd 9058, 1983, p.3; Russell, 1984). First, following 
the Government's acceptance of the Committee's recommendation with 
respect to MINIS, the unit began work to introduce top management 
systems in each Whitehall department (Cmnd 8616, 1982, p.8: Cmnd 
9058, 1983, p.5; Financial Management Unit, 1983, p.24). Next, the 
FMU focused on the delegation of managerial responsibility. In 
co-operation with departments it established a number of experimental 
projects in delegated budgetary control and worked intensively on the 
design for decentralised management accounting systems (see 
Chipperfield, 1983, pp.26-29). Then, the evaluation of programmes 
was addressed. The Government had not accepted the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee's recommendation for a structured cycle of 
review. Instead the FMU was charged with the responsibility of 
developing and introducing effective techniques to assess whether
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programmes were achieving their objectives and providing value for 
money.
Early governmental reports were candid about the political, 
institutional and methodological obstacles which stood in the path of 
managerial change. This candour lay in stark contrast to the public 
relations character of the Government's later papers. The early 
reports drew attention to a host of difficulties with which 
management reformers would have to grapple. In summary these were as 
follows:
(i) The Conservative Government had imposed tight controls on 
numbers of civil service personnel. Yet these controls went 
against the grain of according to departmental managers the 
flexibility to vary the mix of resources at their disposal (Cmnd 
9058, 1983, p.13).
(ii) A balance needed to be struck between flexibility within 
budgets, which increased the responsibility of each manager for the 
use of resources, and flexibility between budgets, preserving for 
senior management the ability to adjust the allocation of resources 
during the budget year (Cmnd 9058, 1983, p.14). Similarly, a balance 
needed to be struck between departmental flexibility and Treasury's 
desire to exercise strict control of public expenditure.
(iii) If delegation were to be successful, the performance of 
programmes needed accurately to be assessed. Developing adequate 
measures of performance, particularly of the quantitative kind, posed 
formidable methodological problems (Financial Management Unit, 1983,
p.10)
(iv) One important although long term objective of the reforms was to 
combine management and budgetary planning. To do this the timetables 
for the two needed to be combined but this posed considerable 
logistical difficulties (Financial Management Unit, 1983, p.37).
(v) Ultimately, the success of the reforms would depend upon the 
ability of the reformers to change entrenched civil service 
attitudes. Whether the changes proposed would, of themselves, be 
sufficient to shift these attitudes was an issue in the forefront of 
the FMU's thinking as it embarked on what everyone recognised would 
be thoroughly daunting task (Financial Management Unit, 1983, p.43).
SECTION ONE: THE FMI THROUGH THE REPORTS
Between 1982 and 1985 a series of reports appeared which summarised 
and assessed the FMI's progress from the Government's perspective. 
This perspective is interesting because it painted an optimistic 
picture of the initiative's development and influence. Only later, 
with the conduct of official evaluations, did cracks begin to appear 
in the facade. Here the official version is briefly considered so
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that it may later be compared and contrasted with the findings of 
this study.
1. Top Management Systems
One of the first assessments to appear was the Financial Management 
Unit's report on the development and operation of top management 
systems (Financial Management Unit, 1984a). The unit reported that 
most departments had installed systems which covered both 
administrative and programme expenditure and which included 
information covering both past performance and plans for the future. 
However, further development was required to clarify 
intra-departmental objectives and to effect the assignment of 
managerial responsibilities for programmes as well as administration. 
Considerable work also needed to be done to create effective links 
between top management systems, PESC and Estimates. The 1984 White 
Paper (Cmnd 9297, 1984) found similarly that solid progress had been 
made with MINIS type systems. Each department, it said, had taken 
steps to introduce a top management system. The systems had 
established a useful framework within which ministers and senior 
officials could take informed decisions on resource allocation and 
effect appropriate changes in departmental organisation.
During 1984, the FMU undertook a detailed survey of top management 
systems in five departments. It reported that the systems were by 
then well established (Financial Management Unit, 1985a). Their use, 
however, needed still to be refined to permit top management to set 
plans for improved performance and value for money; to allocate 
personnel and other resources (including programme expenditure) and 
to review subsequent progress. By the time of the National Audit 
Office (NAO) report on the FMI (HC 588, 1986/87) the Joint Management 
Unit (JMU), which had succeeded the FMU was doing little work in 
connection with Top Management Systems. This, the NAO reported, 
reflected the considerable degree of progress which had been made by 
departments in installing and operating systems which had already 
proven of benefit to ministers and senior officials alike (HC 588, 
1986/87, p.17).
2. Delegation
In 'Budgetary Control Systems' (Financial Management Unit, 1984b) the 
Financial Management Unit produced a guide to instruct departments on 
how they should proceed with the delegation of financial 
responsibility. The Unit proposed that departments take time to 
develop a strategy, compatible with the framework established by top 
management systems, for decentralising budgetary responsibilities 
from central resource divisions to senior line management and their
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subsequent delegation even further down the line. Only when such a 
strategy was agreed could the specification of cost centres and the 
assignment of managerial responsibility proceed effectively.
In 1985, the FMU examined the issue of delegation from a different 
perspective - that of the Principal Finance Officer. In its report 
'Resource Allocation in Departments: The Role of the Principal 
Finance Officer' (Financial Management Unit, 1985b) the unit drew 
from the experience of a number of departments to elaborate upon the 
role which the Principal Finance Officer should play in an 
environment of delegated managerial control. It proposed that PFOs 
should forego their detailed controls in favour of playing an active 
role in setting and monitoring the achievement of value for money 
targets for programme and administrative expenditure. It had 
previously recommended that Treasury adopt a similar stance in 
relation to departments. Treasury it said should exercise aggregate 
control through cash limits and personnel numbers. Beyond this, 
departments should be given block budgets for administrative 
expenditure, leaving them maximum scope for the internal allocation 
of their running costs (Financial Management Unit, 1983, p.37).
3. Policy Evaluation and Programme Expenditure
In 'Policy Work and the FMI', the FMU identified a number of problems 
with arose when programmes had not been systematically evaluated 
(Financial Management Unit, 1985c). Programmes had been misdirected 
or outdated, insufficient information had been generated to assess 
their value and without adequate information, officials had not been 
able adequately to advise the Minister about criticisms of existing 
policy. Therefore, it recommended that new policy initiatives 
brought before Cabinet should specify their objectives in terms of 
'what will be achieved, by when and at what cost'. Subsequently each 
such initiative should be evaluated in the terms outlined (HC 588, 
1986/87, p.19).
4. Governmental Evaluations
The early White Papers and official reports presented a picture of 
steady and substantial progress. Even where difficulties occurred 
they were minor and would be overcome given time. The conclusions 
could hardly be otherwise. The reports were produced by the 
management reformers themselves. However, four years after its 
commencement, the initiative was examined and evaluated more 
independently. The evaluations demonstrated that results were more 
mixed than outside observers had previously been led to believe.
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The Government Accountant, Anthony Wilson, was the first to report 
(H.H. Treasury, 1986a). He led a team which examined the operation 
of delegated budgetary control systems in six central departments.
He concluded that there were healthy signs of progress in the 
delegation of running cost controls. Operational managers had become 
more cost-conscious. Savings had been made and budgetary discipline 
had stimulated local managers to reorganise their work and improve 
services. Nevertheless, progress between departments had been 
variable and the 'laggards [could] do much to accelerate their 
progress by using the developmental work and experience already 
gained elsewhere.1 (H.M. Treasury, 1986a, p.2). The report 
concluded that to be effective, budgeting must secure the firm 
commitment and close involvement of senior management, strong 
connections must develop between budgets, outputs and results, and 
the environment created by central agencies must be continuously 
supportive. However, beneath these prescriptions lay more 
fundamental criticisms of the FMI's progress.
Wilson found that top officials had not been sufficiently involved in 
the budgetary reforms. They had not appreciated the importance of 
becoming managers (Richards, 1987, p.34). They had not exercised 
budgetary responsibilities themselves. They had not used top 
management systems to set objectives, match resources and allocate 
responsibilities. They had not participated adequately in the 
assessment of budgetary performance. Although coated in duly 
respectful language, these criticisms were substantial. Wilson 
argued that greater emphasis should be placed upon the development of 
output and performance measures. He recognised that these presented 
methodological difficulties, particularly when applied to policy 
work. He contended, however, that these difficulties were matters of 
degree rather than principle. Finally, his report addressed problems 
in the budgetary environment. It declared that manpower limits and 
centrally imposed pay assumptions had 'represented the most serious 
detraction from the credibility and realism of the whole budgetary 
process'. (H.M. Treasury, 1986a, p.17). As departmental planning 
systems became more sophisticated, Wilson proposed that central 
agencies should be considerably more willing than they had been to 
cede control.
The Wilson report was subjected to concerted criticism in Whitehall. 
Treasury disliked its conclusions, not least because the report 
reiterated that central controls must be relaxed (Richards, 1987, 
p.35). The much more positive review by the National Audit Office 
found greater favour. The NAO's report was based on an evaluation of 
the FMI's progress in 12 government departments. The report 
concluded that considerable advances had been made in the development 
of suitable management systems. No serious shortcomings had emerged
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in the departments which had been examined (HC 588, 1986/87, p.11). 
Nevertheless, more could clearly be done. The NAO found that all 
departments had developed top management systems which supported the 
setting of objectives, decisions on priorities, the allocation of 
resources and the review of activities. Nevertheless, departmental 
objectives needed to be formulated more clearly; objectives needed 
harmonisation at successive departmental levels; and in many 
departments integration had not yet been achieved between top 
management and budgetary systems. The Office found that all 
departments had introduced budgetary control systems for their 
administration costs. But the range of costs covered by budgetary 
systems varied considerably within and between participating 
departments. Further, there was an emerging danger that holding 
managers accountable for costs, e.g. manpower costs, over which 
their control was limited may prejudice management's acceptance of 
the systems. Echoing the remarks of the Wilson report, the NAO also 
recommended that considerably greater emphasis be placed on the 
development of effective indicators of performance. It pointed to 
methodological difficulties inherent in the evaluation of programmes. 
Nevertheless, it concluded that programmes should be reviewed 
regularly and, in the first instance, reviews should focus on 
programmes whose objectives could clearly be defined and which 
offered good prospects for improving value for money.
Why were these reports so different ? In part the difference can be
explained by the fact that, in its reports, the NAO is unable to
question the basis of existing Treasury policy. It is confined to
determining whether or not a policy is operating effectively. Since
Treasury had already accepted departmental plans of work, the NAO was
hardly likely to denigrate them (Flynn et al., 1988, p.184). The
supportive tone of the NAO's report may also have been related to the
close relationship which existed between the Comptroller and
Auditor-General, Gordon Downey, and the Head of the Efficiency Unit,
Sir Robin Ibbs, for whom he had worked (Hennessy, 1990, p.614).
Departmental officials are traditionally reticent, even defensive, in
the face of inquiries from Auditor. Defences may have been down whenA
the Wilson team conducted its less formal inquiries. The NAO too 
must tread carefully with departmental officials fearing that, if 
criticisms are framed too harshly, departmental co-operation might in 
future be less forthcoming. The Wilson team were insiders examining 
what was happening inside. The NAO's officers were outsiders relying 
heavily on second hand information.
The two reports were, in effect, refereed by the Committee of Public 
Accounts (HC 61, 1986/87). It conducted its own examination of the 
FMI based on the NAO's findings. It was less hesitant than the 
Office had been to criticise. The committee observed that
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departments had been developing their new management systems for 
nearly five years but not all had progressed as quickly as they 
should have. For many departments full implementation was still many 
years away. Similarly it concluded that delegated budgetary control 
systems had taken so long to develop that support for delegation in 
departments had been significantly retarded. The committee turned 
its attention to policy evaluation and programme expenditure. It 
endorsed strongly the Government's requirement that for new policy 
initiatives and reviews of existing policy, objectives should be set 
in terms of what would be achieved, by when and at what cost. In a 
not so subtle rebuke to the constant governmental emphasis on 
efficiency, the committee concluded by expressing its view that the 
FMI should be concerned as much with obtaining improved value for 
money by providing better quality services as with the achievement of 
savings through greater efficiency.
The FMI which emerged from these external evaluations was a 
distinctly more tarnished reform than earlier governmental 
assessments had been willing to admit. Certainly progress had been 
made but it was patchy. Many fundamental problems remained 
unresolved even five years after the initiative had been announced. 
Why, after such a lengthy period, was this so ? In the remainder of 
this chapter that question will be addressed through an examination 
of how ministers and officials in Whitehall reacted to the advent of 
Heseltine inspired Top Management Systems.
SECTION TWO: MINIS AND MINISTERS
The MINIS system was introduced to the Department of the Environment
by Michael Heseltine. Heseltine, who had a background of management
in the private sector, wanted to create a management information
system specifically applicable to the exigencies of government
(Heseltine, 1980):
"When I came to the Department of the Environment I was 
very aware that I was taking over responsibility for an 
enormous department with a vast range of responsibilities 
divided... into many directorates. In the nature of 
things, ...I knew it would be impossible for me to know 
what the Department was actually doing...So from a very 
early stage in conjunction with my then Permanent 
Secretary and the senior officials we set out to create 
an information system which would reveal and cost the 
totality of a government department. This I thought was 
an essential precondition for Ministers to be able to 
make decisions about the totality of their 
responsibilities."
(HC 236-11, 1981/82, p.158)
Heseltine found it hard to determine who was finally responsible for 
the conduct of many departmental activities and whether certain
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activities should be conducted at all. Therefore, he commissioned a 
Rayner team to study what information departmental Ministers required 
to manage their departments. It recommended that a new top 
management information system be established. MINIS was designed to 
provide Ministers and senior officials with systematically presented 
information which would enable them to review priorities, set 
objectives and allocate resources (Likierman, 1982, p.130). It would 
describe how work was organised and who was responsible for doing it. 
Each year, departmental activities, performance and future plans 
would be assessed in particular to determine whether value for money 
was being achieved. Specific areas of work would be selected for 
detailed scrutiny. New departmental priorities would be set and 
resources would then be allocated in accordance with them (Financial 
Management Initiative, 1984a, Ch.5).
In Whitehall the advent of MINIS was not greeted with universal 
acclaim. Senior officials giving evidence before the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee (see, for example, the evidence of Sir Frank 
Cooper, HC 236-11, 1981/82, p.415) argued that they were already 
doing much the same thing; that the system may not be transferable; 
and that its applicability was heavily dependent on the personality 
of its sponsoring Minister (Likierman, 1982, p.130). Others 
questioned whether the return from introducing comprehensive 
reporting in some areas e.g. policy areas, would justify its 
expense. In their view, principles of financial management should be 
applied only in areas of expenditure where they were directly 
relevant, for example, in operational areas (Minutes, Meeting of 
Permanent Secretaries, 7 April 1982). Many Ministers also lacked 
enthusiasm. Explaining the system to Ministerial colleagues in a 
meeting at Downing Street, Mr Heseltine found that there were 'few 
takers'. However, Mrs Thatcher strongly supported it. (Shades of a 
Home Counties Boudicca, The Times, 17 May 1983, p.5). The Prime 
Minister's exhortation ensured that other members of Cabinet fell 
into line.
1. The Minister as Manager
"It comes down to different attitudes on the part of the 
civil service towards Ministers about things managerial. 
Ministers don't actually give a toss about management 
because they don't understand or know anything about 
management in our system. They are interested in good 
management, yes, but there it stops. Even people like 
Michael Heseltine who have done much to improve it are 
not interested in the nitty gritty. After that, he 
doesn't want to know and why should he ? He's got plenty 
of work to do with politics."
(Deputy Secretary)
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Sir Derek Rayner had argued that Ministers needed to take a much 
closer interest in the management of their departments. Their 
involvement in politics and policy was not enough. Ministers should 
also ensure that departmental resources were marshalled effectively 
to achieve their political objectives (Hennessy, 1990, p.608). In 
response to parliamentary questioning the Government endorsed this 
view. The then Minister responsible for the civil service, Mr 
Hayhoe, proclaimed that ministerial involvement in management was 
central to the FMI's success.
Disputing claims that, like other Whitehall reforms, the FMI would 
wither on the vine, Mr Hayhoe reaffirmed the Government's strong 
commitment to a managerial approach and cited the personal interest 
of Ministers in management as a powerful reason why the FMI would 
thrive where other similar reforms had perished (Hansard, House of 
Commons, 28 October 1983, cols.557- 558).
Not long after the FMI's introduction it became evident to senior
civil servants that not all Ministers were managerial enthusiasts.
Rather, their interest was variable:
"I don't think that I am particularly optimistic with our 
present group of Ministers. If you had Heseltine or 
Patrick Jenkin or I don't know...I think they would take 
it more to heart than Norman Fowler. I'm not criticising 
Norman Fowler...It's just that Mr Fowler's working method 
is completely different and I don't think management is 
close to his heart."
(Deputy Secretary)
At least one expressed dismay that the role had been cast upon him:
"As a matter of fact I didn't come into politics to be a 
manager and do you know, I've never been trained as one."
(Minister quoted by a Deputy Secretary)
From the outset, the diffident response of Ministers to management
generally and to top management systems in particular slowed their
incorporation into mainstream administration. The object of the
systems was to assist Ministers to manage - to make better decisions
about departmental priorities. If Ministers lacked interest the
success of the systems would be undermined:
"I think it is dependent on Ministerial support. It has 
to be. Both in the creation of and maintenance of 
information systems, and the way in which they are used - 
if Ministers don't take an interest in setting up and 
keeping in good trim a system which is going to ensure 
that costs are properly allocated and information about
the use of resources is fed up to the centre, the thing
will fade"
(Former Under Secretary)
Soon after the FMI's introduction, however, considerable doubt had 
emerged among officials regarding Ministers' willingness and ability
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to assume managerial leadership. There were a number of aspects to 
their scepticism. First, officials questioned whether Ministers were 
really interested in better management or whether, in the 
alternative, they were primarily concerned with cutting back services 
(Reed and Ellis, 1987, p.181-2; HC 61, 1986/87, Evidence provided by 
the Council of Civil Service Unions, p.18). Certainly, if the latter 
was the case, top management systems provided them with the 
information to do so.
"Some Ministers are interested but not in a very 
constructive way. It was fascinating really because 
Patrick Jenkin and Heseltine simply said 'don't talk to 
me about priorities, I tell you - and halve that man's 
staff"
(Under Secretary)
Second, civil servants criticised the practice of ministerial
management. According to the theory of top management systems,
Ministers should make logical choices between available alternatives
by assessing the consequences of each in accordance with a common
means of comparison. This method of deduction was explicitly
endorsed by the Government's White Papers on management reform. But
soon, officials' observations of Ministerial behaviour began to
dispirit them. Speaking of Mrs Thatcher, for example, one Under
Secretary railed that she:
"thinks the right way to take a decision is to 
pronounce...We will abolish x, we will abolish y. She 
listens to people who are as prejudiced and ignorant as 
she - no one is then prepared to bell the cat until with 
any luck some Minister will try to scramble out of what 
has been decreed with some cobbled up scheme...I mean the 
idea that you assemble your relevant facts, do deductive 
and inductive reasoning and then derive a range of 
options and rank them by whatever criteria of social and 
economic efficiency and political acceptability are 
available seems to be beyond her."
(Under Secretary)
Third, top management systems were designed to provide Ministers with
a comprehensive overview of their departments. The idea was that,
surveying their territory, Ministers would be in a better position to
make strategic decisions. However, even the more managerially minded
Ministers failed to take the wider view. Instead, they tended to use
the information to intervene selectively in aspects of departmental
operation which caught their interest:
"At MOD, [Heseltine] used the MINIS system as a means of 
intervening in different levels of the department simply 
as a tool in the old style system of buggering people 
about and not as a management tool at all in the sense 
which is envisaged."
(former Under Secretary)
Fourth, the FMI's designers had expressed the fond hope that top 
management systems would encourage Ministers to make more rational
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decisions with respect to departmental priorities. Provided with the
detailed information on which to base their preferences Ministers
could take the hard decisions required to redirect departmental
operations. Ministers, however, showed little sign of doing so:
"I think I should register the point that at the end of 
the day the test of much of what we are doing will be in 
the willingness of Ministers to accept that resource 
implications should play a more important role in policy 
decisions than they have in the past. A willingness to 
reduce functions or publicly to defend a lower quality of 
service would be significant and useful signals from 
Ministers, including those responsible for the central 
departments."
(Minute from Permanent Secretary, 12 December, 1983)
Fifth, Ministers found themselves in a dilemma when asked to define
their objectives precisely. On the one hand, by specifying
departmental objectives and targets, Ministers could provide their
departments with greater direction about what they wished to achieve.
Patrick Jenkin's specification of objectives for the Department of
Trade and Industry was one example of this. On the other hand, the
same objectives locked Ministers into a particular course and raised
the prospect that they might be criticised if targets were not met.
Some Ministers were, therefore, distinctly reticent about committing
themselves in the manner that top management systems required:
"Ministers show no wish to define the objective of the 
(x) programme more precisely ...As they wish to retain 
flexibility on the weighting to be given to the three key 
factors (developmental, political, commercial) in any 
particular situation the scope for sharper definition is 
limited.both with regard to overall policy and at a 
disaggregated level."
(Permanent Secretary's minute, 9 December 1983)
Sixth, and for similar reasons, there was significant consternation 
both amongst Ministers and senior officials about the prospect that 
top management system documents would be published. The reservation 
stemmed in part from the understandable desire not to disclose 
departmental decisions and activities which needed remain 
confidential. It also related to the concern beth of Ministers and 
officials that to reveal inadequacies in departmental performance to 
the parliamentary and public eye may cause them considerable 
embarrassment.
Seventh, officials and Ministers brought different time perspectives 
to bear. Managerially minded officials hoped that top management 
systems would help them to plan and achieve their long term 
operational goals. For them, the systems were a strategic tool. 
Ministers by contrast, used them to assist with the achievement of 
short-term political objectives. For them, top management systems 
provided tactical assistance. The different perspectives were 
constantly in conflict:
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"Top management systems are essentially designed to look 
at long-term objectives. They provide you with 
assistance on short-term objectives, to tell you if you 
are doing something downright stupid but they are not 
designed for short-term tactical manoeuvring. Ministers,
I think, are primarily interested in the short and medium 
term. That is the political horizon. There are notable
exceptions but they are rare. Therefore, they are in
fact using the systems for short-term tactical purposes 
rather than long-term direction."
(Under Secretary)
Finally, Ministers' problems with top management systems were 
compounded by the fact they did not have the time to become too 
closely involved with managerial issues. Each already had 
substantial responsibilities to Cabinet, parliament, constituency and 
party. As the most recent interloper, management was the last item 
squeezed in and the first item squeezed out of Ministerial 
priorities:
"All the experience so far is that where this reaches 
Ministers at all, there is forty minutes between two hour 
tightly scheduled meetings and then ten minutes are spent 
on jocular asides and half an hour on the work. Well you 
cannot find this a useful tool."
(Under Secretary)
High rates of ministerial turnover also made it difficult if not 
impossible for Ministers to engage in strategic management.
Ministers could not be expected to use the systems strategically when 
on average they remained with a department for two years or less (see 
Cooper, 1987, p.123).
The volume of material generated by most top management systems in
their early years was such that Ministers blanched at the task of
comprehending it. MINIS in the Department of the Environment
produced five volumes of summarised information for the Minister's
consideration. It was only towards the end of the decade that the
size of reports was substantially reduced:
"When Heseltine was at the DOE, he was unable to digest 
the material presented to him. He couldn't digest half 
the stuff."
(former Under Secretary)
In theory, top management systems provided Ministers with the means 
to increase their control and direction of departments. Properly 
applied, however, they set limits on ad hoc ministerial intervention. 
For the systems to retain their credibility as a framework for 
action, Ministers as well as civil servants had to abide by the 
system's rules (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987a, p.74). In the event, 
civil servants were not persuaded that Ministers had the capacity or 
inclination to do so. Their instincts were not primarily managerial, 
their priorities differed and time constrained their involvement.
So, instead of using top management systems to provide themselves
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with a comprehensive overview of departmental operations as the
precursor to establishing their priorities, Ministers used them to
intervene in selected parts of departmental operations in which they
had a particular interest or which took their fancy:
"...so it changed its character into a diagnostic 
instrument from which issues would be flushed for 
consideration and in that sense it was good. But it's no 
longer an element in an integrated management system.
It's an occasional dipstick."
(Under Secretary)
2. Top Management Systems and Senior Officials
"These systems are only as good as the people who use 
them, the top managers. And frankly, Ministers and
senior civil servants have got other things to do__
Their job is not just running the department, its running 
the country."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
With rare exceptions, Ministers did not engage with top management 
systems. Therefore, the task of their maintenance and use fell to 
the senior management of departments. They were charged with the 
responsibility of implementing the new systems. This they did, 
appointing financial management co-ordination units under the 
supervision of Principal Finance and Establishments Officers, to draw 
up and execute departmental plans of work. Yet, senior officials 
themselves shared some of their Ministers' disquiet about the value 
to be attached to the systems in particular and to management more 
generally.
Senior officials had been bom and raised as the Minister's principal 
advisers on policy. For most, management was of secondary 
importance, a task which was delegated to Principal Finance and 
Establishments Officers. Just as making Ministers into managers had 
proven a difficult enterprise, so too the conversion of top officials 
was slow in coming. In a lively pamphlet, Ponting argued that the 
continuing devotion of senior officials to advising Ministers and 
developing policy doomed the FMI to fail as an exercise to turn 
senior civil servants into resource managers and directors of 
executive operations. The tasks the initiative sought to impose 
were, in his view, seen by top management as at best peripheral and 
at worst pointless (Ponting, 1989, p.69). The evidence in this 
survey suggests similarly that top management systems were given only 
passing attention in senior echelons.
Like Ministers, most senior officials had not been trained in 
management. Certainly, in accordance with the generalist tradition 
they were expected to become familiar with all aspects of the 
governmental machine. In practice, however, this meant that they
44
should devote their primary attention to developing their policy
skills and political acumen. Where managerial skills were required
they could be picked up on the job:
"People at this age (35-45) have done almost no 
management development training at all....I, for example, 
was thrown into the Principal Establishments Officer job 
without ever having done establishments work in my life 
before."
(Deputy Secretary)
As with Ministers, senior officials did not see management as being
as interesting as the more political aspects of their work. It was
in that arena that they obtained their principal rewards. It was in
that arena that they could exercise the greatest degree of influence.
Management, by contrast, was more routine, less exciting. It was not
what most high flying officials had joined to do. It was not
primarily what they were promoted for. It was not where their
priorities lay:
"Management is a tiresome business, nobody goes into it 
unless they have to."
(Deputy Secretary)
Political acuity and managerial expertise did not necessarily go hand
in hand. Most often they required distinctive competencies and
distinctive attitudes, in the view of several officials it was a
mistake to presume that the talents of political adviser and
executive director could easily be melded in the one personality:
"What we've developed is men of considerable caution who 
can see all the twenty sides of a question at once; who 
won't drive by the seat of their pants - they tend to be 
intellectuals, contemplative, unflapping and safe. But 
to manage a government department requires quite 
different qualities from these. They are creativity, 
drive, lots of energy and need different sorts of people 
- positive, extrovert, able to talk to people at lower 
levels, visit them at their stores etc ...I wonder 
whether you can in fact combine the two."
(Deputy Secretary)
In their world-weary fashion, senior administrators also doubted the
capacity of the new systems to deliver the more rational decisions
which they promised. In the intensely political environment
inhabited by Ministers and senior civil servants the scope for
changing fundamentally the way in which decisions on resources were
made seemed to top officials to be very small indeed:
"It doesn't do to be too starry eyed about what will 
actually happen because this is a political process and 
it's in the nature of political operators that they tend 
to take their decisions on this sort of thing at the last 
minute... that's my main criticism, its how politics has 
to work and very often these political imperatives won't 
have an awful lot to do with the painstaking cost benefit 
analysis which officials have done down the line. So 
that I think it would be silly to look for a great new 
era of rationalism in public expenditure."
(Deputy Secretary)
45
In policy divisions in particular, officials regarded the new 
managerial innovations sceptically. These officials acted as the 
Minister's political antennae, sensing shifts in political 
structures, economic conditions, social movements, consumer demands 
etc. and attempting to translate these changes into workable policy 
and programmes. The work, in their view, was not and could not be 
routinised. It was not inherently rational (see Smith, 1976, 
pp.140-141). Objectives were difficult to set because they changed 
frequently, according to political dictates and social pressures. 
Targets moved as problems were redefined. Evaluation was problematic 
since it was frequently the political solution of the instant which 
mattered, not its outcome in the months and years ahead. The 
problems of applying the new managerial precepts were, therefore, 
formidable:
"The nature of our work is so essentially governed by 
Ministers and news and policies and serving political 
ends and reacting to pressure and so on and we have 
economic policies and so much reactive operation that 
these (managerial) concepts are going to be so much more 
difficult...what happens to a perfectly responsible and 
capable manager who puts down in his annual report this 
year six objectives every one of which is cut through 
immediately by the next budget and the next public 
expenditure cuts. That is going to be very difficult.
And I want to associate with that there is a very real 
dichotomy between the professions of Ministers and their 
actions in this respect."
(Under Secretary)
In policy divisions it was the form rather than the substance of top 
management systems that was adhered to. Officials complied with the 
terms of the exercise but, feeling it to be of marginal relevance to 
their work, they did not appear to regard it particularly seriously.
3. Management Information Systems at Operation Level
As a general principle, then, the closer one came to the political
process, the more difficult the application of managerial principles
and systems appeared to become. However, this left that very
substantial portion of civil service work, the delivery of
governmental services, open to improvement. It was in areas of
executive operations that the FMI made its most substantial gains:
"The actual progress of the initiative.... does vary 
very much according to department and even within 
departments because it is rather easier ...to apply the 
principles in executive areas where the task is quite 
clearly defined and it is a question of managing and 
organising it in the most efficient and effective way.
It is rather more difficult in policy areas and perhaps 
most difficult of all where you are responsible for a 
policy which is actually executed by someone else."
(HC 61, 1986/87, Ann Moullem CB, Minutes of Evidence, p.3)
fiUt&JJ-CA
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Operational managers and government consultants put to print 
extolling the virtues of the system in clarifying objectives, 
encouraging thrift, effecting better organisational design and 
promoting organisational cohesion (see, for example, Whitbread, 1987; 
Clark, 1988; Killykelly, 1988). In the Newcastle office of the 
Department of Social Security, for example, Thorpe Tracey concluded 
that the principal achievement of the FMI was that it had enabled the 
organisation systematically to rank objectives and match resources to 
them so that it was then in a better position to advise Ministers 
about what could and could not be done within a given level of 
resources (Thorpe Tracey, 1987, p.335). This he contrasted with the 
previous system under which there had been no formal means of setting 
objectives, allocating resources to achieve them and monitoring the 
outcome. In short, the system had introduced a more methodical 
approach to management in very important areas of departmental work.
At operational level, the preparation of top management system
reports required managers to think through more closely the purposes
of their work and to set individual and unit achievement targets. No
longer would it be enough for an executive officer in a local DSS
office to regard his or her job as simply to supervise the clearance
of claims. The officer was now required to think through 'what he
was expected to do, what he was seeking to deliver, what he was
signed up to be judged on' (Deputy Secretary). Further, the location
of each individual's work within a broader divisional and
departmental context contributed to the development of a shared and
more purposeful identity:
"The major (change] is in the development of an overall 
more business-like attitude. It's the growth of 
corporate identity and the corporate spirit, a sharpness 
of approach, a general appreciation that you only make 
the best of what you've got by acting collaboratively 
under strong central direction."
(Under Secretary)
At the top level of operational departments, the contribution of top 
management systems was more limited. Their value did not rest in 
providing new and compelling management information on the basis of 
which better managerial decisions could be made. Rather the creation 
of a cycle of review provided the management board with the incentive 
to pause, if only once a year, to reassess the allocation of 
departmental resources in the light of changing departmental 
priorities (see Tomkys, 1991, p.260).
"Certainly it improved, although ephemerally, the way in 
which we thought about tasks. But, like an awful lot of 
Whitehall initiatives it became over-bureaucratised."
(Deputy Secretary)
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4. Technical Considerations
Over-bureaucratisation was one of several major technical problems
which impeded the usefulness of MINIS type systems. Both in the
Department of Social Security and the Department of Industry, it took
several volumes to summarise the various facets of departmental
activity. This did not matter too much at local office and branch
level where the amount of relevant information was still manageable.
However, at senior levels, it became very difficult to digest it and
the usefulness of the systems suffered as a result. The danger that
top management systems might induce information overload had been
well recognised from the outset. Even at the end of the decade,
however, a solution was only just emerging:
"My own judgement is that a lot of the top management 
systems are still too cluttered with detail. There isn't 
enough attention on a handful of key targets, key 
objectives, key indicators. This is partly a learning 
process. Those that are now doing best are those that 
are slimming down."
(Treasury Deputy Secretary)
Good performance indicators proved hard to come by. Effective 
planning required managers to assess the performance of their units 
against objectives and targets which had been set for them. Process 
indicators were plentiful. But measures of final output could not 
easily be developed for large tracts of governmental activity (see HC 
61, 1986/87, V. Strachan, Minutes of Evidence, p.17).
It was difficult to harmonise departmental objectives. The 
Department of Social Security started bottom up with statements of 
functions, costs and achievements of various parts of the department. 
On the other hand, the Department of Industry began top down by 
identifying the aims and objectives of the department as a whole to 
provide a framework for the establishment of lower order objectives 
at executive levels (Starkey, 1983, p.215). Either way problems 
remained. Both the NAO report and the Wilson report found that it 
was in many cases difficult to discern the relevance of lower level 
activities and targets for the overall objectives that Ministers and 
senior management had determined.
Most importantly, the integration of top management systems with the
PESO and Estimates systems created significant difficulties. The
FMU's original idea had been that planning, undertaken within the
framework of departmental top management systems, should inform
departmental budgeting, embodied in the PESC and Estimates process:
"Its got to happen. PESC itself has to be set in 
relation to what the department proposes to do. You 
can't separately have another system in which individuals 
bid for the resources they need to carry out their bit of
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the program totally unrelated to what's happening in 
broader terms.... they are part and parcel of the same 
process."
(Under Secretary)
Two obstacles in particular stood in the way of their being melded. 
First, the organisational units (directorates) used as the building 
blocks of top management systems did not necessarily nor even usually 
coincide with the functional division characteristic of PESC White 
Papers. Secondly, timetabling the processes to coincide proved an 
intractable problem (see Financial Management Unit, 1984a, p.33; H.M. 
Treasury, 1986a, pp.14-16). Top management systems did not get 
locked into the budgetary cycle. Without the clout which direct 
resource implications would have given them, their relevance was 
perceived as marginal.
5. Hard questions
Beneath all of the difficulties which top management systems
encountered lay a much deeper one related to their design. The
systems generated a massive amount of descriptive information related
to departmental activities. Ministers and senior officials, however,
had little idea of what to do with it. This was because they did not
find descriptive information very helpful in solving the most
difficult problems they had to face - the problems of making hard
choices between competing priorities.
"Take X department as an instance. It has an enormous 
amount of information about what is being done, what it
costs and what resources go into it. There is not
information about why it is being done, what it is 
expected to achieve and therefore how one attempts trade 
offs in value for money terms between various 
activities."
(Treasury Under Secretary)
The systems had been designed without a clear appreciation of the
fundamental questions which they would be required to answer. These
were not primarily managerial in nature. They were political.
Political decision-making required the effective presentation,
analysis and evaluation of competing policy prescriptions. This, top
management systems were in no position to provide. Their usefulness
was greatly diminished as a result:
"The FMI will never give politicians and their advisers 
sufficiently homogeneous comparable quantitative hard 
edged information which will enable them to make 
decisions as to whether they should put resources into, 
for example, social security or personal social
services .There is still no one doing the job that CPRS
was set up to do, to ask the fundamental questions not 
from a management point of view but from a good policy 
point of view."
(Former Under Secretary)
49
CHAPTER 3
DELEGATION AND EVALUATION IN WHITEHALL
SECTION ONE: THE DELEGATION OF MANAGERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Some months prior to the introduction of the Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI), the Government had commissioned a multi 
departmental review of running costs under the chairmanship of John 
Cassels CB. After surveying management and budgeting practices in 
six central departments, Cassels arrived at some quit» remarkable 
conclusions (Cassels, 1983a). Taking a common sense approach to his 
work, he argued that it was not possible to assess whether 
departmental running costs were effectively spent without first 
examining whether or not their expenditure accorded with departmental 
priorities. Here, however, he hit a snag. He found that the 
departments he had examined either had no formal means for 
establishing their priorities or, if they did, the process of setting 
them was divorced from that of allocating departmental resources.
Next Cassels observed that planning was normally the product of the 
interaction between an operational manager and his or her superior.
As plans were implemented, the manager was held to account by the 
superior for the unit's performance in achieving the targets which 
had been set. However, the responsibility for allocating resources 
to achieve agreed aims did not rest with the operational manager. It 
was vested centrally in finance and establishments divisions. So, 
the line of responsibility for resources was separate from the line 
of responsibility for planning their use. In Cassels' view, the 
separation between planning and budgeting was one of the fundamental 
causes of inefficiency in the civil service. For the effect of this 
separation was to encourage operational managers in the view that 
existing levels of activity and resource consumption could be taken 
as given. Little incentive was present for managers to explore ways 
to achieve either better results with similar resources or the same 
results with less.
The principal change required was to instil in managers at all levels
a concern for the achievement of value for money. Therefore, Cassels
recommended that each department be divided into management blocks
representing its main activities. For each block, clear and unified
lines of responsibility should be established. In each line, cost
centres should be created and a budget holder appointed. Then,
budgetary authority should be delegated as far as possible.
"The right principle must surely be that, so far as 
possible, the consumer of a resource should have a duty 
laid upon him to ensure he uses it as economically as 
possible. That points to the need to develop a budgetary
50
system where it is convenient and practical to identify 
the costs of resources being consumed and put an 
obligation on the manager not only to achieve the output 
expected but also to control his costs and keep them to a 
minimum"
(Cassels, 1983, p.11)
Before examining delegation in detail, it may be useful to define the 
term. It is only ministers who can propose legislation involving 
expenditure or taxation (Brittan, 1974, p.79-81; Punnett, 1983, 
p.302). They are assisted in this task by the Treasury. The 
Treasury is responsible for the presentation to Parliament of annual 
proposals for expenditure and taxation and it is the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury who presents these annual Estimates to 
Parliament. The Estimates are put to Parliament shortly before the 
beginning of the financial year. They are classified by votes and 
divided into sub-heads (Pliatzky, 1982a, p.24). The Treasury, 
therefore, has to be satisfied by the spending departments concerned 
that the expenditure proposed, and the underlying policies, are 
acceptable. However, even when Treasury has agreed to the inclusion 
of a new item of expenditure on the appropriated Estimate, the 
department concerned still cannot use the Estimates money voted by 
Parliament without Treasury agreement. In theory at least, every 
departmental spending commitment must be~approved in advance (Heclo 
and Wildavsky, 1980, p.111; Punnett, 1983, p.311). In practice it is 
not feasible to operate in this way. Therefore, the Treasury 
delegates some of its authority over expenditure to departments. 
Therefore, what delegation to departments means is that the Treasury 
tells a department that, within certain terms and conditions, the 
department may authorise expenditure or approve projects without 
prior Treasury authority.
Similarly, delegation may take place within departments. Formally, 
the Principal Finance Officer (PFO) and Principal Establishments 
Officer (PEO) are jointly responsible for ensuring that delegation 
from Treasury is properly managed. Traditionally, they have ensured 
financial prudence and propriety by exercising financial control 
themselves. However, they may also delegate their powers to 
authorise expenditure to operational managers. Under the Cassels 
proposals, operational managers would take much greater 
responsibility for the control of costs associated with the services 
they delivered than they had previously. Delegation from the centre 
of departments was, therefore, an essential precondition.
In summary, there are two facets to delegation. It may proceed from 
Treasury to departments and then, within departments, from central 
finance and establishments divisions to operational managers. The
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debates and disputes surrounding each form are now more closely 
examined.
1. Delegation from Treasury to Departments
(i) The Departmental position
"It seems to me that if you go to a lot of trouble and 
effort to have departments and ministers placed in a much 
better position to plan for their resources... there must 
be a presumption that, other things being equal, the 
department is to be given the maximum room for 
manoeuvre...I mean why would the department go to the 
trouble of analysing its options, looking to where it 
could make trade offs, looking at better information 
systems, developing a more coherent plan... if all that 
must be subject to a great deal of intervention by an 
external authority."
(Under Secretary)
The advent of delegation necessarily involved a major change in the 
role of the Treasury. Instead of imposing and enforcing detailed 
rules which were uniformly applied, the Treasury would identify and 
prescribe general principles for good financial practice and then 
audit their application by evaluating departmental performance. 
Departments would be left free to manage so long as they developed 
effective systems of financial control and their performance met 
predetermined standards.
Not surprisingly, the delegation push was embraced enthusiastically
by departments. There was little dissent from the proposition that
Treasury, as the eyes and ears of Parliament, should carefully
control the level of public expenditure and take primary
responsibility for ensuring that resources were expended wisely and
with maximum regard for value for money. But where the FMI held out
its promise was in pulling Treasury officials back from daily
'interference' in departmental management (See further Moseley, 1985,
p.29; Fraser, 1987, p.47):
"I have got a large strike on my hands down at our 
central computing establishment at Newcastle. It is
extremely efficient and highly technological we are
having a bust up there over deliberately attempting to 
achieve cost effectiveness. We are trying to alter the 
shift hours because the shifts up there are not 
effective. We have identified the fact that by stopping 
a number of shifts (and altering others) we reckon we can 
save money. We have heeded detailed Treasury advice for 
the degree of leeway we have got for negotiating our own 
settlement. Treasury hasn't been unhelpful but have only 
allowed us so much. I regard that as absolutely 
extraordinary. I've got an administration on my hands of 
one and a half billion pounds a year. This is an issue 
about two thousand pounds a day. We can see our way 
through to saving something like three quarters of a 
million pounds a year...now given a successful deal out 
there, I find it slightly grotesque that I can find 
myself locked in negotiation with the Treasury over the
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odd fifty thousand pounds...I mean what do the people at 
the Treasury know about running a big computer centre and 
handling low paid staff. The answer is very little."
(Permanent Secretary)
Departmental officials objected strongly to Treasury intervening in
what they saw as their managerial prerogatives. Detailed
intervention was not only inconvenient, it was often ill informed.
Departments, they argued, knew more about the practical operation of
their expenditure programmes than the Treasury did. By contrast,
Treasury mandarins were characterised as living in a world of their
own far removed from the practical realities of dealing with the
government's customers. Therefore, they believed that Treasury
should, within certain broad parameters, leave them to get on with
the business of managing (Young and Sloman, 1984, pp.108-9).
Treasury, for example, had a legitimate concern with the public
expenditure implications of policy. But this concern should not
extend to dictating the terms of policy itself:
"I was present at a meeting last year when it was put in 
all seriousness by a Treasury Expenditure Division 
assistant secretary that he was off to a meeting with his 
department, Agriculture, which was proposing a shift of 
resources from, say, pigmeat producers to grain producers 
and he felt it was entirely within his province that he 
should veto this proposal and should impose his view on 
the department as to whether support should go to one 
category of farmer or the other. That illustrates to me 
in very stark terms precisely what the Treasury ought not 
to be doing."
(Assistant Secretary)
As departments had grown in size and their management had become more
complex, the capacity of the Treasury to intervene in matters of
detail had declined. And yet, departmental officials felt that many
unnecessary controls still remained. These controls were exercised
principally in relation to financial inputs. However, the focus of
new management reforms was on the maximisation of outputs. Hence, if
the financial performance of budget centres was continuously
improving, the need to control totals for functional heads of
expenditure lessened considerably:
"How does Treasury reconcile control of total public 
expenditure, which you.do by inputs, and responsibility 
for getting efficient management, which you do by 
outputs. That is the unresolved problem. What we're 
doing now is putting in output budgetary systems but 
still continuing with input controls. Treasury must 
realise that it has to step back."
(Deputy Secretary)
Therefore, departmental officials believed that the time had come for 
a thorough review of Treasury controls. Instead of the Treasury 
authorising expenditure on a case by case basis, departments should 
be allocated fixed sums of money which they could manage as they 
wished:
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"To have Treasury control over individual projects is 
daft... What you have to try and do is to get the 
Treasury on top of total public expenditure effectively 
and that's a Cabinet problem as much as anything. Once 
you have achieved that, then you should delegate the 
power to spend to a department within a given total."
(Deputy Secretary)
What departmental officials proposed was a system of block budgeting. 
Treasury, on behalf of the Parliament, would allocate funds to 
departments in broad categories, i.e. programme by programme with a 
single allocation for running costs. How departments then 
distributed these resources internally would be a matter for them. 
Instead of focusing its attention on expenditure on particular cost 
items, for example, telephones, travel and subsistence etc. (input 
control) Treasury officials would be expected to focus their 
attention on the financial performance of departmental budget centres 
(output control). So, the more that departments exercised control 
through accountable units, the more desirable it would become that 
Treasury should scrutinise through the same channel (Financial 
Management Unit, 1983, pp.37-38).
(ii) The Treasury position
Treasury officials, however, took a much less sanguine view of the 
developments proposed. From the outset they advanced several 
arguments to counter the case for even the limited introduction of 
block budgeting. These arguments consumed a great deal of time and 
their effect was to dampen considerably departmental hopes for major 
change. In their view, the proponents of block budgeting took 
altogether too narrow a view of the role which Treasury should play 
in overseeing public expenditure.
It was Treasury's role to assess spending proposals in the light of a
full range of governmental considerations of which expenditure totals
were but one. For example, Treasury ensured that departmental
spending proposals were consistent with government policy; that there
were no other more economical ways in which to achieve programme
objectives; and that adequate provision for proposed spending had
been made in the cash limit and forward expenditure plans provided
for in PESC. If not, Treasury might insist on savings being made
elsewhere in a department's programme to offset the cost of the
proposal being put forward. In theory, much of this scrutiny could
be undertaken within the department itself. But Treasury officials
doubted whether this scrutiny would be sufficiently detached:
"The civil service works rather on the Thomas a'Beckett 
principle - that we are loyal to and serve with all our 
zeal the organisation in which we are at any one moment.
The drive of the civil servant in a spending department 
is towards policies of his own Minister. Obviously he
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will recognise the constraints posed by government policy 
as a whole but his first loyalty will be (very properly) 
to his own Minister. Ministers themselves often find 
some difficulty in subordinating their own ideas to the 
competing needs of colleagues."
(Minute from Treasury Assistant Secretary, 29 April 1983)
Treasury officials observed that where large amounts of expenditure 
were concerned it was rare for only one department to be involved. A 
policy involving a major shift of resources from A to B might, very 
quickly, assume governmental relevance. Treasury was in a much 
better position than those in departments to assess the impact of 
expenditure on the direction of policy in government as a whole.
Block budgeting also presumed the rationality and inviolability of 
departmental boundaries. In reality, however, these were based on 
convenience and, they argued, provided no reliable guide on how 
departmental programmes should be organised.
The Treasury was concerned that a system of block budgeting might 
curtail the amount of information available to Parliament. Officials 
noted that the Public Accounts Committee had, in the years preceding 
the introduction of the FMI, sought to extend its capacity to 
scrutinise and control supply (Wilding, 1983a, p.48; Robinson, 1985, 
p.39). Since this was the case, the pressures were against widening 
or amalgamating the expenditure categories presented to Parliament in 
the Estimates.
Expenditure division officials argued strenuously that Treasury
control could seriously be jeopardised by the absence of adequate
powers to approve in advance expenditure above certain levels or
between vote heads. Without the capacity to examine such expenditure
case by case, Treasury would be denied a crucial source of
information about departmental activities and processes of
decision-making:
"When it comes to Treasury control I am sure you won't 
ignore the point that no block budget will impose a 
discipline on a spending department unless it is 
uncomfortably tight. To advise Treasury ministers what 
total to go for, Expenditure Groups need knowledge. The 
present system, while imperfect, provides them with quite 
a lot of it and there is at least some link between that, 
and the fact that the Treasury has to be consulted about 
different programmes in particular and not only in total.
..We are giving thought to the possibility of increasing 
delegations and I am certainly not saying the present 
pattern is right. But we should be apprehensive about 
anything that threatened to substitute an opaque wall for 
the windows into departments which we presently have."
(Minute from Deputy Secretary, 27 October 1982)
The requirement that departments should obtain prior approval for 
particular expenditures permitted Treasury, through its negotiations 
with departments, to familiarise itself with the details of
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departmental expenditure programmes. Armed with this knowledge the
Treasury was in a sound position to compare the merits and demerits
of departmental proposals for expenditure reductions and to assess
the pain which each might inflict. Without it, the Treasury, and
hence the Government, would be placed at a significant and
undesirable disadvantage:
"The conclusive argument against block budgeting lies in 
the Government's objective of reducing public 
expenditure. Unless the Treasury is going to be able to 
hack out individual projects/programmes, reductions will 
only come about by overall squeezes. They can and do 
have some good effects; but an across the board squeeze 
will yield only modest savings before some departments 
protest that they can do no more. Treasury will then 
have to look at it in detail to see whether it can do 
more; and if it cannot, but Ministers' overall objective 
is still to be maintained, will have to go hunting for 
the balance. That will inevitably take us back to 
something other than block budgeting."
(Minute from
Treasury Assistant Secretary, 25 April 1983)
Finally, Treasury officials raised explicitly the constitutional
barriers which lay in the path of reform. Constitutional convention
required the Minister and Permanent Secretary, as the department's
accounting officer, to ensure that money had been spent for the
purposes which Parliament had authorised. Their accountability to
Parliament had resulted in the development of a uniform approach to
financial scrutiny and control across the civil service and placed
clear limits on the extent to which it was desirable and feasible to
delegate financial authority. The maintenance of a unified civil
service was a further pressure militating in favour of
centralisation. Hence, they argued that block budgeting could not
proceed without in some way altering the constitutional balance:
"Properly used, the delegation aspects of the FMI will be 
beneficial in shifting the onus of proof on to those who 
wish to retain power and authority. But there are too 
many around who only half understand the realities of 
public administration and can too easily be seduced by 
the naive pursuit of delegation at any cost...It may be 
unfashionable to say it, but we are dealing with Her 
Britannic Majesty's Civil Service, not a series of 
independent bucket shops. To the best of my knowledge, 
the constitution has not yet been changed."
(Minute from
Treasury Assistant Secretary, 16 December 1982)
(iii) Halting progress
In a memorandum to his Deputy Secretary, one Treasury official 
predicted accurately the course which delegation would take in its 
first few years. It was likely he argued, given the ultimate 
financial accountability of Ministers and permanent secretaries
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to the Parliament and given the government's continuing commitment to 
reductions in public expenditure, that the FMI could lead to 
quasi-delegation of many things but full delegation of very few.
This in turn, could result in a diminution rather than an increase in 
managerial efficiency (Minute from Assistant Secretary, 14 December 
1982).
While in early days there was a plethora of delegated budgetary 
control experiments throughout Whitehall, the most important 
characteristic of the administrative landscape in the FMI's formative 
years remained the proliferation of Treasury and departmental 
controls. Throughout the FMI's effective existence, for example, 
personnel numbers were fixed through the application of ceilings. 
Delegation of accommodation costs was regarded as impractical. 
Centrally imposed pay assumptions detracted significantly from the 
ability of departments to manage their pay and running costs budgets. 
Annuality - lack of flexibility to carry over unspent funds from one 
year to the next in anticipation of future expenditure - was 
experienced as a particularly grating and unnecessary inhibition on 
managerial discretion (Cooper, 1983a, p.35). Inflexible definitions 
of capital and current expenditure created difficulties for 
departments in switching between the two, particularly in relation to 
minor items such as micro-computers and office furniture (H.M. 
Treasury, 1986a, p.19). Taken together, the combination of controls 
ruled out much of the scope for departmental managers to vary the mix 
of their resources and hence improve their performance.
However, as the FMI philosophy gained ground Treasury officials 
became steadily more amenable to a re-examination of the nature and 
extent of existing controls. They were not willing to cave in to the 
strong pressure for block budgeting which had emerged in both the MPO 
and departments but instead embraced a more cautious strategy. Two 
years after the FMI was launched, the Treasury responded to 
departmental agitation by conducting its own, low key inquiry into 
existing levels of control. In its brief to departments, the 
Treasury distinguished three different kinds of control. There was 
first, that category of controls and rules thought to be necessary to 
maintain 'the essential needs of a unified civil service'. Rules 
with respect to pay were the most obvious examples. Here, it 
proposed, the scope for delegation would be small. Secondly the 
Treasury accepted that there was a category of controls which existed 
solely for historical reasons. These could more easily be dispensed 
with. Thirdly, there existed those rules which related to the 
control of public expenditure. It was with these that the FMI was 
principally concerned. Such rules could be reviewed on a case by 
case basis. But, Treasury officials constantly emphasised, 
delegation would occur here only where they were satisfied that the
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rule was not an essential part of expenditure control (Letter from 
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, 18 November 1983)
The product of the Treasury's inquiry was made public two years 
later. A new running costs system was introduced in April 1986 (H.M. 
Treasury, 1986b). Under the system each department was given a 
financial limit on the gross administrative costs of running its 
operations. These administrative costs included wages, personnel 
overheads, accommodation, office services and other smaller 
miscellaneous costs. Within its limit, a department was free to 
transfer its expenditures between the five different categories. It 
was not, however, allowed to divert programme funds to administrative 
purposes.
The system represented a significant advance on that which had 
preceded it (Thain and Wright, 1990, p.129). It foreshadowed the 
end, two years later, of personnel number controls. Departments had 
much greater capacity to transfer funds between expenditure heads.
The rules with respect to annuality were modified. But for these 
concessions, the Treasury extracted its price. It bore down on 
running cost totals expecting departments to deliver 'efficiency 
savings' of 1£ per cent per annum. Running cost limits took no 
account of pay settlements even where these exceeded assumptions. 
Departments also had to provide Treasury with three year management 
plans for their programmes, thus increasing the transparency of their 
management. Overall, however, the new system ran with the grain of 
the FMI. It had been slow in coming. The disputation and consequent 
delay which had ensued between Treasury and departments had caused 
considerable anger and disillusionment in departments and the FMI had 
suffered as a result. Nevertheless, once in place the running costs 
system eased the inter-departmental tensions and established the 
preconditions for greater delegation to operational managers from the 
centre of departments. This should have been the easier part of the 
enterprise. Instead, it was to prove another major stumbling block.
2. Delegation within Departments
(i) Departmental reaction
Just as it was proposed that Treasury should adopt an altogether more 
detached position in relation to the control of departmental 
expenditure, so also, within departments, it was proposed that the 
Principal Finance Officer and the Principal Establishments Officer 
should change their roles from that of controllers to auditors (Peat 
Marwick, 1985, p.29ff):
"[The line manager] will, I think, be much more
independent. He'll have a much bigger incentive to go
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back up the line and say 'look, what you're requiring of 
me just doesn't add up' and 'what you require of me 
doesn't make the slightest bit of difference'. In that 
sense there will be a sharper dialogue between the 
operators and the central divisions who dream up the 
things they would like them to do."
(Deputy Secretary)
Delegation, however, necessitated risk. As controls were ceded to 
line managers it was inevitable that decisions would be taken with 
which central resource controllers disagreed. Yet there was no more 
certain way for senior management to demonstrate a lack of 
seriousness about delegation than for them to censure and correct at 
the first sign of trouble (Cassels, 1983, p.13).
In early days, this difficulty appeared far from the minds of 
departmental officials charged with implementing the FMI in 
departments. First on an experimental basis and then more widely, 
departments approached the task of introducing the new principles of 
delegated budgetary control enthusiastically (Bell 1984; Thorpe 
Tracey 1987; Coates, 1988; Killykelly, 1988; Oates, 1988). In the 
Department of Social Security the thrust towards delegation had 
commenced even before the FMI gave it added impetus. Following the 
findings of the 'Traffic Study' (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1982; Warner, 1984, p.256-257), the first phase of a 
decentralised budgetary control system was introduced. Eight hundred 
cost centres had been identified and managers appointed to them.
Each manager was provided with a monthly financial report detailing 
all expenditure charged against his/her unit. Cost centre managers 
were responsible for keeping expenditure within their budget for the 
supplies and services over which they could exercise control 
(Department of Health and Social Security, 1983). There were not 
many of these at first but officials were hopeful that the range 
could be expanded as central divisions let go their reins.
However, as they became more involved in the process, departmental 
officials discovered that many practical questions needed urgently to 
be answered. When could the old style controls safely be relaxed ? 
How should appropriate standards for setting and controlling budgets 
be developed ? What provision should be made for necessary 
specialist finance and personnel support to be provided for line 
managers ? How should new and strengthened supporting information 
systems be introduced ? How could the new budgetary information 
systems contribute effectively to and be melded with the existing 
PESC and Estimates processes ? The underlying question remained, 
however, whether, when, and to what extent, delegation would cascade 
from Treasury to departments and from there to operational managers. 
In Treasury and central finance divisions, by contrast, it was the 
practical limits to delegation rather than methods for its advance
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which were most actively canvassed. The debates which ensued between 
the competing parties again were vigorous.
(ii) The Centre's position
Those in finance divisions, like their counterparts in the Treasury,
placed their emphasis on the control of departmental resources. They
tended not to have confidence that operational managers would take
the same care to achieve savings and value for money as they had.
For them, delegation upset the balance between fiscal responsibility
and operational enthusiasm. Why after all, place cost control in the
hands of the very officials whose task it was to spend money?
"My role I think is to put an emphasis on saving money 
precisely because there is no one else that has that as 
their specific responsibility. I will have very long 
arguments with (the Director of Regional Operations) not 
On the concept of the thing but on how we actually 
implement it. Whether the goal for the regional 
organisation should be to improve service within a given 
sum of money or to reduce costs within a given level of 
service. ...It's not a question of philosophy and as I 
read the current mood of the government it is the latter 
rather than the former."
(Principal Finance Officer)
As with the Treasury, the FMI envisaged that the role of the PEO/PFO 
would change. The PEO/PFO would relinquish detailed controls on the 
expenditure of departmental resources. In return, he or she would 
assume positive responsibilities for advising the permanent secretary 
on the size and distribution of the departmental budget, for setting 
the various ground rules to which operating divisions would work, for 
ensuring that these ground rules were complied with and for 
challenging the decisions of line managers where necessary. These 
positive responsibilities, however, took time to develop. In the 
meantime central finance officers harboured major reservations about 
the delegation of financial responsibility to departments' 
operational wings. Until PFOs were convinced that effective 
financial control systems were available to operational managers and 
were satisfied that these systems could be utilised effectively, 
their natural tendency was to advise the Permanent Secretary against 
assignment of financial responsibility. At the same time, however, 
operational managers argued that unless responsibility was assigned, 
they could neither obtain experience nor demonstrate their 
competence. This particular disagreement was never fully resolved 
and blighted many attempts to achieve even a modest degree of 
intra-departmental delegation.
Finance officials felt that unless carefully planned, delegation 
could run the risk of creating confusion and frustration and, 
ultimately, a loss of overall efficiency. Therefore, they argued,
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rather than pressing for delegation over as wide a field as possible, 
a more cautious approach was required. Departments should first 
think hard about the areas in which something approaching final 
delegation was possible. They could then consider in which of those 
areas delegation would be sensible. Delegation would not be sensible 
everywhere. For example, some officials felt that indiscriminate 
delegation might result in a loss of important benefits deriving from 
economies of scale and the concentration of expertise. In the field 
of accommodation, for example, the negotiation by departments, and 
even individual units within departments, of leasing and other 
similar arrangements would deny government the bargaining power which 
derives from being a large customer and deprive it of the necessary 
expertise to obtain the best leasing terms and conditions.
Lurking beneath these concerns was Treasury's perturbation regarding
its own position. For if authority could effectively be delegated
there, increasing demands would be placed on the Treasury to divest
itself of more and more of its authority. Despite the fact that
Treasury's capacity to monitor departmental performance should
increase given the improvement in the quality of information provided
to it by departments, Treasury officials remained concerned that
their influence would be weakened with consequent detrimental effects
on their capacity to manage public expenditure.
"What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
The advocacy of delegation from finance divisions on this 
sort of scale will lead inevitably to pressures for 
corresponding delegation of responsibility from the 
Treasury. I am not opposed to delegation, either within 
departments or between the Treasury and departments, 
provided that it is kept under the control of the 
delegating authority - who after all has an ultimate 
responsibility for the way in which he exercises his 
judgement when he makes a delegation. But this means 
that the delegator must remain in control of the nature 
and extent of what he delegates; the trouble is that (the 
FMI) creates a presumption the other way which will be 
used against the Treasury by departments just as it will 
be used against PFO's and PEO's in departments."
(Minute from Treasury Under Secretary, 19 January 1983)
(iii) Delegation in Practice
For line managers, delegation presented both opportunities and
anxieties. Generally, it was the more senior managers at under
secretary and assistant secretary levels who greeted the prospect of
change most warmly. Junior staff were more anxious, fearing its
effects on their traditional methods of operation and on their
employment prospects. For both groups, however, the principal
initial difficulty which they experienced was in negotiating any
worthwhile level of delegation at all:
"I was having to sit down and negotiate with my 
colleagues in the central finance part of the office over
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the precise degree of delegation I was going to get.
That took an enormous amount of time. All of us were new 
to the game and they were more reluctant than we were to 
embrace it."
(Deputy Secretary)
One of the most important facets of the negotiations related to the
development of indicators of performance. If delegation were to
proceed, central finance officials wanted to make quite certain that
they would have sufficient knowledge about management's results to
intervene where corrective action was necessary. Debates ensued
between the parties about the appropriateness of suggested measures
of performance. Operational managers wanted to ensure that the
measures accurately reflected their administrative effectiveness.
Central officials wanted extensive and tangible indicators upon which
to base their assessments:
"The other problem was to concentrate your mind on what 
sort of outputs and measures and objectives you should 
set to make a judgement about how well you were doing. I 
think people underestimate the intellectual and 
management difficulty of getting that right."
(Deputy Secretary)
Performance indicators were but one component of the much larger
management information systems which were created to deal with the
additional complexity inherent in a decentralised management
environment. With departments creating many hundreds of cost
centres, each of whose performance needed to be monitored and each of
whose results needed to be standardised and aggregated, management
accounting systems of considerable sweep and sophistication were
required. These systems, however, were only in their infancy when
the FMI commenced and their lack represented a major obstacle to the
rapid delegation of managerial authority:
"Then there was the total inadequacy of management 
information. We had obviously relied on a vote system of 
expenditure, cash controls and all that's fine and dandy 
but it isn't about how you manage a particular component 
part of a major department. So we really had to make 
sure that the information systems came on stream."
(Under Secretary)
Even when new information systems became available, significant
behavioural hurdles had still to be overcome. It took considerable
time for senior managers involved in pilot delegation projects to
recognise and then to act on the fact that they had genuinely new
responsibilities and a new measure of opportunity to be able to make
judgements for themselves. At junior levels, the FMI's proponents
struck considerable opposition and hostility from managers reluctant
to adapt, uncertain about their capacity to master the new challenges
and critical of the lack of rewards available for adaptation:
"Frequently senior managers don't understand what it's 
about. It goes against their whole training...Further
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down the line you have promotion blockages resulting from 
the service having contracted. At HEO and SEO level 
younger ones are often more go ahead in their thinking 
than older ones who because they don't agree with the 
approach are hostile to it on the grounds of ideology and
self interest they see themselves as ready to be thrown
on the scrap heap...These are substantial obstacles and I 
don't think they can be ignored."
(Efficiency Unit Assistant Secretary)
Defensiveness in the face of change was exacerbated by the fact that 
few incentives to embrace it existed. It was of critical importance 
in the early stages for staff to see that there were benefits for 
them in seeing the department run better. Hence, in a number of 
departments employee bonus schemes were established in which some 
part of efficiency savings could be redirected towards an improvement 
in working conditions. But these were small beer in comparison with 
larger politically and institutionally founded obstacles to more 
effective management.
At senior levels for example, officials still saw little sign that
their opportunities for promotion would be enhanced by throwing
themselves with enthusiasm into the managerial fray. Promotion was
still linked tightly to soundness in the political and policy arena.
The 'golden route* to the top through a series of appointments close
to Ministers remained substantially unaltered. Unless and until a
new route could be created, the priority accorded in officials' minds
to managerial proficiency was bound to be secondary:
"Part of the standard doctrine in all this is that you 
will be judged on your use of resources and that people 
who are efficient in that will be promoted. I have my 
doubts about that. We have one principal in this 
department who saved us three million single handedly in 
the last year and was not at the top of the promotion 
list and is not going to be. I'm not at all sure how far 
people are going to regard a person if one of them comes 
and says 'look, I can deliver for ten per cent less. He 
won't say jolly good... he'll applaud the man who comes 
and says I can deliver ten per cent better service for 
the same money."
(Finance Assistant Secretary)
Junior staff were bitter about the Government's critical attitude to
the civil service and, identifying the new changes with attempts to
punish them, were reluctant to comply:
"We have a government that hates the sight of us, looks 
down on us as necessary evils to cut and screw down.
Everything this government says seems aimed at knocking 
us. They are our employer and they hate the sight of us.
Staff feel this terribly and are very insecure...I'd like 
to see how they'd cope, by Christ I would, there is no 
deadwood or easy jobs anywhere, I say that with such 
conviction."
(Departmental Assistant Secretary)
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"The real difficulty is in convincing people at the 
coalface that this is not just another strategy for 
cutting departments down. After all, no one will 
willingly work themselves out of a job."
(Departmental Under Secretary)
Finally, however, it was the continuing proliferation of departmental 
controls which detracted from real progress with delegation. One 
early example from the Department of Industry serves well to 
illustrate the point. In the Department, pilot projects were 
established in three discrete departmental units. Under the terms of 
the experiments, the following authorities were delegated: altering 
the grade mix below the level of Assistant Secretary subject to 
staying within manpower targets; the employment of casuals and the 
approval of overtime subject to cash limit controls; recruitment of 
low level clerical staff; fund transfer between division heads; and 
the authority to enter into financial commitments and authorise 
payments for a limited range of vote headings to set maximum amounts. 
These delegations, however, were subject to the following 
constraints: prior permission was to be obtained where the cash limit 
allocation of the office might be exceeded; prior authority was to be 
obtained from Treasury to transfer funds between sub- heads; 
financial commitments for future years had to be covered by specific 
allocations of the department's public expenditure provision; 
expenditure had to be within government policy; authority was 
restricted to the terms of any agreement between the department and 
the Treasury; there had to be prior consultation with the central 
divisions who would in turn consult the Treasury on any novel or 
contentious expenditure; and the relevant provisions of government 
accounting, the Department's finance handbook, the accounting 
memoranda of the department and establishments officers guide all had 
to be followed (Department of Trade and Industry, 1984, Annex A1).
At a training programme for managers on the implementation of the 
FMI, the Director of the Business Statistics Office declared himself 
unhappy with these arrangements. Although he was pleased to have 
some additional flexibility, this was small and came at the cost of 
more intensive reporting requirements. In addition, the 
flexibilities obtained had to be set against the thirty per cent 
manpower cut he had to manage in the previous four years, a cut which 
had reduced the services offered by the office at a time that 
business was placing pressure on it to improve and extend its output.
In summary, what happened in the first five years of the FMI's life 
in departments was that managers were given new responsibilities but 
were not provided with the requisite authority, technical capacity or 
incentives to exercise them. This was a most potent formula for 
disillusionment and delay.
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Not until running cost controls replaced manpower ceilings in 1987, 
five years after the FMI was introduced, did the flexibility 
available to managers increase significantly. By then, however, the 
FMI had effectively run its course.
SECTION TWO: POLICY AND EVALUATION
1. Background
Since PAR, there had been no concerted attempt in Whitehall to 
evaluate government policy and programmes (Gray, 1986, p.12). PAR's 
demise, and that of the CPRS, had been effected in the first term of 
the Thatcher Government. It was a government profoundly sceptical 
about the capacity of sustained analysis to deliver benefits for the 
advancement of governmental objectives (Plowden, 1985, p.401; 
Williams, 1983, p.24; Williams, 1989, p.257). Yet the case for 
effective policy review was strong. It derived not only from 
criticisms of past performance (Dell, 1983, pp.96-97; Hennessy, 1986, 
Chapter 3; Hoskyns, 1983, 1984) but also from a sincere desire on the 
part of many senior officials, particularly those who had recently 
retired, to see an improvement in Whitehall's capacity to deal with 
turbulence and change (see, for example, Delafons, 1982, p.221; 
Cooper, 1983b, p.20; Hunt, 1983, pp.91-92; Naime, 1983, p.256; Wass, 
1983, pp.106-107; Wass, 1987, p.182; Pliatzky, 1984, p.27; Butler, 
1986, pp.20-21).
The Financial Management Unit (FMU) picked up the theme and in its 
report on 'Policy Work and the FMI' (Financial Management Unit,
1985c) argued that the policy process could be improved substantially 
through the application of managerial principles. Just as 
operational units could become more effective if clear objectives 
were specified, targets set and performance assessed, so also the 
work of policy units would be enhanced if the objectives of policy 
were made clear, responsibility for its implementation was properly 
defined, its performance monitored and its outcomes systematically 
evaluated.
The FMU's successor, the Joint Management Unit (JMU) pursued its 
quest for better policy on two major fronts. First, the Unit had an 
incentive for improved policy analysis and evaluation embedded in 
Cabinet procedure. In its original report, the FMU had drawn 
attention to the ambiguity which characterised many policy 
objectives; to the fact that assumptions which underpinned policy 
were not often made explicit or tested; and that little systematic 
performance assessment was undertaken (Financial Management Unit, 
1985c, p.2). Therefore, it recommended that whenever a new policy
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initiative which involved significant public expenditure was 
launched, the plans for monitoring and evaluating it should clearly 
be specified in the Cabinet submission. In response, the Cabinet 
resolved that wherever a new policy proposal was put to it, 
departments would have to specify what was to be achieved by the 
change, by when, at what cost. In addition, Cabinet submissions 
would have to outline how policy performance was to be evaluated (HC 
588, 1986/87, p.19)
Secondly, the JMU pressed on with its focus on policy evaluation:
"We concentrated heavily on evaluation. We realised that 
if you could get evaluations then you would meet the 
other criticisms as well. If you evaluate, then this 
flushes the ambiguity in objectives out in the open...The 
question was, could we do it ? Were the methodologies 
there ?"
(Assistant Secretary)
The JMU sponsored some 40 evaluation case studies. Their subject 
matter was varied ranging from a review of action for equal 
opportunity for women in the civil service to consideration of aid to 
refugees in Thailand to an analysis of the North Sea fiscal regime. 
These were collected together and disseminated internally (JMU,
1987). The interest of the case studies rested not primarily in 
their content but in the lessons they contained about the methodology 
of evaluation and the organisational arrangements established for its 
conduct (Flynn et al., 1988, p.182). The lessons were then distilled 
in a practical guide to conducting policy evaluation (H.M. Treasury, 
1988a). This formed the core instruction document for a wide-ranging 
series of seminars which the JMU built into the Civil Service 
College's top management training programme.
The new focus on evaluation was aimed primarily at improving the 
practice of management rather than provoking the fundamental 
reappraisal of policy. It was a programme of policy management 
rather than policy review (Gray and Jenkins, 1986, p.181). Neither 
the Government nor senior officials had been suddenly persuaded of 
the merits of public policy analysis in any broad sense. The need 
for better policy management sprang from the necessity, in a 
constrained fiscal environment, to balance conflicting public demands 
for improving the quality of public services and lowering the burden 
of taxation. The Government could provide better quality services by 
ensuring that existing funds were expended more efficiently and 
effectively (Butler, 1986, p.22). Hence the purpose of evaluation 
was to determine whether policy could be framed and managed to 
achieve better value for money. Policy evaluation under the FMI 
would not be PAR revisited. Rather, the objective was to make it 
part and parcel of normal operational management. However, even with 
these more modest objectives it quickly ran aground.
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2. Policy Evaluation in Practice
"It (policy evaluation) did not filter one bit. The 
Treasury wrote a lot of books, X. was a great expert in 
the field - a great enthusiast. My impression was that 
although [the unit] managed to get through Cabinet a 
policy that all policies should be evaluated - no 
important policy was ever evaluated. De-unionisation of 
GCHQ was never evaluated, privatisation of British 
Telecom was never evaluated. Why ? Because people don't 
see any point."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
This is a harsh judgement on the JMU's work. It was in Whitehall 
terms a not inconsiderable achievement that forty government schemes 
were reviewed and that a whole cadre of officials was equipped with 
new methodological skills and provided with a new enthusiasm for the 
evaluation cause. Yet, it is also true that formulation and review 
of major policy remained unaffected by the FMI's forays (Richards, 
1987, p.32). The reason was that neither Ministers nor senior policy 
officials found the new methods of value. The position of each is 
now examined in more detail.
(i) Officials and Ministers
One senior official is said to have remarked that 'If the news is 
good Ministers do not need to know, and if the news is bad they do 
not want to know.' Hence, if policy assessment is to succeed, 
Ministers will have to want it (Whitbread, 1987, p.105). Officials 
in policy divisions expressed considerable doubt, however, about 
whether this precondition could be met. The problem began with the 
attitude of the Thatcher Government itself. This was a government 
which appeared little interested in assessing the effectiveness of 
policy except in frankly ideological terms:
"These problems [of comparing and choosing between finely 
balanced policy options] will not go away because they 
are so difficult. But the asking of this sort of 
question is so antipathetic to the current administration 
that it doesn't get done. Walter Williams describes the 
Reagan administration as the most anti-analytical in 
American history. The same could be said to be true of 
the Thatcher administration."
(former Under Secretary)
More fundamentally, policy evaluation obtained little currency in the 
political arena because Ministers and managerialists looked at the 
policy problem across a deep professional and practical divide. A 
number of its manifestations emerged clearly during the research. 
Ministers of all persuasions adopted policy settings not principally 
because they had emerged, as the result of extensive evaluation, as 
the most effective solutions to social problems, but rather because
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they accorded with their political values, attitudes and commitments.
In these circumstances, the best offices of the civil service and any
evaluations could do little to alter the substance of decisions whose
nature was predetermined:
"[The problem of public ownership] has been bedevilling 
British industrial policy for thirty years. But there 
has been an increasing urgency about it in the last ten. 
Successive governments have been denationalising steel, 
nationalising our partnership with BL and denationalising 
British Air. That's a crazy way of organising things.
There is no way the service can alter political attitudes 
to public ownership. We simply have to carry out the 
sterile business of changing ownership between one 
election and the other."
(Policy Under Secretary)
The politician's task is to make party commitments concrete and in a
manner which will maximise the support of relevant actors. In this
context, the painstaking specification of programme objectives,
targets and performance will be secondary. Thus, for example, the
management of programme expenditure was so integrally a political
matter that policy officials doubted whether analysis and evaluation
of the kind that the FMU proposed could make a significant difference
to programme operations. These were governed by much larger
considerations:
"It [the FMI] will not assist with programme expenditure.
For example, the x programme has been on a sharply
expanding budget for a number of years because it
constitutes an important part of the balance in the
relationship between government and the x industry. So, 
we have therefore, in practice, been able to operate 
without constraint on expenditure - our staff are limited 
but not expenditure. Only this next year will we have 
constraint which was suddenly imposed. We will be 
getting slightly more than last year - but actually 
because of the growing number of cases we will have to 
cut right back. That is the real constraint that forces 
us to manage. Hitherto it has been a responsive scheme 
operating against a number of pre determined criteria.
If the criteria are met, the cases go ahead. All this is 
a much greater influence than the FMI."
(Policy Under Secretary)
Just as changes in prevailing ideology could affect the climate in
which policy is made, so also could changes in the preferences of
individual Ministers. Each brought with him/her particular
commitments and interests which influenced the direction of policy
and the manner of its making. Analysis conducted for one proved next
to irrelevant for another:
"You go through terrific problems in setting down what 
your aims are, to have an evaluation plan and indeed to 
establish a base line...we did everything perfectly. The 
policy was conceived by one Minister and ...the next 
Minister came along and decided that the area we were 
involved in wasn't an area that DTI should be involved 
in. It should be transferred to another department. Of 
course in the process of transferring the policy, all the
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work that we did about evaluating the policy got lost. 
That's what happens, there are a lot of policy variations 
- evaluation gets overwhelmed by some bigger wash."
(Policy Principal)
Individual Ministers' priorities and objectives also changed
constantly in response to the pressures of circumstance. For
Ministers, and for their policy officials, the challenge was
primarily to manage the tide of events, to forge solutions to
ever-present political problems. To administer departmental
programmes effectively had traditionally been of secondary
importance. In this context, strict adherence by Ministers to
predetermined objectives became problematic and so too did the
careful pre-planning of programme management:-
"I mean take it at its crudest and say that a Minister 
has a session with a set of under secretaries... they are 
all committed to this policy and twelve objectives are 
set down and then he says four months later 'here are the 
twelve objectives' and you only achieved two of them. It 
isn't terribly easy in the nature of relationships with 
Ministers to say yes but nine of the remaining ten were 
not achieved because three weeks after you had approved 
the original ones you created new priorities and another 
fortnight you changed again...Either you tell them they 
don't know what they are doing or you tell them that they 
disregarded their own concepts and skills and neither of 
these is comfortable for a civil servant to do."
(Under Secretary)
The transparency of evaluation caused Ministers immediate problems.
If the outcome of a considered evaluation was the withdrawal of a
programme or a reduction in its funding, Ministers could find
themselves in difficulty. Hence it had become a rule of politics
that it is preferable to continue a programme than to end it (Butler,
1986, p.22). If an evaluation disclosed that a programme did not
adequately meet its objectives, there may still be many beneficiaries
who demanded its retention and who amassed considerable political
support in its favour. If the pressure was sufficiently intense,
Ministers might easily relent:
"There are no votes in spending less and cutting out 
service. There are only votes in spending more and 
introducing new service. Given that, it is clearly a 
difficult thing to introduce [policy review]. Hence the 
suspiciousness of many policy officials."
(Treasury Assistant Secretary)
The aim of policy management was to obtain better value for money 
from policies and programmes. But what is value for money for the 
manager may not be so for the Minister. Cost effectiveness is but 
one of many considerations which feature in Ministerial assessments 
of policy and programme effectiveness. There are others which will 
often weigh even more heavily in the balance. In determining the 
appropriateness of policies and programmes, a Minister considers 
their acceptability to local constituents, to government backbenchers
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and to other important interest groups. He/she will examine their
effect on particular sectors of industry or individual geographical
areas. Policies will be vetted for their consistency with the party
platform and government policy. Having looked at these, the policy
setting arrived at will not necessarily be one which a more objective
analysis of efficiency dictated:
"[Ministers] do want value for money but it may mean 
something different in their terms. Value for money is 
important because they only have limited amounts of money 
and they are always having to make choices about how to 
spend it and therefore must be making calculations in 
their heads about what constitutes better value. That 
may however not be measurable in the sorts of terms that 
the management people propose... it may be in terms of 
scoring political points, winning elections or getting 
the good will of some particular pressure group. So they 
are interested in value for money but it is very dubious 
what that actually means."
(Deputy Secretary)
(ii) Managerial Prescriptions for Policy Work
"The FMI was presented as an advance in rationality.
There would be clarity of responsibility, accountability, 
information, access to the experts. It is fundamentally 
a rational process and this is why there was the spastic 
reaction from anybody involved in policy that this 
doesn't connect with my world."
(Treasury Under Secretary)
Policy officials had one fundamental problem with the managerial
prescription. Managerialists believed that policy could be arrived
at rationally. The experience of policy officials persuaded them
that it was formulated through a curious and unspecifiable process
embracing, among other things, analysis, perception, knowledge,
opportunity, balance, skill, cunning, hunch and plain gut feeling.
Events coalesced and judgements were made, new circumstances arose
and new solutions posited. Policy-making was a fluid process rather
than a logical sequence. Careful analysis was valuable but only to a
point. Beyond it the qualities of particular individuals and their
skill and experience in assessing situations and acting on them
seemed to assume far greater importance:
"The FMI tried to [evaluate] and I think it fell on its 
face because you can evaluate delivery but evaluating 
programmes is much harder because you are deeply enmeshed 
in competing views. Also, people very seldom formulated 
their aims before they began. It may be odd to say this 
of government, but I don't think people do often 
formulate their ideas very clearly, they come up in all 
sorts of funny ways...You don't know why policy comes 
along. Somebody once asked me how the legislative 
programme comes up - I answered that it is far more 
happenstance than people give it credit for."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
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The FMU had argued that policy-making should be conducted more
systematically. An evaluation plan should be present from the
outset. Each new policy should be evaluated within a fixed period
and modified accordingly. Policy officials found it much harder to
segment policy in this way. Policy was fluid. It had no clear
beginning or end. It formed part of and was constrained by its
historical antecedents, the commitments which underlay it and the
programme structures used to effect it. Programmes meant different
things to different people. As they became more deeply embedded,
policy became what its practice was:
"Take the first point - having aims and objectives and 
things like that. We did try to do that for some social 
security policies but it was incredibly difficult for 
most of them. Say you've got a benefit - you don't have 
a policy, you've got a benefit and in fact you have to 
invent the policy to suit the benefit. Like retirement 
benefit - what is the policy ? It is incredibly 
difficult to try and write a set of objectives there 
which everybody would agree on and which are not somehow 
mutually contradictory because you actually find that 
it's trying to do a lot of different things - to provide 
some support to people in old age. So if it's doing 
that, why isn't it means tested ?"
(Deputy Secretary)
The concept of targets also created difficulties. The success of any
policy once set loose in its environment depended on many factors,
only one of which was its architects' careful design. The outcome of
a programme of support for the car industry, for example, might be
affected not only by the terms and conditions of the particular
scheme but also by variations in local demand; industrial
disputation; tariffs, interest rates and other aspects of national
economic policy; the level and intensity of national and
international competition; the price of oil; the pressure for cleaner
cities and many others. All this made the setting of targets, except
in rudimentary process terms, exceedingly difficult:
"The thing that worries me most about it, as geared to a 
policy division is that the concept of target setting is 
not fully appropriate. There is not really an effective 
distinction between something that is a policy target and 
something that is a managerial target. You might have a 
policy target to reduce import penetration by 50 per cent 
by the end of this year. Now, in no way is that 
something by which I ought to allow my career to be 
judged. Whereas getting the handling time for special 
assistance cases down from ten to eight weeks is the sort 
of thing that might be measured."
(Policy Under Secretary)
Policy making, officials argued, was fluid rather than static. 
Policies were in a constant state of emergence and transformation. 
They had no clear beginning nor ending. They merged one into the 
other. As this was the case, the conduct of overarching evaluation 
appeared less relevant to policy officials than constant but close <- 
monitoring of progress and its subsequent marginal adjustment:
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"The notion that you have a policy and then you have a 
point in time a couple of years later when you say 'and 
now it has worked' is really a bit naive because life has 
moved on and the objectives have moved on and bits of 
monitoring information have become available as you go
along and you've made little changes lots of
information has become available and you change in 
response to that, so the animal you're evaluating has 
changed as well and maybe you have to see it as a rolling 
programme of watching what you are doing rather than a 
big bang thing which is how I imagined it would be when 
we started...It might not be any the worse for this and 
it may be the only way you can do these things unless you 
say I will not touch this piece of policy again."
(Deputy Secretary)
Here, then, there appeared to be room for accommodation between 
policy officials and their managerial counterparts. If the larger 
ambitions of the management reformers could be replaced with more 
modest ones, policy officials were significantly more willing to 
allow that useful results.might flow from policy management. Rather 
than aiming continuously for the global assessment of policy, a more 
incremental approach could be utilised. Certainly, the experience of 
comprehensive evaluation along FMI lines had not, for some, been a 
happy one:-
"We did invest a lot of effort in doing an exercise in 
relation to provision for the elderly with retirement 
pensions and income support, coming up with objectives, 
looking at evaluation methods... the thing just sat on the 
shelf because by the time we finished it, it was such a 
motherhood thing that you couldn't actually use it and we 
all found that very disillusioning."
(Deputy Secretary)
So, policy analysis should be concentrated on change at the margin. 
For instance, although one could not specify the objectives of a 
benefit with precision, if a change in its administration were 
proposed then the task of analysing the effect of that change became 
manageable. Its objectives could be delineated more easily and its 
effects monitored more readily. Since much of the original policy, 
and the programmes which were its tangible expression, were not in 
any case open to alteration, the incremental approach appeared to 
hold out considerably more promise that the global alternative. 
Existing policy rather than being the object of analysis could act as 
the framework within which evaluation of incremental change could 
take place:
"Most of it is rather intermediate stuff because often 
the objectives of change themselves are intermediate 
sorts of things. They don't tend to be global like 
stopping people from starving. You're not in that sort 
of fundamentalist territory."
(Deputy Secretary)
For all its benefits in practice, the more limited conception of 
policy management failed, nevertheless, to come to grips with more
72
fundamental questions regarding the effectiveness with which policy
was delivered and the appropriateness of policy choices. In reality,
it amounted to monitoring and adjustment with a particular eye to
issues of cost. Policy officials conceded that evaluation of this
kind would be helpful but so long as it focused principally on
efficiency, its potential remained limited. Gray, for example, calls
attention to the fact that in concentrating so heavily on the
mentality of accountants, the FMI may have missed the opportunity to
learn more from managerial advances in private industry where there
had been a renewed focus on assessing the quality of products and
services rather than concentrating on the efficiency of their
manufacture or delivery (Gray, 1986, p.19). In fact, not until Next
Steps was well under way did the quality of services delivered by
government become a major preoccupation:
"Policy people are right to be sceptical about the 
capacity of the financial management people to ask the 
right sorts of questions about programmes. It is OK to 
ask questions about the efficiency of industrial policy 
but what they haven't got is the tools to ask questions 
about its effectiveness. There is a gap in the rhetoric 
here."
(former Policy Under Secretary)
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CHAPTER 4
TRYING AGAIN: THE NEXT STEPS
Five years after its inception, the FMI had 'run out of steam'. Its 
successes, although present, were limited. Its failures, whilst 
understandable, were manifest. In summary, the FMI lost momentum 
because its forms prevailed over its substance, because there was 
deep suspicion at many levels of the civil service about the 
motivations of its political and bureaucratic proponents and because 
it failed to overcome deeply entrenched structural and cultural 
impediments to change. Managerial zeal did not, however, fade with 
the programme that was its standard- bearer. It re-emerged 
resplendent, draped in the new garb of the Next Steps programme.
This reform built consciously and conscientiously on the foundations 
which the FMI had lain. At the same time, however, its designers 
sought at every step to avoid the pitfalls which had buried its 
predecessor. In this, they appear to have been only partly 
successful. Although there is much in the Next Steps approach which 
is attractive, its introduction into the arcane world of Whitehall 
politics could not be expected to proceed without a hitch. In the 
event, the political and bureaucratic forces which had drawn swords 
on the battlefield of the FMI, picked them up again to war in the 
very same fields over its successor.
1. The Background to 'The Next Steps1
By 1987, five years after the FMI's launch, the Prime Minister had,
for good reason, become concerned that the pace of managerial change
had slackened. Advised by Sir Robin Ibbs that the FMI had failed to
deliver many of the benefits it had promised, she commissioned the
Efficiency Unit to conduct a scrutiny not solely of progress with the
FMI but of management in government more generally (Hennessy, 1990,
p.618). Unlike previous scrutinies, 'Improving Management in
Government' was not focused on the delivery of a particular service
or the conduct of a particular function but was designed to examine
the entire process of management reform since the Thatcher Government
assumed office in 1979. The scrutiny was further motivated by the
perception among Efficiency Unit personnel that the unit itself
needed to assess its future direction. Coming on the tail end of the
Parliament it was appropriate for its members to pause to think about
how its contribution might be renewed when the next government
assumed office:
"They realised that what they had done was largely 
marginal in so far as basic attitudes were concerned.
The ethos still looked a good deal like it had done 
before. So they focused on the FMI, as the latest of the 
reforms that had taken place. They asked what has the
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FMI delivered and then found that well, perhaps, it 
hadn't delivered anything substantial at all."
(Principal)
The Government's new concentration on managerial change was also 
fanned by its radical reform agenda. It had a very substantial 
programme of political change ahead of it. There was not only civil 
service reform but reforms to the poll tax, education and the 
National Health Service among others. The magnitude of the reforms 
proposed led the Prime Minister and the Efficiency Unit to question 
whether the structure and operation of the civil service was adequate 
to deal with the political stresses with which the governmental 
machine would soon have to deal.
The unit therefore began a comprehensive programme of interviews with
Ministers and civil servants at all levels of the administration.
The need for further reform combined with mounting evidence of the
FMI's lack of success in achieving fundamental change soon persuaded
its officials that more major surgery was required:
"They talked to people about the FMI, about the 
expectations that people had for it and whether these 
were being realised. They talked to senior people about 
the extent to which they thought they managed departments 
and about why they couldn't. They talked to Ministers 
about their managerial responsibilities and ministers' 
worries that the sheer workload was preventing them from 
doing the job they thought they were in politics for.
But the real motivator for the Next Steps was their 
talking to the real people out there doing it who 
persistently gave them the same message - that they could 
do more, that they wanted to do more...but that the 
machine prevented them from doing it. That was the 
bedrock on which all the rest was constructed."
(Principal)
The unit released a draft report for internal consumption. It was
the source of immediate consternation. Three different disputes
began over its prescriptions. The first related to civil service
size. The Efficiency Unit saw the fledgling conception of agencies
as a means to reduce the size, role and influence of the service even
further than it had been. Hence, the first that departments heard
about Next Steps was that it was an initiative designed to cut back
the core civil service. This would be achieved either by privatising
or by hiving off agencies which would then establish their own
methods of organisation and conditions of operation:
"I got involved with the Next Steps from mid-1987, pre­
publication. Departments were asked to deliver up 
candidates [for agency status] on a hush hush basis. The 
whole emphasis of the Next Steps was not on improving 
management but on reducing the size of the civil service.
There was great chest thumping stuff coming out of the 
Efficiency Unit about how, on this approach, one might
get the civil service down to twenty five thousand.
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Since then we have seen a shift in emphasis so that we 
are back on the track of improving management in 
government."
(Departmental Deputy Secretary)
The attempt to hive off civil service work to autonomous agencies 
outside the civil service umbrella met with swift and stiff 
resistance, not least from the Treasury. Departments and their 
staffs were not yet ready to countenance the abandonment of a unified 
civil service. Following intensive negotiation, management 
improvement was reinstated as the primary objective of the new reform 
programme. However, as Next Steps developed further the issue of 
whether and to what extent it was consistent with a unified service 
loomed large as a matter which required urgent resolution (Fraser, 
1988, pp.48-49).
A second dispute arose because Treasury was concerned about the 
impact the intensive push to delegation would have on its ability to 
control public expenditure. Treasury officials reasoned that if 
agencies were permitted openly to bid for resources, to control their 
staffs and to manage their financial affairs more independently, it 
may not be able to control new demands for additional expenditure 
which would inevitably arise. This concern, while quite legitimate, 
was soon sucked into the vortex of Treasury-departmental 
relationships with each side suspecting the other of making inroads 
upon their respective spheres of influence (Cameron, 1988, p.11; 
Drewry, 1988, pp.505- 506). In the event, the impasse was ended by 
the intervention of the Prime Minister and the head of the Home Civil 
Service:
"The Efficiency Unit reports directly to the PM...They 
told the PM what the ideas were and she responded 
favourably when she first heard them and crucially, so 
did the head of the home Civil Service, Sir Robert 
Armstrong. Without him, and his support right from the 
outset, I'm sure that this would not have come about, 
certainly not in the way that it has."
(Principal)
Third, the Prime Minister had still to persuade the Chancellor and
other Ministers of the merits of the new approach. By convention, a
Prime Minister did not interfere with the way Ministers managed their
departments. Yet the Next Steps clearly had fundamental implications
for the relationship between Ministers and their departments. In
addition there was considerable division of opinion between Ministers
regarding the desirability of the changes. Some greeted with relief
the programme's avowed intention to relieve them of managerial
responsibility. Others, however, were concerned that Next Steps
would rob them of control:
"So Ministers needed to be brought on board. They were 
consulted and the Chancellor was one of those Ministers - 
and he said 'I don't much like the look of this and there
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are many matters which would need to be sorted out before 
I support it in the form of a number of preconditions and 
steps that would have to be satisfied before an agency 
would be established.' Once these were agreed in general 
terms, the issue went to Cabinet for endorsement. In the 
final analysis it was a political decision."
(Principal)
2. The Next Steps Report
The Next Steps report was finally introduced to the Parliament by the 
Prime Minister on February 18 1988. It presented a sweeping 
indictment of the progress of management reform in Whitehall since 
1982. It found that while the civil service was much more conscious 
of the cost of its activities than it had ever been, the essential 
features of management in Whitehall had remained untouched by five 
years of intensive administrative reform. Short-term political 
priorities still squeezed out long- term planning. Policy and 
ministerial support dominated civil service structure and function to 
the neglect of effective delivery of government services. Government 
programmes were focused on the expenditure of money rather than the 
achievement of results. There was a chronic shortage of managerial 
skills. The civil service itself was far too large to manage as a 
cohesive entity. Clearly, the introduction of new management systems 
had been a welcome development. However, without a real change in 
attitudes and institutions, in the culture of the administration, the 
benefits obtained from the systems had been limited (Efficiency Unit, 
1988, Appendix B, p.21).
The Efficiency Unit's more specific findings on progress in each of 
the three components of the FMI was no less damning. Certainly 
progress had been made in the development of systems but little 
beyond the quality of information had improved. The unit concluded 
that top management systems had been found relevant principally to 
executive functions but had made scant progress in altering patterns 
of analysis in headquarters and policy divisions (Efficiency Unit, 
1988, Appendix B, p.22). Delegated budgeting systems had been 
trialled with some success. However, the pilot systems had been 
overwhelmed by larger forces, militating against delegation including 
ministerial responsibility to Parliament, the existence of extensive 
central controls and a general reluctance by managers to embrace the 
risks implicit in delegation (Efficiency Unit, 1988, Appendix B, 
p.28). There was still an inadequate concentration on results. Many 
more performance indicators had been developed but these related 
principally to administrative expenditure. Systematic evaluation of 
programmes had not yet been undertaken (Efficiency Unit, 1988, 
Appendix B, pp.25-26).
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The Efficiency Unit's programme was a radical one. It made five
principal recommendations. First, 'agencies' would be established to
carry out the executive functions of government. Second, the manner
in which an agency would perform its tasks would be specified in a
policy and resources framework agreed with its sponsoring department.
Third, each agency would be headed by a chief executive appointed
from within or outside the civil service. The chief executive would
be held personally responsible for the achievement of the specific
objectives and targets set in the agency's framework document.
Fourth, chief executives would responsible to Ministers who in turn
would be accountable to parliament for the operation of their
agencies To implement these changes, the unit recommended, fifth,
that a full Permanent Secretary be designated as 'project manager' to
ensure that the reform programme proceeded quickly and at a high
level. The unit summarised the impact of its proposals in the
following terms:
"The aim should be to establish a quite different way of 
conducting the business of government. The central Civil 
Service should consist of a relatively small core engaged 
in the function of servicing Ministers and managing 
departments, who will be the sponsors of particular 
government policies and services. Responding to these 
departments will be a range of agencies employing their 
own staff, who may or may not have the status of Crown 
servants, and concentrating on the delivery of their 
particular service, with clearly defined responsibilities 
between the Secretary of State and the Permanent 
Secretary on the one hand and the Chairmen or Chief 
Executives of the agencies on the other. Both 
departments and their agencies should have a more open 
and simplified structure."
(Efficiency Unit, 1988, p.15)
The new approach had an eclectic parentage. In 1968, the Fulton 
Report observed that there were many constraints on delegation in 
Whitehall and that large scale executive operations should be hived 
off wherever possible to independent boards (Cmnd 3638, 1968, para 
147). In the late 1970s, some departmental agencies were created, 
the most important of which were the Property Services Agency and the 
Procurement Executive. Generally, however, the movement towards 
hiving off failed to take root because, as economic conditions 
worsened, political attitudes towards the proliferation of 
non-departmental public bodies hardened (Garrett, 1980, p.69). A 
decade later circumstances had changed, producing an altogether more 
conducive environment for a reconsideration of Fulton's ideas. Cash 
limits had placed a clear ceiling on budgetary expansion. Delegation 
rather than amalgamation was the administrative fashion. The 
strictly hierarchical civil service had begun to creak under the 
pressure of increasingly unpredictable economic and social conditions 
(Richards, 1989, p.31). Perhaps most importantly, the Government 
itself was strongly persuaded of the need for managerial reform and 
it had the will to effect it (Butler, 1990, pp.4-5).
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"I think that it was framed at a time when everything was 
right for it. There was the political will to drive 
through management change...There was a grass roots 
feeling that delegation had not run through, that 
managers had been given the trappings and not the tools.
I think there was also a growing number of people working 
their way up into reasonably influential positions who
were interested in management issues at the very top
level there was a developing feeling that departments 
were extremely difficult to manage...on top of trying to 
do what most Permanent Secretaries are interested in 
which is policy work. A system that enabled those areas 
to be better managed was urgently wanted. All this 
formed a climate where there was a readiness for change."
(Treasury Under Secretary)
Next Steps also had a respectable private sector lineage (Richards, 
1989, p.29). Newly emergent managerial literature emphasised the 
importance of 'loose tight' properties - the co-existence of firm 
central direction with maximum sub-divisional autonomy - to 
managerial success (Peters and Waterman, 1982, p.318). Establish a 
small central core of personnel whose task it is to set policy and 
establish guidelines for the delivery of services, enter contracts 
with service suppliers to meet sales and service targets and then 
just watch how well the system runs, was the simple but cogent 
message which came from business analysts (Toffler, 1985, p.170).
This idea resonated clearly in the design of the Next Steps reforms. 
'Small is beautiful' was the sincere belief of the new reformers and 
the increasingly hackneyed but popular phrase was cited with approval 
right across the managerial spectrum (See, for example, Peters and 
Waterman, 1982, p.321; Butler, 1990, p.5).
The Next Steps was not so different in concept from the FMI 
(Richards, 1989, p.29; Gray and Jenkins, 1990, p.161). Both sought 
to break down the excessive centralisation and hierarchy which had 
characterised British central administration for decades. In its 
place, a looser more delegated managerial environment was to prevail. 
However, the difference with the Next Steps was that it confronted 
more directly the major institutional impediments which had stood in 
the way of the 'loose-tight organisation'. It did so by proposing 
substantial delegation of budgets, manpower and pay and conditions 
backed by structural changes to match. It also sought to dilute the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility to permit agency executives as 
well as Ministers to be held accountable for the performance and 
mistakes of the agencies in their charge. There were confrontations 
on both fronts. Each is now considered.
3. Ministerial Responsibility, Ministers and Managers
"The FMI talked quite a bit about management by 
Ministers. It only talked about it though. The reality 
was that Ministers couldn't exercise their
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responsibilities and what is more, arguably they didn't 
want to. That's not what they joined for. Next Steps 
took that on the nose."
(Principal)
The FMI had tried hard to engage Ministers in management. In this it 
failed miserably. The Next Steps blueprint drew from this the lesson 
that Ministers should be required to involve themselves in management 
only to the degree necessary to provide clear policy direction and 
establish definable targets for effective performance. The split 
between the policy responsibilities of Ministers and the managerial 
responsibilities of the administration was then institutionalised by 
effecting a structural separation between core departments, whose 
task was to provide political advice to Ministers, and executive 
agencies, whose task was to deliver governmental services.
Ministers, together with their Permanent Secretaries, would be 
responsible for charting strategy, determining specific policy 
objectives, ensuring compatibility between the various component 
parts of portfolio operations and endorsing annual performance 
agreements. Chief executives, by contrast, would be responsible for 
ensuring that their agencies pursued the objectives which had been 
set ministerially, reached the targets which had been agreed, 
delivered an effective service to the public and, where appropriate, 
for making recommendations to the Minister regarding policy changes 
which could facilitate their work.
This division of responsibility was also reflected in the 
accountability arrangements which were formulated for Ministers and 
chief executives respectively. Ministers would account to Parliament 
for the work of their departments including the performance and 
conduct of agencies within their portfolio. Agency chief executives 
would account to Permanent Secretaries and through them to Ministers 
for the achievement of the agency's operational objectives (HC 
494-11, 1987/88, Evidence of Rt. Hon. Richard Luce, Minutes of 
Evidence, pp.64-65). Stated like this, the division of roles 
appeared clear and unambiguous. However, two assumptions needed to 
be fulfilled if the division was to be effected successfully. The 
first was that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility could be 
modified to accommodate the implicit loosening of Ministerial 
control. The second was that an effective distinction could be drawn 
between policy and administration. Both were open to question.
(i) Modified Ministerial Responsibility
The problem began with the Government's assertion that traditional
patterns of accountability would not be altered by the administrative
reforms which had been proposed:
"What we are saying is that we must preserve, of course, 
the basic principles of ministerial accountability to
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Parliament. That is absolutely cardinal and I am glad to 
have a chance to reinforce that point. That must be 
preserved. At the same time, on the day to day 
operational management of the agency, we would delegate 
as much authority as possible. That means the chief 
executive himself must take a large number of decisions."
(HC 494-11, 1987/88, 
Rt. Hon. Richard Luce, Minister for the Civil Service,
Minutes of Evidence, p.64)
However, as the Expenditure Committee pointed out in its 1977 report 
on the Civil Service, the creation of quasi autonomous administrative 
agencies necessarily implies a diminution of Ministerial control.
For this reason, it believed there was a need to achieve a proper but 
altered balance between Ministerial supervision and autonomous action 
taken by an agency; between the formal accountability of Ministers to 
Parliament and the effective responsibility of chief executives for 
the conduct of their operations (HC 535, 1976/77, p.91). It is too 
early to predict what effect the Next Steps will have on these 
complex relationships. However, two quite different scenarios might 
reasonably be envisaged. In the first, it is assumed that the 
Government's position remains unaltered. No change in the operation 
of ministerial accountability to Parliament occurs. In the second, a 
shared responsibility to Parliament and public is envisaged. Both 
illustrate, more generally, the significant impact which the 
interaction between politicians and administrators can have on the 
outcomes of new programmes of administrative reform.
Scenario 1: Existing Accountability Arrangements
a. If the Minister is still held formally accountable to the 
Parliament not only for setting the framework of agency operation but 
also for its management then inevitably he or she will be inclined to 
intervene in administrative affairs. As was the case under the FMI, 
the delegation of authority to agencies and within agencies will be
accepted as given only until a question is asked, a detrimental
report is filed or a widely publicised administrative error is made. 
After that, Ministerial intervention to rectify the situation and to 
circumvent further political attack can reasonably be expected. 
Territorial disputes between Ministers and chief executives would be 
the result:
"I didn't think the Next Steps would work when it 
started. I didn't for instance think you could take 
something like social security and make it separate from 
politicians - I am still actually to see that you can do i
that. I didn't think politicians would allow it. I
still can't see what politicians think is in it for 
them...Given that I couldn't see what was in it for 
Ministers because it just removed from their direct
control things which might end up being embarrassing, I
don't know what they will do if they can't actually
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change the wording of a form - I actually had a Secretary 
of State drafting a form...In a way the civil service has 
rather railroaded them into it."
(Deputy Secretary)
If, as might be expected, Ministers do intervene to avoid 
embarrassment and parliamentary sanction, delegation under Next Steps 
will be substantially prejudiced (See further HC 494-11, 1987/88, 
Evidence submitted by the First Division Association, p.36).
b. Because, formally, Ministers are held accountable to 
Parliament, agency chief executives may well be inclined to adopt a 
conservative approach to the management of the agency in order to 
ensure that the Minister's position is made safe. The cautious, 
multi-layered, supervisory culture so prevalent in Whitehall 
departments may be replicated in agencies whose chief executives are 
concerned at every point to avoid errors having political 
repercussions. Such a conservative approach, however, would run 
contrary to the expressed intention of Next Steps which is to make 
agencies more entrepreneurial in outlook and action (See further HC 
494-11, 1987/88, Evidence submitted by W. Plowden and G. Drewry, 
p.30).
c. If chief executives are to answer to Parliamentary select 
committees for the day-to-day operations of their agencies, they 
should be permitted to speak and to be drawn to account on their own 
behalf when appearing before them. However, the traditional view, as 
embodied in the Osmotherly Rules, is that all civil servants are 
accountable through their Minister and give evidence on behalf of 
their Minister. The Treasury and Civil Service Committee recommended 
to the Government that the rules be altered to permit chief 
executives to answer on their own behalf (HC 494-1, 1987/88, p.xix). 
The Government responded unfavourably to the suggestion. Here, the 
Government's concern to retain some control over agency chief 
executives lay in stark contrast to the assertion by agencies of 
operational independence.
Scenario Two: Modified Accountability Arrangements
This somewhat pessimistic analysis needs to be balanced by an 
appreciation of the very different problems which might arise if the 
alternative scenario were to come to fruition.
a. Where a Minister adopts a hands-off rather than hands-on 
approach to the management of agencies, the power and influence of 
chief executives will correspondingly increase. If, at the same 
time, the accountability of Ministers to Parliament for operational 
matters is diminished, an accountability vacuum may be created (See 
in particular Drewry, 1988, p.513; Drewry, 1990, pp.325-328). Chief
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executives would exercise their operational responsibilities in the 
absence of effective parliamentary sanction. This may not matter 
given the presence, as in Australia, of a fully developed system of 
administrative law. In its absence, however, it may reasonably be 
expected that there would soon be calls from Parliament for Ministers 
to reassume responsibility for their agencies in order to restore a 
balance between the exercise of administrative power and 
accountability for its use.
b. Chief executives would bear primary responsibility for the 
conduct and performance of their agencies. Acting more 
entrepreneurially, they may reap considerable success but with 
increased risk comes also the prospect of failure. Where failures 
occur, cooler Ministers may respond by pointing to compensating 
successes and arguing that the occasional failure is one cost of a 
system which as a whole produced far greater efficiencies. More 
likely, however, many Ministers would respond by reasserting their 
control.
c. Given their responsibility for large chunks of governmental 
work it is inevitable that chief executives, particularly of the 
mega-agencies, will increasingly become public figures in their own 
right. Not only does this prejudice traditional notions of public 
service neutrality but it also creates the potential for active and 
potentially public conflict between the executives and their 
Ministers. If, for example, chief executives were to be blamed by 
select committees for a deterioration in agency performance caused 
principally by Ministerially imposed policy or resource constraints, 
the temptation to criticise or at least allude to impediments posed 
by these constraints would be significant. However, such allusions 
might lead to a swift ministerial response (see, for example, HC 
494-11, 1987/1988, Evidence of Rt. Hon. Michael Hesletine MP,
p.48).
(ii) The division between policy and administration
The second assumption upon which the successful operation of agencies 
rested was that a clear distinction could be drawn between policy 
functions, which rest essentially in the domain of Ministers, and 
administrative or managerial functions which are the province of 
civil servants or managers. On this the relaxation of the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility largely depends. For if there is no 
workable distinction, it will be difficult to determine the 
respective responsibilities of Ministers and their agency officials 
and even more difficult to determine who should answer for agency 
performance. Yet, both academic literature and practical analysis 
cast doubt on its viability:
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"I don't accept that there is such a thing as a division 
of policy and administration. I think at the highest 
possible most ethereal level, Ibbs was all about the 
division of policy and administration. What he said was 
that Ministers were overburdened with day-to-day stuff. 
They should be out there governing the country, making 
policy and should not be burdened with the minutiae of 
how their particular services should be run. But when 
you've said that, when you get down the line, policy and 
administration are quite inseparable. The words actually 
slip away in your hands."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
Where, at the margin, there is an inevitable overlap between the two, 
new difficulties will certainly be created for Ministers and agency 
officials alike. Three examples will suffice to illustrate the 
point.
First, Ministers are keen to ensure that their policy settings are
calculated to achieve maximum political advantage. However, these
settings may not necessarily coincide with those preferred by agency
chief executives whose principal concern will be to maximise the
satisfaction of the consumers of their services. It is entirely
possible, therefore, that centrally determined policy objectives will
conflict with those dictated by operational concerns. Chief
executives will be unwilling simply to accept policy as read and will
soon seek actively to influence its direction. In consequence, two
different policy streams may emerge as core department and agency
negotiate constantly to achieve an appropriate balancing of
interests. Different perspectives on policy may also spawn
duplication as chief executives come armed to policy discussion with
arguments and research of their own and departments recruit to better
their understanding of operational exigencies (See HC 494-11,
1987/88, Evidence submitted by Robert Baldwin, p.88; HC 481, 1989/90,
Evidence submitted by Rt. Hon. Richard Luce, p.48):
"[Duplication] is an enormous risk of agencies. As soon 
as you split anything, both sides try to regain their 
expertise. We are already finding at the centre that we 
have to build up some of the things that had been there 
formerly. When we set up the computer agency we suddenly 
found that all the computers had gone and I know that 
some agencies are recruiting policy people."
(Deputy Secretary)
Secondly, the more autonomous agencies become the more likely it is 
that they will be subject to 'capture' by their constituencies (See 
HC 481, 1989/90, Evidence submitted by P. Dunleavy and A. Francis, 
p.70). It is a moot point whether core departments will be able 
effectively to scrutinise the activities of their agencies and any 
lack of understanding will only serve to exacerbate splits in 
perspective between policy analysts and agency operatives.
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Thirdly, the inevitable overlap between policy and administration may 
also cause difficulties in determining whether it should be a 
Minister or chief executive who should answer for an agency in 
Parliament. Individual complaints, for example, may raise both 
administrative and policy questions. Where operational failures are 
at issue, there may be a tendency for Ministers to redefine policy 
questions as administrative issues and for administrators to do the 
reverse. In either case, the waters of accountability may be muddied 
(see for example HC 494-11, 1987/88, Evidence submitted by the First 
Division Association, pp.38-39). The avoidance of responsibility 
would make it significantly more difficult for Parliament to apply 
the already limited sanctions at its disposal.
In summary, the proper implementation of the Next Steps would 
necessarily involve a considerable relaxation of the rules governing 
the accountability of Ministers to the Parliament. Such a relaxation 
in turn presumes that an effective distinction could be drawn between 
policy, for which Ministers will in future be held responsible, and 
administration, for which chief executives will be called to account. 
At present, however, the Government both embraces the distinction 
between policy and administration and shows little or no sign of 
acceding to the relaxation of ministerial responsibility. In the 
absence of such a relaxation, the operation of the Next Steps 
reforms, like those of the FMI before it, may be hampered (see also 
Chapman, 1988, p.6; Fry, 1988, pp.436-437) as Ministers and their 
officials engage in increasingly difficult territorial negotiations.
"Accountability, however, will be unpicked by 
decentralisation. We're not necessarily saying that 
Ministers will not be accountable in a decentralised 
government just as they are in a centralised government
 but what it does require is an adaptation on the part
of both Ministers and the public in the way they handle 
business in decentralised government and a good deal more 
thinking must be done in this area."
(Treasury Deputy Secretary)
(iii) Political incentives for change
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the political problems 
associated with the implementation of Next Steps. The discussion 
needs to be balanced by a recognition that, despite the formidable 
difficulties the initiative faces, there are a number of powerful 
forces in the political arena which have exerted strong pressure in 
its favour. As with the FMI, the most important of these has been 
the commitment which Prime Minister Thatcher brought to the cause of 
managerial improvement. Her interest in changing the way that 
government was administered was unflagging. It persisted throughout 
the life of the FMI and, when its fortunes began to wane, she was not
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discouraged but actively sought to revive the reformist agenda by
embracing Sir Robin Ibbs' even more radical prescriptions. Despite
inherent contradictions between her public advocacy and private
style, between her active dislike of the administration and her drive
to improve it, she nevertheless drove the managerial agenda in a way
no Prime Minister since Lloyd George had previously done:
"I think what any civil servant would recognise is that 
she was a passionate advocate to get substantial 
improvement in the management of government. She cared 
very much about the issue. She did not pretend that she 
was a manager but she wanted people who were good 
managers to manage well. What is more important she 
called people to account for the objectives and targets 
that ministers had laid down. She took a genuinely 
personal interest in making sure that the reforms were 
working. It seems to me that whether she had been in 
government for five, seven or nine years, that would have 
been her contribution."
(Deputy Secretary)
Further, the Next Steps has, since its inception attracted 
considerable interest and enthusiasm in parliament. With no less 
than four inquiries in three years, scrutiny by parliamentary 
committees has acted as a very important impetus for change. By 
demanding that evidence of progress be provided and that explanations 
be forthcoming in its absence (HC 481, 1989/90, Evidence submitted by 
Peter Hennessy, pp.60-61), the Parliament applied intense pressure 
for managerial improvement.
Finally, the FMI, whatever its faults, had served as a vehicle 
through which some of the more intractable problems of reform could 
be resolved. As a result, Next Steps was able to build 
constructively on the foundations which had been laid. The FMI, for 
example, laid to rest the notion that Ministers either could or 
wanted to become managers. The Next Steps was not then bedevilled by 
endless debates on how they should be made interested in and 
committed to the managerial cause. It disclosed that Ministers had 
little time to devote to the details of administration. One of the 
reasons Next Steps was so eagerly embraced by some was that it 
recognised the reality of the Minister's position.
4. Treasury, Departments, Agencies and Delegation
The principal obstacle which lay in the path of the FMI had been the 
resistance of the Treasury to a relaxation of central controls. This 
resistance had been mirrored in departments where central finance and 
establishments offices were at best cautious and at worst actively 
resistant to the transfer of managerial authority to operational 
managers. The Next Steps programme took direct aim at these points 
of resistance. The Efficiency Unit report had been critical of the 
plethora of central controls still retained by the Treasury. It
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cited controls over recruitment, dismissal, choice of staff, 
promotion, hours of work, accommodation and the use of information 
technology among others as strong impediments to managers assuming 
their proper, delegated responsibilities. Each was seen as a 
significant constraint. None produced incentives to manage better 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988, p.5). It found similarly that central 
finance and establishments divisions by restricting flexibility, for 
example to switch resources between budget items, heavily constrained 
the ability of operational managers to exercise their initiative 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988, Appendix 2, p.28). In Whitehall, the trend 
towards the centralisation of financial and managerial affairs had 
been a long, steady and powerful one. Yet Treasury power, just as 
much as ministerial responsibility, required modification if the Next 
Steps revolution were to succeed. The substantial and successful 
reduction of central financial control was the sine qua non of 
successful administrative reform.
(i) Treasury and Agencies.
From the outset, the Treasury was deeply concerned about the Next
Steps reforms. When early drafts of the proposals were first
distributed they met with strong reservations (HC 494-11, 1987/88,
Evidence given by Sir Robin Butler, p.57; Drewry, 1988, p.506; Gray
and Jenkins, 1990, p.163). Its fear was that the strong push to
delegation would undermine its control of public expenditure.
Memories of expenditure rampant still exercised a pervasive influence
on Treasury attitudes:
"No one who was in Treasury in 1976 as I was, when the 
IMF came in, there is not a chance whatever that any of 
us would let that happen again. Public expenditure 
control has to remain absolutely."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
Agencies, focused as they were on the delivery of better quality 
services, could soon be expected to vocalise demands for additional 
resources. This, combined with their greater independence, more 
assertive leadership and public recognition could, it was feared, 
place the Treasury and public expenditure under very considerable 
pressure:
"I think one has to recognise that devolution can work in 
one of two ways. It can work to support Government 
policy, and it also could work in the opposite direction.
The real problem is that the vast majority of the 
expenditure we are talking about is not priced. If it is 
not priced, supply always succeeds demand...People can 
have high cost options rather than low cost options, and 
they can have more rather than less, assuming it is a 
desirable product you are supplying the public, which 
money generally is. So I think one has to take great 
care to ensure the energies one is releasing from 
this...move in the direction of Government policy."
(HC 494-11, 1987/88, 
Evidence from Sir Peter Middleton, p.74)
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Treasury realised that, on the one hand, it had to move with the 
times and support the general thrust towards delegation. However, on 
the other, it could not abandon its commitment to public expenditure 
restraint. Therefore, it set two tough preconditions for its 
continued support. First, any improvements in the quality of service 
arising from the creation of agencies had to be achieved within 
existing levels of resources. There would be no relaxation of 
central expenditure controls (HC 494- II, 1987/88, Memorandum from
H.M. Treasury, p. 68). Secondly, the Treasury demanded and was 
accorded the right to scrutinise candidates for agency status and to 
determine, in association with the sponsoring department, the policy 
and resources framework within which each should operate.
Having established its place at the negotiating table, Treasury 
insisted on strict conditions being met before agencies could be 
permitted to set sail. Every alternative to agency status should be 
considered before agencies were established. Framework documents 
should set out clearly the agency's aims and objectives and its 
arrangements for financial planning and control. Before acceptance, 
each agency should have adequate management and accounting systems. 
Responsibilities delegated to agencies would be the maximum 
practicable but had to be consistent with essential central controls. 
Targets had to be challenging but could not be such as to create 
demands for additional resources. Each agency should report on their 
progress against targets and set in place appropriate arrangements 
for evaluation (HC 481, 1989/90, Memorandum from H.M. Treasury, 
p.23).
It was in negotiations around the terms of agency status that the
major battles between Treasury and agencies began. Treasury
conditions were regarded by agencies as too onerous. Agency demands
for greater freedom were treated mistrustfully by Treasury:
"Let me caricature the Treasury as the people who are the 
less than devoted freaks. There are I think legitimate 
worries in the Treasury and there are less legitimate 
worries. Let me polarise the freak and unfreak by two 
attitudes. The freaks take as the starting point what 
controls is it absolutely essential to retain in order to 
preserve the constitutional position and to protect the 
position of the Secretary of State and the Accounting 
Officer. They throw the onus for proving the need on to 
the person wanting to exert the control. That is the 
right approach. Those who are less convinced want the 
case for each freedom to be argued. When you have 
arguments from these different starting points it can 
make for major difficulties."
(Deputy Secretary)
It would be quitO' wrong to assume from what has been said that there 
had been no change in the Treasury position. The Treasury was 
considerably more prepared than it had been to delegate some of its
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financial controls, particularly input controls. It accepted, for
example, that agencies should have increased in- year and end-year
financial flexibility; that agencies might, in appropriate
circumstances, be accorded trading fund status; and that chief
executives rather than Permanent Secretaries could be nominated as
Accounting Officers (see generally, Cm 914, 1989). But for this
relaxation it had extracted a price. The price was a greater role in
setting targets and monitoring agency performance. The ground it
lost on inputs it made up on outputs:-
"At any point in time...the Treasury will inevitably be 
battling to retain the controls it has had. But that may 
not be the real battle. The battle may be about what 
sort of controls it should have. What I believe to be 
true is that there is more than one way of controlling 
costs. And we have to adapt in Treasury to a world in 
which greater management responsibility is passed down 
and, with it, greater discipline is passed down. I think 
we are moving from a period in which Treasury had to 
place complete reliance on global input controls to one 
in which it can increasingly place suitable reliance on 
output oriented controls - overall budgetary performance, 
cost performance, value for money, quality of 
performance. I think we're seeing the development of a 
new balance between input controls and output controls 
...this doesn't mean that everyone has a block budget.
But it does mean that people have got more freedom within 
the budgetary total."
(Treasury Deputy Secretary)
On the surface it appeared that Treasury had ceded considerable 
ground. Looked at more closely, it was not at all clear that the 
balance of authority between the Treasury, departments and agencies 
had changed fundamentally. Indeed the first study of agency 
financing suggested that if anything, Treasury control had been 
tightened rather than relaxed. Mellon's survey of experience with 
five of the first agencies concluded that Treasury appeared unwilling 
to trust in the capacity of agencies to manage properly. It still, 
she argued, operated within a framework of control rather than 
facilitation (HC 481, 1989/90, Memorandum submitted by Elizabeth 
Mellon, p.101).
(ii) Departments and Agencies
The most dramatic effect of Next Steps was not on the relationship
between Treasury and departments but on that between departments and
their agencies. The transfer of responsibility from departments to
agencies involved, particularly in the case of larger agencies,
shifts in authority and influence of almost unprecedented scale:
"Agencies are about power. In the DSS a year ago, the 
Permanent Secretary presided over a department of about 
eighty-two thousand people. A year from now he will 
preside over a department which will consist of a funny 
little rump of an HQ of a thousand people, a benefits 
agency of seventy thousand people with running costs of 
one thousand million pounds a year and responsible for
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disbursing benefits of almost six thousand million pounds 
a year; an Information Technology Services Agency of 
three thousand people; a National Insurance Agency of 
nearly seven thousand people; a smaller agency concerned 
with resettlement; and in a further two years, a child 
support agency it represents a reverse takeover."
(Deputy Secretary)
In the post-agency era, core departments were expected to take on a 
much more strategic and less interventionist stance. They had to 
clarify their new identity, set targets for their agencies and 
develop new skills to perform adequately in the changed managerial 
environment (See HC 481, 1989/90, Memorandum submitted by the 
Department of Social Security, p.107). The key attitudinal change 
necessary was that the core department should learn to trust chief 
executives to perform effectively. Its own rule would be to 
determine whether what was done was consistent with governmental and 
ministerial objectives. Departments would have to learn to manage 
'hands off' even at the cost of agencies making early mistakes. Only 
in this way would they be able to realise their potential (HC 348, 
1988/89, pp.40-41).
To effect such fundamental change was always going to be difficult. 
One lesson which the FMI had demonstrated with crystal clarity was 
that the centre of departments had been extremely reluctant to pass 
on increased flexibilities to their line divisions. The full 
flexibilities inherent in the running costs system, for example, had 
rarely been transferred from the centre of departments. The danger 
was that:
"Departments though apparently delegating control may not 
do so in practice or - more insidiously - in the name of 
monitoring an Agency's performance, may supervise and 
constrain the Agency's freedom of action at every turn."
(Butler, 1990, p.7)
From the core department's perspective, freedom did not mean licence.
The additional freedoms which agencies possessed needed to be
balanced by a rigorous framework of operation, clear targets, and
effective management information systems:
"Agencies are about empowering people. With that of 
course goes responsibility and accountability. Because 
we are talking about major change, we are talking about 
power and the transfer of power and this does inevitably 
create sensitivities and worries."
(Deputy Secretary)
Frequently, it took protracted negotiation before the respective 
roles of Minister, Permanent Secretary and Chief Executive were 
clarified and the framework document endorsed (HC 481, 1989/90, 
Evidence given by Chief Executive Employment Services Agency, p.32). 
The position of core departments was especially difficult since they
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needed to balance their own interests against those of the Treasury
on the one hand and agencies on the other:
"There is now almost a three-tier system of tension.
There is tension between agencies and putative agencies 
wanting to go their own way and the central divisions of 
departments, particularly finance divisions, wanting to 
retain a measure of control. Then there is the tension 
between the department as a whole and the Treasury."
(Under Secretary)
For agencies, however, the position was altogether more simple. They
had steadfastly to assert their rights against both finance divisions
and the Treasury:
"It is ...like one of those electronic games where you 
encounter a minor enemy which you can set apart and kill 
only to encounter the gorilla which kills you - that, of 
course, is the Treasury!"
(Deputy Secretary)
There were two areas of contention in particular which dominated 
discussion. The first related to determining the targets which 
should be set for agencies. The second was the debate about who 
should set them. As a general rule, core departments would argue 
that very detailed targets should be set so that the performance of 
new agencies could be monitored carefully. Agencies on the other 
hand contended that targets expressed in terms of general levels of 
service would be sufficient.' Such high level targets, they argued, 
would avoid the need for constant intervention by those at the centre 
of departments. Departments countered by contending that high level 
or selective targets may still not be sufficiently sensitive to 
permit them to avoid Ministerial embarrassment when agencies did not 
perform:
"You come back to the question of the answerability of 
the Secretary of State and it has been made abundantly 
clear that he will still answer to the Parliament for the 
service. Even if you take key targets, a mixture of high 
level targets and targets for particular benefits of 
extreme sensitivity, those where you musn't delay in 
processing a claim, there will nevertheless be other 
benefits where an inordinate delay or an inordinately 
high rate of inaccuracy will put the Minister in an 
embarrassing position."
(Deputy Secretary)
Core departments and agencies also differed on who should set 
targets. Agencies proposed that only they were in a position to do 
so. Departments felt that unless targets were formulated centrally, 
a potent source of control would be denied them. Successful 
negotiations usually involved a compromise. Targets were set upwards 
through the agency and formed part of the business plan it presented 
to the department. The department then satisfied itself first, that 
the targets, as set, would contribute to its overall aims and 
objectives and secondly, that there were no glaring omissions:-
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"We have an extremely strong commitment to equal
opportunity policy at senior level. If there were no EO
targets in the agency's plan, I would expect questions to 
be asked. It would then be for agencies to come back 
with a target - it should not be imposed."
(Deputy Secretary)
(iii) Managing by Contract
The buzz word used to describe the emerging relationship between 
departments and agencies was "management by contract". The idea 
behind the phrase was that the rigid, hierarchical form of managerial 
control for so long characteristic of Whitehall departments would be 
replaced by a series of quasi-contractual agreements between core 
departments and autonomous agencies to deliver government services as 
efficiently and effectively as possible (Plumptre, 1988, p.210; Kemp,
1990, p.25; Richards, 1990, p.5). The model established greater
equality between the parties. It presumed that greater autonomy 
would facilitate the release of managerial energy. Greater maturity 
would qualify an unadorned rush to independence.
However, the reality was that no enforceable contracts existed. Nor
was there legislation to structure the changes. All the arrangements
were administrative. In the absence of enforceable terms, the agency
concept relied almost solely for its success on the adjustment of
attitudes of mind through the creation of new, somewhat artificial,
managerial constructs. The principal benefits of agencies seemed to
rest in their psychology:
"What is an administrative agency - it is nothing, it's 
an administrative unit but people feel it's part of the 
family, people feel it's there - the Treasury can give it 
delegations, put a man in charge, increase pay and 
personnel flexibility. The very act of having a ring 
fence means that within it people can be given greater 
freedoms and responsibility than otherwise - it's an act 
of faith."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
Early evidence suggested that the psychological approach was yielding 
quite: promising results. Official after official said that there was 
a very different feel about living in an agency as opposed to a 
departmental environment. However, the lack of a secure foundation 
for agency structures and operations remained a legitimate cause for 
concern. Would control actually be ceded, or would it be simply that 
its emphasis was changed ? Could psychology alone overcome 
longstanding practices and habits of mind or would a new legal 
framework be required ? These were questions asked with equal 
validity of the relationship between core departments and agencies 
and the relationship between core departments and Treasury. Mellon 
again provided some preliminary and contingent answers. She wondered
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aloud whether, in practice, the rhetoric had been matched by action. 
She argued that, at least in the early days of the agencies she 
studied, what had tended to happen was that there had been little 
change in delegated authority but a major change in language and the 
sociology of ideas (HC 481, 1989/90, Evidence submitted by Elizabeth 
Mellon, p.101). Ideas may act as the precursor to action. However, 
as in the case of the FMI, if these were not soon to be matched by 
additional power, disillusionment would be the inevitable result.
(iv) Administrative incentives to change
Mellon's results were obtained at the micro level. At the macro 
level there were still many factors which weighed heavily in favour 
of the Next Steps reforms. Learning from the lessons of the FMI, the 
architects of Next Steps shrewdly designed their new reform portfolio 
to avoid many pitfalls which had beset its predecessor. So, whilst 
it was commonly acknowledged that Next Steps would encounter stiff 
opposition, the reformers seemed better prepared.
There was little doubt that this time there was a marriage of minds 
between Ministers and senior civil servants regarding direction and 
strategy of the reform programme. Both Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir 
Robin Butler, the first privately and the second publicly, emerged as 
articulate spokesmen for the Next Steps. Sir Peter Middleton at the 
Treasury also supported it although his enthusiasm was tempered by 
his concern to ensure that rigorous public expenditure control was 
maintained. There was, in addition, very substantial agreement 
amongst respondents at senior levels that the Next Steps was worth 
trying and that it could, despite major problems in its execution, 
yield substantial benefits. The agreement of the Prime Minister and 
the Head of the Home Civil Service has normally been a precondition 
for major machinery of government alterations (Pollitt, 1983, p.3). 
The spread of this consensus through senior levels of the bureaucracy 
laid an even deeper foundation for the changes embodied in Next 
Steps.
The Efficiency Unit recommended specifically that the implementation 
process be led by a Permanent Secretary. In the event a Second 
Permanent Secretary of visible enthusiasm was appointed to head the 
Next Steps team. There were two important aspects of this 
appointment. The first^  was its seniority. It was considerably more 
difficult for recalcitrant officials to ignore the urgings of 
Permanent Secretary rank with direct access to the Prime Minister 
than it had been for officials to brush off the exhortations of the 
FMU's leader, who, at Under Secretary rank had limited access even to 
the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury:
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"The fact that Peter Kemp was put in charge of it meant 
that there was a strong unit in the middle harassing 
Permanent Secretaries about it. Therefore, a number of 
Permanent Secretaries perceived it to be to their 
advantage to be behaving nicely."
(Deputy Secretary)
The second factor was that Mr Kemp was named and charged openly with
the task of setting the reforms on course. He was fond of saying
that it was the first time in Whitehall's history that someone had
been specifically put in charge of anything. That the Next Steps had
a public persona set it significantly apart from the FMI. It made
its entry on to the broader public stage and, in doing so, encouraged
a degree of interest in administrative reform which had rarely been
seen previously:
"That was something the FMU didn't have. They were a 
team not an individual, they had no public face. The 
other thing is that they didn't get beyond the bounds of 
the civil service, giving talks and all that kind of 
thing. I can do it."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
The public leadership of Next Steps heralded a new approach to reform 
in Whitehall. The Next Steps reforms were implemented more openly 
than any since the war. Chief executives were named and their posts 
often advertised in open competition. Framework documents were made 
public. Agencies were required to report publicly on their 
performance against targets. Parliamentary interest in the progress 
of reform was welcomed. Next Steps became the focus of major 
addresses by the Chief Secretary of the Treasury and the Head of the 
Home Civil Service. The project manager participated in many 
academic and public forums regarding the Next Steps developments and 
contributed to journals, thus focusing more attention on reform and, 
incidentally, reducing the likelihood that it would be resisted and 
submerged.
However fragile, the artifice of agency generated considerable
enthusiasm amongst many rank and file civil servants. The prospect
of managerial autonomy was alluring and countless discussions ensued
on how one might best take advantage of the opportunities the new
initiative afforded:
"There is a real question about what in the agencies is 
there for the staff. There are two answers. First, the 
promise of more responsive personnel and pay 
systems..there is nothing disreputable about recognising 
local differences...and any efficiency savings are now 
shared with the Treasury. Secondly, there is genuine 
accountability down the line - empowering people to do 
things. It is difficult to know what that means. What 
there is not a limit to is encouraging people to come up 
with ideas...In an agency like DSS there is always a 
tendency to become procedural. If you can show people 
that there is a premium on doing things in a different 
way - that is what risk taking means."
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(Deputy Secretary)
The Next Steps strategy looked upon structural change as the 
precondition for attitudinal change. This joint action on structures 
and people held greater promise of success that the FMI's approach 
which had hoped, against hope, that management information systems 
themselves would be sufficient to expose weaknesses in administration 
and generate sufficient momentum for structural and attitudinal 
reform.
Finally, the Next Steps reforms were embarked upon quickly,
decisively and extensively. The pace of change was criticised, among
others, by union representatives arguing that inadequate consultation
prejudiced its prospects of success (HC 481, 1989/90, Evidence
submitted by the Council of Civil Service Unions, p.38). Still
others remarked on the thinness of the analysis which preceded
changes of such magnitude. Perhaps it would have been better for a
series of pilot agencies first to have been established to test the
validity of the approach (HC 481, 1989/90, Evidence of Professors
Hood and Jones, p.80). But for those at the heart of the changes
such arguments counted for little. What was important was to garner
political support and swoop:
"The Canadians fell for the worst form of old fashioned 
trap. They've done precisely what we didn't do when we 
set up Next Steps. They set up eleven little working 
groups, to look at, as it were, pay across the board, the 
roll of outside boards across the board, accountability
across the board. We, as you will have seen went for the
Next Steps bull headed. We had political support, we 
just went in, we had to get the show on the road, there 
was no other way of doing it. They've gone down the path 
of extended navel gazing first. We decided to act."
(Second Permanent Secretary)
It will only be in retrospect that an informed judgement can be made 
on the wisdom of this approach. The substantial risk which were 
taken may result in the reforms' early demise. Equally, however, the 
'bull-headed' approach may in time be seen as having been the single 
best way to have finessed entrenched opposition and placed reform on 
a significantly higher trajectory.
5. Policy and Practice
For the sake of completeness, it is important to allude briefly to
the fate, in the Next Steps era, of the third component of the FMI
schema, policy analysis and evaluation. In short, it appears to have 
died. The important work on performance indicators conducted by the 
Treasury in the FMI period has proceeded and has become increasingly 
sophisticated. But the broader objective of advancing and
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systematising policy evaluation simply 'ran into the sand'. The
former head of the JMU's policy evaluation arm remarked ruefully:
"There is no talk now about policy. We now divide policy 
and administration...The risk with agencies is that they 
will become a penumbra of para-statals, which will be 
doing a lot of things very efficiently but no one will be 
checking that they are the right things."
(Under Secretary)
In a sense the Next Steps marked the total victory of the policy 
officials over their FMI-inspired managerial challengers.
However, two caveats need to be entered with respect to this 
conclusion. First, as has previously been observed, there 
is already an emerging confrontation between policy officials at the 
centre, responsible to Ministers and largely political in 
orientation, and similar officials in agencies, responsible to chief 
executives and focused largely on operational concerns. This is not, 
as it was under the FMI, a confrontation about the applicability of 
technique but rather a genuine and potentially constructive 
interaction of competing perspectives. The prospect that traditional 
policy analysts will be able to insulate themselves from these new 
sources of advice is considerably less likely than it was previously.
Secondly, there was at the time of this survey more than a germ of
concern in Whitehall that too much had been sacrificed in the
headlong drive to management by agency. There was a continuing, if
quiet, recognition among perceptive officials that something more
needed to be done to improve policy and programme performance. For
some, there was even a hope that a new look at policy might
constitute the next phase of the administrative reform process:
"We do need to think about what happens after Next Steps, 
because if you shine a light on the executive bit, which 
desperately needed a light shone on it, and you get that 
right, it's like draining the pond in St James's park, 
you suddenly find that there are these huge boulders left 
behind. And now some people are starting to think about 
how it is that we can manage policy better. After all, 
we spend a much smaller amount on managing the civil 
service ...than we do on programme expenditure. The poll 
tax, to take an example could have been much better!"
(Principal)
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CHAPTER 5
THE FMIP, MINISTERS AND CORPORATE PLANNING
Canberra's Financial Management Improvement Program (FMIP), like 
Whitehall's FMI, emerged in response to a report on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the civil service. In this case, the report was 
prepared by a governmentally appointed committee of inquiry chaired 
by the businessman, John Reid (Commonwealth of Australia, 1983a). 
Reid, like H.C. Coombs before him, argued that Commonwealth 
administration had for too long been dominated by the requirement 
that ministers' political interests be protected. Certainly, this 
was an important objective. But beyond it, the administration had 
failed to adapt to the changing nature of governmental activity. The 
functions conducted by government had expanded substantially. It had 
become a huge provider of services. The capital, personnel and 
financial resources required to deliver these services had increased 
correspondingly. They needed more effective management. Therefore, 
Reid believed that a more appropriate balance needed to be 
established between political and managerial work (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1983a, Ch.2).
Accordingly, he made a number of important recommendations to improve 
management in government. Ministers, he proposed, should increase 
their involvement with the administration of their departments. 
Management should rank equally with policy. Reid rejected the idea 
advanced in the United Kingdom that ministers should manage their 
departments (Commonwealth of Australia, 1983a, p.41). However, he 
thought that ministers should exercise clear administrative 
leadership. This they could do by participating in the development 
of the department's goals and strategies and taking part in the 
allocation of its resources. In order to achieve this, the 
departmental secretary should ensure that regular and adequate 
information was forthcoming to the minister on operational and 
managerial issues (Commonwealth of Australia, 1983a, p.42).
To improve efficiency and obtain value for money, Reid re- endorsed
the principles of accountable management. The committee quoted with
approval the opinion of the then Secretary of the Department of
Finance that:
"At this level, financial management in the public 
service is presented with particular difficulties since, 
often, the nature of the results sought by programs 
allows only imprecise assessment of the effectiveness of 
different approaches to program management. Despite the 
difficulties, there is an overriding need to develop a 
capacity for a fully informed perception of resource
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implications of policies, and for encouraging an attitude 
of mind that constantly relates the development and 
operation of individual programs to broader budgetary and 
other objectives."
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1983a, p.73)
The Department had suggested that a series of pilot studies in 
financial management improvement be established in selected agencies. 
Reid went further and recommended that a service wide financial 
management improvement programme be initiated. He believed that 
management in the public sector could be improved substantially if 
insights from private sector management could be applied in 
government. More specifically, he argued that leadership should be 
improved, that managerial authority should be devolved and that a 
greater awareness of the cost of activities should be instilled at 
all levels. New accountability arrangements should also be set in 
place to ensure that performance was regularly evaluated against 
approved goals, strategies and priorities.
In response to these recommendations the Government introduced the 
Financial Management Improvement Program (Commonwealth of Australia, 
1983b, pp.20-21). Its central aims were:-
a. to develop budgetary and regulatory processes which would
encourage efficient and effective departmental management practice;
b. to identify and promote techniques and systems which would help
departmental and agency managers, ministers and others to focus on 
results; and
c. to change administrative procedures and practices to give
managers more incentive to manage and a greater awareness of the 
resource implications of their decisions (see Beale, 1985, p.376; 
Australian Public Service Board and Department of Finance, 1986, 
p.23; Keating and Holmes, 1990, p.169).
In the jargon of the reformers, by reducing impediments present in 
the framework of expenditure control, the FMIP would 'let the 
managers manage'. Through better planning and the adoption of 
flexible and devolved managerial forms, the programme would 
'encourage the managers to manage1. By holding managers accountable 
for their activities and their use of resources, the FMIP would 'make 
the managers manage.' The whole approach was dubbed 'managing for 
results' (Keating, 1988a, p.73; Holmes, 1989, p.30; Keating 1990, 
p.1).
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The FMIP was built on and elaborated a simple planning cycle. The 
cycle can be represented diagrammatically in the following terms:
Planning
Evaluation Budgeting
Implementing/Monitoring
\
Figure 1 : The planning cycle
The principal objective of 'planning' was to link an agency's 
strategy to its operations. Planning would form the basis for a 
department's programme structure; decisions on appropriate 
organisational arrangements; approaches to devolution; resource 
allocation; and the priorities for evaluation (Holmes, 1989, p.36).
In practice, this meant that departments would be encouraged to 
develop a corporate plan in which the objectives, targets, and 
performance indicators of each of its sub-divisions would be 
formulated and applied. Budgeting involved the explicit connection 
of programme objectives to the resources available to meet them. In 
practical terms this meant that the budget would be presented to 
Parliament by programme rather than item by item. Within 
departments, the development of programme budget structures would 
form the basis on which managerial responsibility could be devolved. 
Implementing/ Monitoring required the development of management 
information systems through which managers could be informed about 
all aspects of their programme's operation. It also involved the 
introduction of performance indicators through which a programme's 
progress against its objectives could be assessed. Evaluation was 
the quid pro quo for the devolution of managerial authority.
Managers, having been accorded greater responsibility for the conduct 
of their programmes, would be drawn to account for their results. 
Evaluation would assist effective decision making and provide the 
essential bridge between past performance and future planning. And 
so the cycle would begin again.
The FMIP was implemented in the order set down in the planning cycle.
Its first thrust was to improve planning. Budgeting, monitoring and
evaluation would then follow:
"The changes to the budgetary and regulatory environment
were the essential changes that had to be made .After
that we said the most important thing was to set 
objectives. Then we concentrated on the development of 
management systems in departments - corporate planning,
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devolution and management information systems. Once 
you've got objectives, to tell whether you're achieving 
them you need performance indicators. Evaluation we left 
to the end."
(First Assistant Secretary)
As with the FMI, then, the FMIP contained three principal threads. 
These were departmental planning, improved budgetary and financial 
management and the evalution of programme performance. A number of 
Government and Department of Finance reports were released in 
subsequent years which outlined the progress of each of these 
components. These are now briefly examined as a prelude to 
introducing this study's more detailed findings.
SECTION ONE: THE FMIP THROUGH THE REPORTS
1. The FMIP Diagnostic Study (1984)
To translate the new financial management prescriptions into 
practice, John Reid recommended that private sector consultants be 
employed to work with public service officials in order to develop a 
concrete plan of action. The Government accepted the recommendation 
and a consultancy team set out immediately to find out from senior 
officials themselves what improvements to the practice of management 
were required. So, consistent with the Hawke Government's 
consultative style, senior officials were involved from the outset in 
planning the new approach.
The consultancy study team discovered that there was considerable 
variability in the performance, approach and quality of resource 
management between Commonwealth agencies (Australian Public Service 
Board and Department of Finance, 1984, p.9; Weller and Lewis, 1989, 
p.6). To improve it the team's report, 'The FMIP: Diagnostic Study', 
put forward proposals in two areas, infrastructure and 
performance-oriented management. With respect to infrastructure, the 
team recommended that there should be a more effective fit between 
each agency's resource requirements and the Government's policy 
goals. To achieve this end,. corporate planning should be introduced 
in every department. To underpin corporate planning, the team 
suggested that greater priority should be given to the development of 
computerised management information systems. These would provide 
senior managers with the information they required to take resource 
decisions corporately.
Performance-oriented management required departments to structure 
their activities into programmes which had specific objectives and to 
develop performance indicators through which to measure their 
results. The team realised that in government considerable
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difficulties faced those who sought to define objectives clearly. 
Objectives might clash and their interpretation differ from the 
perspective of each actor who sought to define them. Nevertheless, 
it believed that 'responsible management' should seek to overcome 
these difficulties by developing consensus both with respect to 
corporate objectives and the means by which their achievement could 
be judged.
Devolution of managerial authority was also central to the 
performance management approach. Greater devolution of authority 
from central agencies to departments and from the centre of 
departments to line managers would act, in the team's view, as the 
greatest incentive which could be provided for improved managerial 
performance. The team identified three kinds of devolution: the 
ability to transfer resources between programmes; the ability to 
reallocate resources within programmes; and an ability to utilise 
administrative resources flexibly in meeting operational 
requirements. The power to allocate resources between programmes 
required the explicit decision of government. The power to transfer 
funds between appropriations depended on parliamentary authorisation. 
However, even within these constraints, considerable leeway still 
existed to devolve both staffing and financial responsibility.
2. The FMIP Report (1986)
The Financial Management Improvement Program was introduced to the 
public in 1986 in a report which was more in the nature of a public 
relations brochure than a concerted attempt to summarise its progress 
(Australian Public Service Board and Department of Finance, 1986). 
Having introduced the core components of the programme, the report 
represented diagrammatically the number of agencies which had taken 
preliminary steps related to each. But more detailed commentary and 
analysis was scant. The report concluded that, in the first twenty 
months of the FMIP's life, significant progress had been made in the 
areas of corporate planning and programme structuring. Devolution of 
managerial authority, the introduction of management information 
systems and evaluation was still in its infancy.
3. FMIP and Program Budgeting Report (1987)
'FMIP and Program Budgeting: A Study of Implementation in Selected 
Agencies' (Department of Finance, 1987) was commissioned by the 
Department of Finance. It engaged a private sector consultant to 
conduct an independent review of the initiative's progress in five 
portfolios. Looking first at corporate planning, the study found 
that each department had established the framework in which such 
planning could take place. Goals and objectives had been defined,
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corporate management committees had been established and strategies 
had been set. In few cases, however, had statements of objectives 
and programmes been developed to the stage where the plans could be 
used as the basis for assessing performance. No cases existed where 
this had been done satisfactorily. The report found that progress 
with corporate planning had been slower in large and complex 
departments than in small and more unified ones. Operational 
agencies, in which proximate measures of performance were available, 
had been more successful in establishing corporate planning and 
programme budgeting structures than policy departments.
Programme budgeting, the report stated, had been introduced as a 
practical means through which to focus managerial attention on the 
purposes to which their activities were devoted. Programme 
structures, therefore, collected activities having a common purpose. 
The evaluators found, however, that a department's programme 
structures often diverged from its functional organisation. This 
created considerable overlap and confusion. Despite this, the 
devolution of managerial authority had proceeded satisfactorily. The 
report found that all survey departments had devolved additional 
responsibilities both to divisions and regions and there had been a 
corresponding increase in managerial communication between centre and 
periphery. However, the report observed that a number of factors had 
slowed the pace of change. Detailed work was still required to align 
programme and organisational structures as the condition precedent of 
considered devolution. Some line managers, particularly in technical 
areas, had been reluctant to accept responsibility for resource 
management. Many lacked the skills to carry out their 
responsibilities effectively.
It was with performance indicators and evaluation that least progress 
had been made. There had been some promising work undertaken on the 
development of efficiency indicators but little if any in measuring 
effectiveness. This reflected the fact that administrative processes 
were more readily amenable to quantitative measurement than were 
programme outcomes. For the same reason, there had been greater 
progress with developing performance indicators in operational rather 
than policy departments. The report concluded that much more work 
was required to refine quantitative indicators and work needed to 
start on the formulation of qualitative ones.
4. The FMIP Report (1988)
One year later, the Department of Finance followed its independently 
commissioned evaluation with an assessment of its own (Department of 
Finance, 1988). The Department reported that most agencies had 
adopted relatively formal planning procedures and documentation.
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Many, however, were still in the process of making effective links 
between corporate planning, policy development and resource 
allocation. Few, it concluded, had integrated planning with 
performance information and evaluation. Practical experience had 
demonstrated that planning processes should to be tailored to suit 
individual agencies with no single formula being applicable. So, for 
example, large service delivery agencies had found the adoption of 
formal planning processes easier than policy focused agencies. In 
decentralised agencies, corporate planning was likely to be more 
important than in highly centralised ones.
Devolution from the Department of Finance outwards to departments had 
proceeded successfully. However, the devolution of responsibility 
from the centre of agencies to regional and divisional managers had, 
the report concluded, been much slower to materialise. This was 
because many managers had been unwilling to take on additional 
resource management responsibilities, seeing them as complicating 
rather than simplifying their work. In addition, there remained a 
substantial deficit in the skill level required to undertake the new 
responsibilities which were being imposed.
The Department concluded that progress with performance indication 
and evaluation had still been limited. Two-thirds of the departments 
surveyed reported that efficiency and effectiveness indicators had 
been agreed at programme and sub- programme level. However, few of 
these had been developed to the stage where they were regularly 
measured. Those that were related to efficiency rather than 
effectiveness. The report observed that, based on international 
experience, the development of performance indicators would be a 
long-term process. Formal and systematic evaluation remained scarce.
5. 'Not Dollars Alone'
The most detailed and independent assessment of the FMIP's 
development was produced late in 1990 by the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration. Entitled 
'Not Dollars Alone' it concluded that progress in implementing the 
core components of the FMIP had been slower than expected (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration, 1990, p.xiii). The reforms embraced within the FMIP 
had been instituted successfully in a number of areas but many 
departments were still far from obtaining full benefit from them.
The Committee supported the general thrust of the reforms. However, 
it warned that too great an emphasis on 'risk management may 
prejudice the achievement of other equally important administrative 
values such as probity, fairness and ethical behaviour' (House of
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Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration, 1990, p.94).
There were a number of general factors which, in the committee's 
view, had retarded the programme's development. It had been 
identified principally as a cost-cutting exercise. Similarly, its 
primary focus had been seen as the reform of financial and resource 
management arrangements rather than the comprehensive improvement of 
management. It was viewed as a central agency initiative of limited 
relevance to programme managers. The pace and scale of surrounding 
public service reforms had decreased the attention which could be 
devoted to it (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Finance 
and Public Administration, 1990, p.23).
The report concentrated principally on budgetary and financial 
changes. The cause of devolution, it concluded, had been 
considerably advanced by changes in the wider framework of budgetary 
regulation (see Chapter 6). In particular, the introduction of a new 
running costs system had provided departments and their managers with 
considerably greater financial flexibility. However, the devolution 
of authority within departments had proceeded much more slowly.
This, the Committee concluded, was because most departments had 
underestimated the need to manage the devolutionary process and 
because major shifts in the attitudes of Ministers and senior 
managers to central control were still required (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration, 1990, p.68).
The committee dwelt for a considerable time on the problems which had 
been experienced with the development of adequate indicators of 
performance. It acknowledged that a number of methodological 
difficulties stood in the way of their development (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration, 1990, p.76). Nevertheless, it believed that 
considerable scope existed for the use of performance information and 
urged the Department of Finance to relax its resistance to the 
development of qualitative indicators. In addition, the Committee 
recommended that departments should make a renewed effort to develop 
their evaluation planning processes.
The committee's report made no comment whatsoever about corporate 
planning. Its focus was on programme management and budgeting. Why 
it neglected corporate planning is unclear since corporate planning 
was clearly one of the FMIP's principal components. Perhaps the 
committee's omission reflected the fact that by 1990, five years 
after the FMIP had commenced, corporate planning had, in all but a
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few areas, been marginalised. In the remainder of this chapter, the 
reasons for this marginalisation are examined.
SECTION TWO: CORPORATE PLANNING IN CANBERRA
1. Introduction
The Reid review of Commonwealth administration argued that ministers 
should take a more active role in supervising the administration of 
their departments. To exercise this responsibility properly, they 
needed adequate information on all matters of operational concern 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1983a, pp.40-42). Therefore, the report 
proposed that ministers should be provided with well organised and 
summarised management information so that they would become aware of 
the key issues without having to be immersed in day-to-day details of 
administrative activity. Reid noted the development of MINIS type 
systems in Britain but rejected that model. Rather than imposing 
stereotypical systems in each department, he argued that management 
planning and information systems should be tailored specifically to 
the responsibilities and requirements of individual departments. The 
key was to develop individualised systems each of which would permit 
the minister to assess departmental performance against expectations, 
having regard to the practicalities of the particular portfolio.
Armed with this information, the Minister could exercise 
administrative leadership. More specifically, the minister could 
participate at an appropriate level in the development of portfolio 
goals, strategies, implementation arrangements, departmental 
organisation and management control.
Unlike their counterparts in Britain, Australia's management 
reformers placed no great weight on involving Ministers in 
management. Certainly, Ministers should be kept informed about 
operational matters but their practicalities and detail were properly 
the province of senior administrators. Ministers were not managers. 
They were and should be concerned primarily with setting departmental 
directions:
"They are not basically put there to do detailed 
management. It is not their background qualifications or
interest. A good Minister has a policy vision and wants
to get it done. What he wants is to ensure that he 
trusts the department to get it done and has confidence 
that the Secretary will get senior managers to deliver 
rather than prescribe each step as to how it is 
delivered. I'm reasonably comfortable with that as the 
classical description of it and that it is broadly 
working."
(Departmental Secretary)
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In the senior echelons of the Canberra public service, there was a
ready and early recognition that Ministers' interest in management
would vary. Some would be very concerned to ensure that policies
were effectively and efficiently executed. Others would be happy to
leave every aspect of implementation to their departments so long as
it proceeded without incident. Ministers should be consulted about
operational issues but would refrain from becoming embroiled in them.
They should be watchful but not interventionist:
"I talk to the Minister about certain things and he picks 
me up from time to time. I talk to him about very senior 
appointments and he makes it clear that these are my 
responsibility but that he's interested. He will take me 
to task when something is not happening quickly enough or 
make it clear that he is watching something but he also 
makes it clear that it is me he looks to produce and to 
say how it is done."
(Departmental Secretary)
Corporate planning, then, began life not as a means of injecting 
Ministers into management as MINIS had done but rather as a vehicle 
for improving the strategic and organisational capacity of 
departments themselves. The Canberra version of corporate planning 
was composed of a number of steps (see, for example, Newton, 1979, 
pp.15-16; Monaghan, 1984, pp.1-3; Beale, 1988, p.2; Australian 
Public Service Board and Department of Finance, 1986, p.13;
Department of Finance, 1987, p.29; Glasson and Goode, 1988, p.103; 
Howard, 1990, p.78):
(i) The department or agency defines its mission. In private 
sector language it identifies the nature of its current business and 
what it should be.
(ii) From this definition of function, a statement of objectives and 
goals is obtained.
(iii) Objectives are then situated in the context of the 
organisation's external and internal environment. The threats and 
opportunities presented by the external environment are assessed and 
incorporated into the strategic analysis. The internal strengths and 
weaknesses of the organisation are similarly factored in.
(iv) From this analysis, alternative means of achieving 
organisational objectives are elucidated and a strategy is formulated 
to move the organisation in the desired direction. The strategy must 
be effective, efficient and equitable.
(v) Work priorities are determined and specific targets and 
standards of accomplishment are set. Individual officers are made 
accountable for the achievement of particular results and minimum 
standards of performance are identified.
(vi) Resources are allocated according to a pattern which reflects 
the strategic priorities which have been agreed upon.
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(vii) Where possible, measures of performance are defined and then 
used to feed back to the department or agency information on the 
success of its plans.
(viii) An organised review of objectives and results is conducted to 
weed out those objectives which no longer serve a purpose or which 
have proven unattainable.
(ix) The planning process begins again.
Corporate planning constituted a way of thinking about government 
organisations with a view to managing them better. Its aim was to 
foster a cohesive and coherent departmental identity. It was a top 
down-process in the sense that objectives at each successive level of 
a department were to be defined by and related to a centrally 
determined mission. At the same time corporate planning would 
encourage a participatory and communicative management style 
facilitating a common understanding of and commitment to agency goals 
and corporate priorities (Harris 1989, p.2). By requiring the 
Minister to endorse departmental directions, it sought to reduce the 
volatility associated with frequent changes in political direction.
2. Politics or Planning?
Although corporate planning was to be driven by departments rather 
than Ministers, the process clearly needed to be mindful of 
Ministers' priorities, interests and sensitivities. The strategy 
which informed the corporate plan had ultimately to be determined by 
the Minister and not the agency. Equally, nothing in the corporate 
plan could be permitted to prejudice the Minister's political 
position:
"I have my own scepticism about this. The idea that 
agencies somehow independent of government can have plans 
is wrong, it's undemocratic, it's not our system of 
government. So, any plan that we might have must be 
something which gets its authority from the Minister and 
Cabinet. In terms of operational plans, sure, we can 
have plans about how we're going to do it. But in terms 
of what it is we are doing and what priority should be 
given to the work [it] can only have an effect if the 
Minister endorses it and if the Minister drives it within 
the framework of overall Cabinet direction."
(Departmental Secretary)
Corporate planning was conceived as a rational process. Its 
proponents took as given the assumption that government would be 
better conducted if its strategies, policies and operations were 
subjected to formal logic and analysis. There was nothing wrong with 
this assumption as far as it went. The problem was, however, that 
the logic of planning and the logic of politics frequently differed. 
Although no less rational, Ministers did not operate in the way that 
management textbooks would have them do. As soon as Ministers'
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interests had to be considered, corporate planning's logic and 
symmetry began to unravel. There were a number of dimensions to the 
interaction between Ministers and officials which were of particular 
relevance in this regard.
The corporate planning approach presumed that Ministers would both be
willing and able to rank their portfolio priorities. This Ministers
showed a singular disinclination to do. In part, this was because
its synoptic model of decision making was an ideal type. In
practice, there were many constraints which operated to modify it.
Not the least of these was the absence of any consistent and
measurable foundation on which to assess the value of alternative
courses of action:
"Even in the market context, any market suffers from 
limitations that mean it departs from the perfect model 
even though a market has prices to guide it. In public 
sector decision making, the limitations are so much 
greater because the process lacks the guide of prices.
Those limits include the lack of:
(a) a preference schedule that the government can 
define clearly specifying its weights and priorities and 
will hold to consistently; and
(b) a schedule of options available to Ministers, 
including a schedule of probable outcomes, from which 
systematic choices could be specified.
This may seem obvious, yet much of what we are led to 
expect from formal corporate planning, program budgeting 
and the like only improves the rationality of decision 
making - as opposed to the ease of exercising control - 
if (a) and (b) do exist."
(Departmental Secretary, Memorandum, 26 May 1988)
There is little doubt that departments can affect Ministers'
preferences by providing them with a well documented and analysed
range of options to consider. The knowledgeable Minister is more
likely to make good decisions than the ignorant one. However,
knowledge itself does not determine preferences. It can only inform
them. Ultimately it will be the Minister's values combined with his
or her assessment of the way events conflate which will conclude the
choice he or she makes between competing sets of objectives:
"Priorities amongst goals are largely set by Ministers in 
responding to departmental assessments of the future 
domestic and political environment and of the 
considerations affecting priorities. The shift, among 
the multiplicity of departmental objectives, to a higher 
priority for economic objectives is an example. This is 
an attitudinal rather than formalised weighting process."
(Departmental Secretary, Memorandum, 26 May 1988)
Every good Minister has a programme of reform which he or she wishes 
to effect. But, in the political world, implementation is not simply 
an executive function. It certainly requires careful planning. But 
ministerial method consists also of negotiation, bargain, trade-off
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and artfulness. Political gamesmanship, of which these methods are
the tools of trade, is played out in many different political arenas
of which the parliamentary, party, policy, inter-organisational and
administrative arenas are but some. Interests in each arena and
between them need to be set against each other, weighed and assessed
before departmental strategies and directions can firmly be
established. Into this intensely political environment, corporate
planning arrived seemingly in innocence:
"There is a hell of a lot of tactics involved in some of 
these longer term objectives that a Minister might have: 
tactics about how to square off community interests, how 
to square it with colleagues etc. To have some sort of 
plan there that says I'm going to do x by y is slightly 
naive about the political process. Basically there is a 
certain naivete in the whole idea of corporate planning
in government ....  It is rightly more difficult than
the wide-eyed planners would think - that you can have 
some sort of totally rational process in government, you 
can't. Because government is populist. There are all 
sorts of trade-offs with what is possible."
(Departmental Secretary)
Ministers live in an environment characterised not only by fickle and
altering allegiances but also by constantly changing political,
economic and social circumstances. However, ready adaptability to
changing circumstances was not a hallmark of the corporate planning
approach. It was a planning technique fitted for the long term.
Ministers' political horizons were far more limited. It could assist
with the planned and extended development of operational programmes
such as the introduction of information technology. But in the
shifting sands of politics and policy, its structured and somewhat
cumbersome approach would often be found wanting:
"The more the environment is changing and uncontrollable, 
however, the more the need for organisational 
flexibility. The more planning specifies the use of 
resources, the less room there is for experimentation or 
flexibility of response."
(Departmental Secretary)
"We are judged by criteria of rationality when dealing 
with uncertainty. It can't work that way."
(First Assistant Secretary).
Governments change and so do Ministers. In each case, substantial
policy and operational realignments are inevitable. The corporate
planning cycle, unless limited specifically to areas of departmental
activity characterised by substantial continuity, was often
considered unwieldy, untimely and inappropriate:
"We had a reasonably well developed plan for priorities 
over the next two or three years, prior to the last 
election. We then got a Minister, a very strong 
reforming Minister who wanted to think through the old 
verities  He has a vision, but he knows there are many
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steps to be gone through, that there is much art and 
artifice in getting there. To have it all laid down 
flatly in a plan would be precisely the wrong thing to 
do."
(Departmental Secretary)
Corporate planning presumed that Ministers would play the analytical
game. But many officials were very sceptical about their willingness
to do so. Formality, structure, direction and strategy were
desirable in theory but when the Minister swept in with a new
enthusiasm, corporate plans did not act as a constraint
"If during the year, the Minister wants a push on that 
but the Corporate Plan says we're going to do this and 
we've got a specific budget allocated towards it - what 
do you do then ? The answer is you bloody well do that!
And don't give this crap about financial management 
improvement. This is something which often people in 
[the Department of] Finance don't understand."
(First Assistant Secretary)
Because the task of meshing corporate planning and political finesse
proved difficult, departmental officials worked hard at accommodating
the technique to its new environment. So, for example, in order to
preserve a degree of political flexibility, the Department's mission
statements tended to be couched in very general terms. Similarly,
where politically sensitive policy changes were being considered,
their import might be disguised
"We can't just continue with the old plan - a good 
example is x programme. [The Minister] wants while 
retaining x to have a pretty fundamental think about some 
things. Now the way we dealt with this in the plan was 
to talk about fine tuning - but that's not what it's all 
about. But to have put down what it was all about while 
it was still developing would have been a. inappropriate 
tactically and b. simply illogical."
(Departmental Deputy Secretary)
Steadily a division appeared between the public and private faces of
the corporate planning process. This trend was first noted in the
1987 FMIP/Program Budgeting Study (Department of Finance, 1987,
p.29). In the following years, the division widened to such an
extent that, in late 1990, the interdepartmental Management
Improvement Advisory Committee (MIAC) expressed deep concern to the
Government's peak management advisory committee, the Management
Advisory Board, that:
"the link is not being made between the objectives and
the performance of  programs and the government's
purpose in being involved in a particular field. This is 
in no way intended to suggest that at senior levels there 
is not constant attention being given to the purposes of 
government. The concern is that the formal corporate 
processes which are being developed are not sufficiently 
driven by the Government s purpose. There is certainly a 
feeling on the part of many that a number of Ministers 
are not prepared to commit themselves in such areas as
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specifying objectives. There is at minumum a 
communication problem (which everyone agrees about) and 
it may be that formal corporate processes are adding to 
it."
(Management Improvement Advisory Committee, 1990, p.v)
After a survey conducted in several major departments MIAC discovered 
that departments had increasingly been focusing their formal planning 
processes on operational rather than strategic concerns. Further, 
planning proceeded principally in accordance with agencies' 
functional rather than purposive organisation. It had become short 
term rather than long term. The committee was quite unclear about 
how the practice of planning either derived from or meshed with 
Ministerial objectives and priorities.
MIAC also found that differences had emerged in the content and 
quality of information being utilised for internal management 
purposes and that provided for the purposes of external reporting. 
Objectives in corporate planning documents were found to be different 
from those contained in programme budgeting documents. Performance 
information in internal management documents differed from 
performance reported in external reporting documents. Internal 
departmental reviews, evaluations and market surveys were only 
fleetingly referred to in the explanatory notes prepared for 
Parliament. In short, a positive and truncated image of corporate 
planning was being presented to the Parliament and the public while 
the messy political realities were increasingly hidden from view.
3. Policy and Planning
Not only did a demarcation develop between operational planning and
politics, but the technique also had little impact upon policy
development. It was subsumed under and then simply reflected policy
decisions made in other forums. It did not shape strategy but rather
was shaped by it. Thus, for example, in the Department of Social
Security, a comprehensive politically initiated and independent
review of policy and programmes was conducted which in turn informed
the corporate planning cycle:
"The Social Security review has really been our external 
corporate plan because it has changed all our policies 
and changed the nature of the department. So, when we 
came to the end of last year we had massive information 
technology changes, industrial change, a lot of policy 
change and a few other changes here and there...
(Deputy Secretary)
Harris (1990, p.29) commented similarly that change in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs proceeded principally from a policy related
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external review of foreign representation rather from step-by-step
decision-making sequences characteristic of corporate planning:
"The Review of Australia's overseas representation, a 
large and detailed study completed in 1986, provided 
[clear understandings] in a way that helped in informing 
management, in giving departmental staff a unified view 
of the whole of the Department's activities, in having 
much of the general philosophy discussed widely in draft, 
thus creating a shared focus, and being subsequently 
easily available inside and outside the department."
For policy personnel the corporate planning process was perceived as 
being of distant relevance. It did not belong to or guide them 
except in the most general terms. It was sometimes useful to pull 
the plan from the shelf to get one's bearings. But in practical 
terms, this was an exercise which belonged firmly in the operational 
sphere:
"It is not directed towards us but provides us with 
legitimacy because having structured it to take our work 
in particular directions, the work is given weight by 
being validated in the plan. But you would obtain 
different answers from those who run our computing 
divisions. It's the computing people who actually have a 
job to do in the sense of producing an end product who 
like regional office have got a job out of the corporate 
plan. What the documents do is set out a direction for 
them."
(First Assistant Secretary)
Harris, a critic of corporate planning first inside and then, after
his retirement, outside the Commonwealth public service believed that
corporate planning, whilst providing some limited benefits for the
efficiency of the service, had little to contribute-e^to the more
important task of policy analysis:
"The tendency has been for [corporate management 
techniques] to be most effective in dealing with how 
things can be done more cheaply. They have been less 
effective in showing how things can be done better and 
they can often be a barrier to looking systematically at 
whether things should be done at all."
(Harris, 1990, p.28)
In the event, Harris's understanding of American experience with 
corporate planning, of which’this quotation was an encapsulation, 
proved steadily more true of Australian experience. Corporate 
planning was not regarded as particularly helpful by Ministers, 
except perhaps in the context of public relations. Nor did policy 
officials find its rational, cyclical and structured techniques of 
particular assistance when devising solutions to complex policy 
problems. Where corporate planning did make its contribution, 
however, was in the administrative arena.
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4. Planning for Management
Perhaps it had been unrealistic for the proponents of financial 
management improvement to assume that corporate planning would effect 
a revolution in the manner in which politics was conducted or in 
which policy was formulated. Its promise lay principally in 
improving the management of operations. In the managerial arena, 
Departments soon realised the technique could offer some tangible 
benefits.
"We are using [the corporate plan] much more at the micro 
level now. It is OK when considering individual tasks 
that people are performing and placing them in the 
context of longer term objectives...but putting it 
together in a grand plan is something which is, really, 
inappropriate."
(Departmental Secretary)
In this department, a major service provider, the problems of 
applying corporate planning in a political environment had been 
tackled by segmenting the planning process. The corporate plan's 
first tier consisted of an overview of departmental operations and 
directions and included a departmental mission statement couched in 
general terms. This general plan permitted considerable room for 
manoeuvre to accommodate political and policy change. The 
second-tier plan defined the department's programme structure and 
then, for each programme, produced a description of its objectives, 
goals and performance indicators. The third tier consisted of 
ancillary plans relating for example to program management and 
budgetary statements, equal employment opportunity, industrial 
democracy, information technology, fraud control, management 
improvement and evaluation. The more specific and tangible the task, 
the more likely it was that clear objectives could be formulated, 
targets set, performance measured and alternatives rationally 
considered. A disaggregated approach to planning was found to serve 
the needs of administrators far better than the original, more 
comprehensive method had done.
"Corporate planning has had a positive impact on the 
department albeit in a sectional way such as information 
technology planning and so on. We have a fine national 
computer system which has come up through a corporate 
planning process...but corporate planning per se in terms 
of the overall directions of the department has not been 
a success."
(Deputy Secretary)
Corporate planning generated not only operational benefits but also 
benefits relating to process. The iterative discussion which 
preceded it was perceived as very productive. In the departments 
studied, staff, no matter what their status, were presented with the 
opportunity to contribute to the formulation of sub-divisional and
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divisional goals and objectives. The invitation to participate was
welcomed. Senior management became progressively more aware o£ the
difficulties and concerns of their outposts. The outposts became
more aware of executive strategy and its rationale:
"Perhaps the greatest value of the plan lies in actually 
developing it. By that I mean the process we are going 
through of establishing program objectives and priorities 
requires the executive, policy developers and programme 
delivery staff all to focus on each programme. In turn, 
the process tends to achieve agreement on the real 
priorities and to identify those programmes which are 
harder to justify in the competition for scarce 
resources.
(Minute from Departmental Secretary, 18 May 1988)
(v) Technical and Administrative Issues
The success of corporate planning was predicated on the development 
of certain technical capabilities. The most important of these were 
management information systems which would permit managers to assess 
their progress against their objectives and, as part of this, the 
development of performance indicators. In those departments where 
the technical capabilities lagged, so too did the technique they had 
to support:
"Q. Again, I am a little surprised that a department 
like yours does not have a corporate plan.
A. I do not think it is surprising. In many ways the 
key part of corporate planning, which is the development 
of performance indicators, is very much easier for 
departments and agencies whose major role is program 
delivery. I think it is fair to say...that in the areas 
of policy coordination, policy advice, it is very much 
more difficult to discover what are appropriate 
performance indicators, what are appropriate ways of 
evaluating our performance. I do not think it is 
surprising that we have been rather slower than some of 
the programme delivery departments in looking at ways of 
developing a corporate plan."
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Finance and Public Administration, 1989, FMIP Report,
Mr P.R.Shergold, Minutes of Evidence (unpublished), p.375)
The implementation of corporate planning also suffered from the fact
some departments devoted too few resources to promote it. Although a
process which required high level input, it was left mainly to middle
and junior level officers, sometimes without any experience of the
technique to develop it. These officers found it extremely difficult
to engage the attention of their more senior and hard-pressed
colleagues. When they did, they could offer few if any tangible
benefits to encourage participation:
"I don't think this place took it very seriously because 
the resources that were put into it were virtually 
nothing. I know this from personal experience. I 
regarded corporate planning as nothing more than a 
nuisance."
(First Assistant Secretary)
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To bridge the gap between corporate planners at the centre and
programme managers at the periphery was one of the technique's major
early assignments. In many departments, this, as Considine (1990,
p.174) reports was an assignment rarely handled well. Initial
material was voluminous and complex and, as a centrally dictated
initiative, it was subject to resistance in the regions:
"The material the department produced was very unhelpful.
It didn't provide a framework for me to operate in. I 
didn't find it the least bit helpful. It was far too 
complex and detailed to be used by our people and they're 
the bread and butter of the place. The early days of 
corporate planning had little effect at all.
(Regional Manager)
Corporate management was introduced as the first and leading
component of FMIP in 1986. Its introduction coincided with a time of
great flux in the Commonwealth public service. Following the
adoption of reforms proposed in the Government's White Papers on
public service and budget reform, the entire service was subjected to
an intensive period of change. Amongst many other things, corporate
planning and programme management and budgeting were to be
implemented together. Of the two, PMB was accorded first priority
since it formed part of broader budgetary changes, the implementation
of which had been promised by the Hawke Government to the Parliament.
Consequently, corporate planning was sidelined while PMB was first
set in place:-
"The focus in Finance and agencies was on achieving a 
proper programme structure. Some departments bunched 
activities together and called them programmes. Others 
simply renamed their existing divisions as programmes.
But the main focus from 1984-1988 was on PMB. After 
1988, Finance started asking questions not about 
programme structures but about whether programs should 
exist at all. This re focused attention on corporate 
planning."
(Department of Finance, Assistant Secretary)
Then, in 1987, a second round of changes was introduced principal
among which was the amalgamation of departments and their rebirth as
super ministries. The nascent process of corporate planning which
had been introduced in the then separated departments had to be
completely transformed to meet the dictates of the new entities.
This was not a simple transformation. It required the acquisition of
new understandings and new agreements as to the purpose, structure
and focus of the new mega-departments. The scale of change within
departments and the priority accorded to restructuring meant that
corporate planning was accorded a very low priority.
"We've had so many changes in budget, information 
technology changes, public service changes, the policy 
changes, that they swamped it and this remains a risk 
with any strategic planning process."
(Deputy Secretary)
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Conclusion
In 1987, the FMIP/Program Budgeting study concluded that corporate 
planning had not yet become embedded in the practice of management or 
in the process of resource allocation. It constituted a separate 
exercise whose linkages to everyday administration had yet to be 
forged. The evaluator, however, remained optimistic that this 
embedding would occur (Department of Finance, 1987, pp.50-53). A 
study by two Public Service Commission personnel in 1988 concluded 
similarly that whilst goals, objectives and strategies had been 
defined in the departments which were surveyed, these had not 
necessarily been translated into operational plans and actions 
(Glasson and Goode, 1988, p.104). More recently, Considine (1990, 
p. 174), concluded that corporate plans had simply fallen out to the 
edges of the bureaucratic system from where they had been 
unsuccessful in demonstrating any of the benefits claimed by their 
proponents. The evidence adduced in this survey tends also to the 
latter conclusion. Corporate planning floundered as a technique 
designed to enhance political and departmental strategy.
Nevertheless, when applied to operational areas it ushered in 
tangible if limited benefits for Commonwealth public administration.
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CHAPTER 6
DELEGATION AND EVALUATION IN AUSTRALIA 
SECTION ONE: DELEGATING MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY
1. Introduction
It was in the budgetary arena much more than in the abstract realm of
corporate planning that the new public management in Canberra took
hold. Here, a quiet revolution took place (Walsh, 1990, p.41).
Following from its White Paper on budget reform, the Government,
through the Department of Finance, set in place the most
comprehensive reforms to Canberra's budgetary and management
framework since the Second World War. Of these, the FMIP was an
important part. The underlying purpose of the reforms was to:
"develop an attitude of mind in departmental managers at 
all levels so that they appreciate and accept a 
responsibility for pursuing cost-effective performance 
which constantly relates the development and operation of 
the services for which they are responsible...to the 
resources available and accordingly determine priorities 
and strategies for achieving those objectives.
(Department of Finance, 1982, p.3)
There is a clear resonance here with the fundamental aims of the FMI. 
However, if the two managerial initiatives did not differ in concept, 
then their introduction certainly differed in nature. The well 
recognised themes of delegation and accountability were certainly 
present but in Australia they formed but one part of a much more 
complex and systematic drive to improve the management of government.
2. The Budgetary and Management Framework
The Government's budgetary and financial management reforms consisted 
of three strands which were introduced in sequence:
An aggregate spending framework was established, the purpose of 
which was to ensure that overall expenditure would be attuned to the 
Government's economic policy needs and in particular to an 
environment of constraint.
A new system of programme budgeting was set in place through 
which objectives for programmes could be set and programmes 
externally and internally assessed.
Within this system of tight strategic controls, there would be 
the maximum possible delegation of financial and managerial 
authority, particularly with respect to running costs (see Barrett, 
1988; Keating, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989, 1990; Keating and Holmes, 
1990).
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The new aggregate spending framework consisted of five interlocking 
elements. First, a new system of forward estimates was introduced. 
The estimates recorded the level of expenditure authorised by Cabinet 
for future years (based in some cases on necessary economic and other 
forecasting assumptions) but did not include any provision for new 
policies or discretionary changes to policy. As such they provided 
both the Government and the public with information on the level and 
composition of outlays that applied in the absence of policy or 
environmental changes. The estimates had been collected by the 
Department of Finance for many years but, as part of the new 
portfolio of reforms, they were made integral to the budget process 
through two major changes:
the conversion of the estimates from bids by agencies to an 
authoritative baseline for budget deliberations and public reporting 
so that the starting point for the forthcoming budget would be year 
one of the previous estimates; and
the publication of the estimates and of any deviation between a 
forward estimate and the budget year to which it eventually related 
as part of the budget papers.
The responsibility for determining the estimates was transferred from 
departments themselves to the Department of Finance. The estimates 
were formulated within the Department of Finance, communicated to 
departments and changed only in response to savings, new policy 
decisions endorsed by the Cabinet and changes to economic and other 
relevant parameters. Therefore, under the new system, Cabinet was 
required to pay far greater attention to the specification of 
out-year funding levels for programmes and to be much more conscious 
of and accountable for decisions to vary the estimates which had been 
published.
Second, portfolio budgeting was introduced. Portfolio budgeting was 
a generic term used to describe a range of budgeting strategies that 
gave greater emphasis to the role of individual Ministers in 
identifying their priorities and allocating the resources at their 
disposal (Walsh, 1990, p.46). The strategies included the setting by 
Cabinet of portfolio expenditure targets which Ministers were 
expected to meet and the requirement by Cabinet for a proposing 
Minister to identify offsetting savings where new expenditure was 
proposed. However, once having set aggregate resource targets and 
specified requisite savings, Cabinet, and the Department of Finance 
on its behalf, would leave individual Ministers and departments to 
devise the methods of achieving them. In contrast to the situation 
in Britain, therefore, a form of block budgeting applied from the 
outset.
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Third, the Department o£ Finance introduced a comprehensive running 
costs system (see Rothman and Thornton, 1990). The running costs 
system was the leading edge of the drive to devolution of managerial 
responsibility. Prior to its introduction, salaries and 
administrative expenses were funded separately. For administrative 
expenses, budgeting and appropriation was by individual item such as 
travel, furniture and fittings, postage and telephones. Hence, 
budgets were based on the detailed examination of the level of 
administrative inputs. Similarly, the allocation of staff was the 
subject of detailed numerical control. Staffing was not considered 
as just one major variable within total running costs. By contrast, 
under the new system running costs constituted a single consolidated 
appropriation. Consequently, managers of departments and agencies 
were given significantly increased flexibility to apply their 
resources in the manner they believed most effective.
Fourth, the aggregate control of running costs was complemented and 
made more stringent by the application of an efficiency dividend.
The Government assumed that there existed scope for the improvement 
of public sector efficiency and determined, in consequence, that an 
annual dividend of per cent of running costs should be returned to 
the budget by all agencies. In addition, it offered departments an 
additional incentive to save. Where savings over and above the 
efficiency savings were achieved, these could be kept by departments 
and reallocated as they saw fit.
Fifth, both delegation and evaluation were effected within the 
framework of programme management and budgeting (PMB). The purpose 
of PMB was to focus managerial attention on the purposes of 
departmental programmes and the cost-effective achievement of their 
outcome (Shand, 1987, p.2; Barrett. 1988, p.55; Walsh, 1989, p.44; 
Keating and Holmes, 1990, pp.173-176). By contrast, line item 
budgeting, which PMB was designed to complement, focused principally 
on financial inputs and the maintenance of financial probity (see 
generally Knight and Wiltshire, 1977, pp.83-112). PMB sought a 
change in emphasis from accounting for stewardship to an active 
concern with the achievement of results (Holmes, 1990, pp.44-47). 
Under PMB, a programme structure was established in each department 
and the objectives of each departmental programme were defined. For 
budgetary purposes, all departmental expenditures were attributed to 
particular programmes and hence related to the achievement of 
specified outputs or outcomes. For each programme, measures of 
performance were determined. Programmes were then subjected to 
regular monitoring and evaluation to assess the extent to which their 
objectives had been met.
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3. The Framework's Facilitation of Delegation
Between them, these measures removed many rules and procedures which 
had formerly stood in the way of the delegation of managerial 
authority. The imposition of tight expenditure control through 
forward estimates provided a reasonable guarantee that the effect of 
delegation would not be to encourage a break-out in public 
expenditure:
"One of the factors explaining our success has been that 
we've abolished anything like the PESC system and 
replaced it with forward estimates. Forward estimates 
aren't allowed to be revised by departments. We control 
the forward estimates... Cabinet approves the rules 
which we then adjust in line with economic indicators.
We don't have any bids to assess. Unless Cabinet updates
its policy, we just update the estimates. It gets rid of 
the upward creep so characteristic of the UK system."
(Departmental Secretary)
Portfolio budgeting reduced the necessity for senior economic 
Ministers to involve themselves in the details of departmental 
expenditure in individual departments. They were freed to enhance 
their role in the determination of the Government's broader 
priorities and fiscal strategies. The role of the Department of 
Finance also changed. It became involved in the reallocation of 
departmental funds only where these had cross- portfolio 
significance, where they involved major issues of policy and where 
there were other decisions which were likely to impact on the medium 
to longer term resource usage of the portfolio (Barrett, 1988, p.52).
Similarly, the new running costs system produced a major change in
the relationship between the Department of Finance and other 
departments. Previously the Department had been involved in detailed 
inquiries into the minutiae of agency operations in order to find 
minor savings. It was also involved in protracted negotiation about 
additional allocations. Following the introduction of the new 
system, departmental managers had much greater autonomy in the 
allocation of running costs within aggregate parameters. They were, 
therefore, freed to concentrate on programme performance. The 
Department of Finance in turn could expend greater effort in 
promoting and contributing to programme evaluation (Rothman and 
Thornton, 1990, p.94).
The aggregate spending framework was ambitious and quickly 
implemented. It placed a cap on expenditure while at the same time 
encouraging the development of a more devolved and flexible 
managerial environment. In comparison with Britain, the pace and 
scale of change was substantial. There are three factors in 
particular which explain why this was possible. First, the style of
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the Prime Minister himself was decentralist rather than centralist.
Under his predecessor, the powers of the Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet had accumulated significantly. Mr Hawke was for more
inclined to entrust primary responsibility for portfolio management
to his Ministers (Thompson, 1988, p.222-224). Consequently, an
acceptance of portfolio budgeting came more easily to him:
"The philosophy of devolution, to give Ministers more 
autonomy suited the Hawke style. When he arrived he 
broke down the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
which under Fraser had become a mini-government in 
itself, and left Ministers in charge of their portfolios.
This reinforced the move to devolution and a whole range 
of other measures including portfolio budgeting."
(Deputy Secretary)
Second, the structural division which had earlier taken place between
the Treasury and the Department of Finance permitted the latter a
freer hand in developing public sector management reform. Set loose
from the constant emphasis on macro-economic management, it was able
totembrace micro-economic reform in the public sector more readily:
"In 1976, the decision was taken to split the Finance 
department from the Treasury. I wonder whether our 
public management reforms would have been anywhere near 
as successful had that decision not been taken. I think 
that the Secretary of the Treasury is inevitably going to 
be concerned with macro-economic management...he will not 
have the time or enthusiasm to be directly associated 
with public sector management. We [the Department of 
Finance] were the controllers and yet our concern wasn't 
purely the control of public expenditure. We were 
concerned about the effectiveness of public management.
Whereas my impression is that faced with a choice between 
the efficiency of the public sector and the level of 
public expenditure, the UK Treasury will tend to side 
with the reduction of levels of taxation, the levels of 
borrowing etc."
(Departmental Secretary)
Thirdly, the public service reforms generally, and delegation in
particular, had the support of a strong, capable and committed
Minister of Finance, a Minister willing where necessary to break old
moulds in the pursuit of enhanced governmental effectiveness. One of
these was the conundrum which beset all attempts at delegation - that
central agencies were unwilling to cede control unless departments
could demonstrate that they could utilise delegated authority
effectively. At the same time, departments could not demonstrate
their capacity without first having been ceded a measure of control.
In Canberra, this logjam was resolved in favour of delegation
directly as the result of Ministerial intervention:
"We cut through that, and that was due to two people,
John Dawkins and me. Dawkins was a doer. There was 
considerable opposition and talk about how you can't 
devolve authority until you can prove that they can do it 
or you've got accountability mechanisms in place but
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I said that if we don't do it we'll never succeed. So we 
did it. We pay a price for that - the implication that 
we have thrown some accountability mechanisms out the 
door - but in time we'll have much better accountability 
arrangements.
(First Assistant Secretary)
The signs then were promising. All the structural preconditions for 
the delegation of authority were there. Inside the bureaucratic 
system, however, much had still to be learnt. Progress, although 
steady, turned out still to be slower than might have been expected. 
As in Britain, this was particularly the case in the delegation of 
authority within departments themselves.
6. Delegation from the Department of Finance to Departments
The Department of Finance committed itself to a very significant 
delegation of financial authority from the centre. This it believed 
was both an essential precondition and necessary incentive for better 
financial management in departments. Within the aggregate 
expenditure totals set, departments would have discretion with 
respect to the allocation of their resources. In return they would 
be expected to demonstrate yearly improvements in financial 
performance:
"Perhaps the most important issue raised is when is it 
allowable for Finance to investigate (intrude) and what 
should be left to departmental prerogative. I take the 
view that requests for additional funds whether for new 
policy or for existing programmes should always be open 
to Finance investigation as they cannot be considered 
solely on the grounds of efficiency, effectiveness, 
appropriateness but must be weighed against other 
portfolio's requests for funding. On the other hand, it 
would usually be the individual department's prerogative 
to rearrange its internal priorities within a fixed level 
of funding. My officers will respect that prerogative 
where agencies live within their assigned aggregates. 
Governments may, however, also wish to consider 
substantial proposals for proposed departmental 
allocations which:
* imply increased expenditure in the out years, and
* involve across portfolio issues.
The success of these arrangement will rely heavily on a 
mutual understanding between Finance and program 
departments."
(Keating, 1988a, p.79)
New mutual understandings were critical. In the Department of 
Finance a transfer of emphasis from control to audit was required.
In departments, a transfer of emphasis from resource administration 
to programme management was needed. Each required new 
conceptualisations, commitments and skills. Yet most of the changes 
would have to be effected by those practised in and wedded to old 
ways of doing things. Not surprisingly, therefore, resistance was 
experienced as new systems and new ways of relating took hold.
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(i) General perspectives
In the Department of Finance itself the delegation of financial
authority to departments did not proceed without incident. It was
achieved only after those in favour of devolution and those opposing
it had engaged in protracted and bitter debate:
"I have to say to you that there was a lot of resistance 
within the Department - there were genuinely two camps 
here. One of my colleagues and I were at different ends 
of the spectrum. He firmly believed you had to put up 
and shut up. You, the departments, must go out and do 
these management things and then we will give you the 
autonomy. But we believed that what we had to do was 
give them the freedom and then take it back if the 
experiment did not work. There was of course a risk.
Once you give it away, it's not all that easy to get it 
back.
(Deputy Secretary)
This conflict was not resolved by agreement but by the exercise of 
power. In the end, both the Minister and the Secretary supported 
devolution. The Minister's role has already been referred to. It 
was complemented by that of the newly appointed Departmental 
Secretary:
"We had drive from the top of course. There is no 
question that the majority of supply division people were 
of the same mind, i.e. controllers, and might still be 
close to it if you scratch them but the point was that 
you had the Secretary of the Department standing up and 
saying that delegation had to go ahead."
(Finance First Assistant Secretary)
Despite the existence of strong executive leadership and direction,
pockets of resistance within the Department of Finance still
remained. Resource management divisions fully supported devolution.
However, others in supply divisions were very much more reticent:
"Finance self-satisfaction is so much rhetoric. My 
perception is that it has worked reasonably but not 
nearly as well as they would tell you. They will also 
tell you there is a huge cultural problem in Finance.
There remain a large number of people in that place who 
cannot resist tallying the minor figures. They say the 
delegation camp has won. I dispute that. The line 
divisions are fine but the supply divisions have much 
more difficulty with this concept ...they understand that 
if they let go of some of their material, they lose their 
empire...if they take a broad interest in the portfolio 
and nothing more, then what is their job?"
(Departmental First Assistant Secretary).
As delegation bit, some officials in the Department appeared not to 
have a clear picture of what their new role should entail. In 
consequence, departments reported that, if anything, supply division 
officials began to increase their scrutiny of internal departmental
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management rather than focusing on audit, review and the special 
case:
"central co-ordinating agencies have undergone 
considerable cultural change and reshaping of traditional 
roles with the introduction of system changes such as 
one-line appropriations. But, for example, the supply 
divisions of the Department of Finance are still seeking 
an interventionist role in the management of departments 
as substitution for earlier roles."
(Bedlington, 1989a, p.80)
Adherence to the new principles in supply divisions in particular was
patchy. Some officials embraced the new philosophy, others were less
certain about its merits. Not all supply division officials could be
tarred with the traditionalist brush. For some, hands-off
supervision was both reasonable and justified:-
"From a personal point of view I'd be quite happy to 
leave DITAC [the Department of Industry, Technology and 
Commerce] to run its own ship and these minor matters we 
sometimes get involved with I'd prefer us not to get 
involved with..what we come back to is what is the 
department's role, what are its objectives... if their 
achievement means spending more money in a particular 
area I would be happy to support that...but you need to 
go through an evaluation phase first."
(Supply Division official)
For others, however, intensive scrutiny would always be necessary:
"A. If the department is running in an efficient manner 
then we can make the judgement that we can take our hands 
off.
Q. What will persuade you of that?
A. Nothing! [laughter]."
(Supply Division official)
Despite these differences, the fact remained that the Department of
Finance did withdraw to a very considerable extent from detailed
intervention in departmental affairs. Without exception,
departmental officials welcomed the change (Taylor, 1988, p.83).
Departments had greatly increased financial flexibility and relished
the opportunities which that flexibility offered. Not everything was
running smoothly. It could not be expected to do so. But the trend
was definitely a positive one. The running costs system in
particular was the subject of departmental approbation. The
flexibilities it provided changed the nature of Finance-department
relationships and provided individual managers with the scope to
exercise their authority. The time saved both by Finance and
departments when controls were loosened, freed each side to
concentrate more intensely on audit and management respectively:
"The Department of Finance's devolution process was one 
that I think was welcomed by departments; it was easy to 
implement...if there are any problems it would be in the 
area of classification of positions...Finance has been 
concerned, I know about the growth in average salaries
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within the service but in terms of actually managing
the agency we have a lot less controls and a lot more 
freedom and a lot less time wasted on talking to the 
central agencies."
(House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration, 1989, FMIP Report, 
V.McMahon, Department of Immigration, Local Government 
and Ethnic Affairs, Minutes of Evidence, unpublished, p.60)
(ii) Portfolio Budgeting
Running costs, over which departments were given substantially 
greater control, constituted approximately 10 per cent of 
departmental budgets. The remainder was allocated to programmes. 
Portfolio budgeting was designed to give departments much greater 
flexibility to manage their financial affairs. In the event, 
however, there were a number of factors which impeded the achievement 
of this aim (see also Walsh, 1989, pp. 46-47).
While running cost allocations were left largely to departments to
dispense, new policy proposals were still vetted for their accuracy,
out-turn implications, cross-portfolio implications and economic
impact. Further, because in accordance with Expenditure Review
Committee guidelines new policy proposals had to be matched by
equivalent savings, departmental savings proposals too were
scrutinised to determine whether they were of equivalent value and
whether greater reductions could achieved. The hunt for savings
became especially intense when departments argued that matching was
either not possible or not desirable. The continuing degree of
Finance involvement caused some dissatisfaction:
"We don't have true portfolio and programme budgeting.
We still have for perfectly legitimate macro reasons, the 
Department of Finance coming up with savings options and 
the Minister not being able to run portfolio budgets 
properly... it is better than it was but it is still not 
entirely the case that Ministers are told here is an 
envelope of dollars - you run away and tell us how you 
want to do it. They are still vetted individually for 
new policy, savings are looked at separately, only when 
savings are achieved are they allowed to put forward new 
policy...It's the same old stuff."
(Departmental Secretary)
Similarly, in demand-driven programmes, the advantages of hands- off 
programme management were largely theoretical. An agreement by the 
DOF to let departments manage as long as their expenditures were ^ *p-
within a predetermined range had little applicability where, due to 
increased take-up, departmental expenditure exceeded estimated 
bounds. Then, departments were forced to return to the centre for 
additional allocations opening themselves, as a result, to renewed 
DOF scrutiny:
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"So they always chum over our bids in the way that they 
did before. Assessments are not made about the costs and 
benefits of the programme but rather at the edges and as 
long as the focus remains there, then the bigger 
questions about overall allocations and the effectiveness 
of overall programmes takes a back seat. There has been 
a major difference in relation to running costs but ...on 
the programme side, things remain much as they were."
(Policy First Assistant Secretary)
Parliamentary rules regarding the appropriation of expenditure 
required departments to report in considerable detail and in standard 
form about the nature and pattern of their expenditure. They also 
required the strict segregation of programme expenditure from 
administrative expenditure. As a result the capacity of departments 
to combine and reallocate their resources in this respect was 
limited:
"We are still bound by quasi constitutional arrangements 
around appropriation bills and all of that...we are 
limited by the fact that Parliament and estimates 
committees in particular still show a great fascination 
for detail. Therefore, we have to keep separate running 
costs items and we can't integrate our running costs with 
our programme expenditure. These are unnecessary and 
irritating constraints."
(Deputy Secretary)
(iii) Efficiency Savings
For departments, the efficiency dividend was a sugar-coated but 
nevertheless bitter pill. Each department was required to render to 
the Treasury an efficiency saving of 3.75 per cent of running costs 
over three years. This was a significant cut in expenditure Yet, it 
was a dividend shrewdly constructed to provide departments with a 
number of benefits to offset their pain. Where departments achieved 
the requisite savings, the Department of Finance agreed not to 
examine departmental budgets in pursuit of additional administrative 
savings. The dividend would suffice. Hence, the specific savings 
target provided departments with a clear indication of the real level 
of funding for running costs which, barring major workload changes, 
they could expect. This in turn facilitated medium-term planning 
(Keating, 1988a, p.74).
As a mixed blessing, the efficiency dividend received a mixed
reception. No one liked the pain it inflicted but many, particularly
at senior management level were willing to concede its necessity:
"I accept the efficiency dividend. It's not particularly 
harsh. We have to identify our own particular savings
against it What's one and a quarter per cent. We have
seventeen to eighteen thousand staff at the moment and in 
that it's not much. We have a lot of people out in the
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field worried about resources but even there is a change 
in culture where people are trying to achieve the 
organisation's broad objectives and in that there are 
efficiencies to be made..."
(Deputy Secretary).
Further down the line, operational managers regarded the dividend
quite differently. For them, it constituted a cut pure and simple.
They argued that if the dividend had represented genuine expenditure
reductions in response to greater efficiency, savings would
presumably have been targeted in particular areas of a department
where the efficiency had been achieved. However, most departments
had simply imposed the dividend as an across-the-board charge.
Whether or not greater efficiency had been achieved, therefore, every
departmental division suffered the pain of running costs reductions.
Programme managers regarded this as unfair and also expressed concern
that the savings required would result in the reduction of client
services. Others, for example in the union movement, pointed to the
contradiction between the FMIP's devolutionary philosophy and the
imposition of centrally dictated reductions in expenditure. At the
same time that the Department of Finance encouraged managers to make
better use of their existing resources, they argued, it reduced their
capacity to do so by insisting that savings must be made and returned
to Treasury coffers:
"We do see...in practice, the contradiction between the 
ideology of devolution of financial decision making and 
the practice of government decision making which has 
tended to further centralise decision making. We point 
out in particular that the 1.25 per cent efficiency 
dividend sits very strangely with the financial 
management improvement program which looks to effect 
genuine efficiencies and reform at the micro level."
(House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration, 1989, FMIP Report,
D.Bunn, Public Sector Union, 
Minutes of Evidence, unpublished, p.277)
7. From the Centre to the Periphery of Departments
Just as authority was transferred from the Department of Finance to 
departments, so too it was expected that a similar transfer of 
authority would occur within departments themselves. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, progress in this regard was patchy. Central
finance divisions, enjoying the greater freedom to manage which had
been accorded them, appeared either less able or less willing than 
their counterparts in the Department of Finance to push
responsibility out to field managers themselves.
The Department of Finance's intentions with respect to intra- 
departmental devolution were spelt out in the following terms:
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"Individual program managers are (or should be) entrusted 
with a set of resources (that is a budget) by the central 
office of the department in return for which they are 
expected to deliver an identifiable quality and quantity 
of service, that is, they are held accountable for 
performance. The implications of this are twofold:
- First, the program manager must have adequate autonomy 
to use the resources allocated to achieve the specified 
goals and
- Second, any variation in available resources during the 
budget period may have an impact on the quality and 
quantity of service which the program manager is able to 
deliver, and this must be allowed for in evaluating his 
or her performance."
(Keating, 1988b, p.86)
Four years after the FMIP had been established, the Department of 
Finance itself reported that progress had been slower than it had 
anticipated (Department of Finance, 1990, p.58). In a survey of 
delegation within departments, it found on the credit side that 
resource management in Commonwealth agencies had been substantially 
decentralised from Canberra to State and regional levels. However, 
on the debit side, the survey reported that very limited 
decentralisation had taken place in policy areas and policy 
departments. Further, whilst managerial responsibility had been 
devolved, managerial authority had not proceeded in parallel.
Taking the credit side first, in departments with regional service
delivery networks, the decentralisation of authority from Canberra to
States and regions appeared to proceed rapidly (Commonwealth of
Australia, 1991d). In the Department of Social Security, for
example, decentralisation and devolution proceeded hand in hand:-
"We have devolved, as far as possible, functions and 
responsibilities and delegations to those area offices so 
that they, in many instances, have virtually the same 
responsibilities as the State offices under the old 
arrangements. We have also gone a long way down the 
track of delegating responsibility not only for decisions 
under the Social Security Act, but also under the Public 
Service Act, the Audit Act and Finance Regulations, to 
regional offices."
(Deputy Secretary).
This pattern was repeated in a number of other service delivery 
organisations (see, for example, O'Connor, 1989; Australian Taxation 
Office, 1989; Bedlington 1989a, 1989b; Bashford, 1990).
In head office too, life for programme managers changed 
significantly. Greater flexibility in the application of running 
costs was clearly evident everywhere and most programme managers 
reported that, following from the devolution of authority from the 
Department of Finance to departments, they too had been assigned more 
significant responsibilities in the management of their staff and 
administrative resources:
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"In terms of how I use my budget...I am by and large 
entirely free and know so. That's very different from 
what it was only five or six years ago when you could not 
create a position without an elaborate procedure. I can 
open and shut positions, hire at any level and the only 
control is in the amount that I spend - although the 
department does keep an eye on average staffing levels."
(Departmental First Assistant Secretary).
Programme managers generally were enthusiastic about the new
discretions which they could exercise. Yet for many life had not
changed significantly as a result of receiving them. The reason was
obvious. Programme activity remained largely constant. Once set in
place, the resources required to administer programmes varied little.
Unless new initiatives were funded or cuts were imposed, change
occurred only at the margin. The scope for entrepreneurial
management was small yet not insignificant:
"When I get an administrative costs budget I can spend it 
on whatever the needs of the division are. But there is 
not a lot of discretion because the needs define 
themselves. I have to fit within the overall budget but 
within that it is broadly my decision. But in fact there 
isn't much flexibility because of the static demand. But 
it's there, and I have to make judgements."
(Departmental First Assistant Secretary)
Despite these apparent successes, several problems were also 
encountered. The major ones were the following:
(■»■)■■ The eurganflog-ef authority from 'Corporate Servi-eeo Divioiono 
Officials in the Department of Finance were somewhat dismayed that 
delegation had not proceeded as effectively within departments as it 
had done from the centre of government to departments. The Deputy 
Secretary of the Department observed that his own department had 
substantially increased the capacity of departments to choose the 
best mix of resources to achieve specified programme objectives. 
Despite this, the further delegation of these flexibilities had not 
proceeded in parallel or at a comparable pace in departments 
themselves. Corporate services divisions had assumed the mantle of 
central agencies but not delegated further. Not only this, but in 
departments there was still a lack of appreciation of the fact that 
resource issues should no longer be the sole or principal 
responsibility of such divisions (Barrett, 1988, p.53). In its 
survey, the Department had suggested a number of reasons why 
intra-departmental devolution had proceeded so slowly. Senior 
management had not thought through clearly an appropriate structure 
for devolved decision making. Managerial attitudes had proven a 
stumbling block. Financial management information systems had not 
come on stream quickly enough (Department of Finance, 1990, 
pp.58-59). Each of these was relevant. But there were other, more 
fundamental, explanations.
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The Deputy Secretary's dismay was mirrored in the attitude of
programme managers who had been promised much greater authority but
who, several years later, were still waiting to assume it:
"Central office hasn't been first cab off the rank.
There is a reluctance to hand money out to people who are 
by and large not professional managers. Part of it also 
has to do with the fact that they have much larger fish 
to fry - negotiating with DOF regarding delegations, 
balancing accounts etc. But there are still many 
decisions I want to deal with but I can't."
(Departmental First Assistant Secretary)
Certainly, managers had greater flexibility with respect to the
management of their running costs. But there remained major areas of
authority in relation to which devolution had made little progress.
Accommodation, the employment of consultants and purchasing were
three of many examples which were cited frequently:
"There are still some considerable inflexibilities in 
terms of how we operate in relation to the Australian 
Property Group; Australian Construction Service; issues 
of recruitment, where we are tied to using the Department 
of Employment to recruit people; the user charging issue 
of being tied to people who are not necessarily 
delivering the service at the price that we could get 
elsewhere."
(House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration, 1989, FMIP Report, 
J.Bedlington, Department of Community Services and Health, 
Minutes of Evidence, unpublished, p.159).
However, if officials in corporate service divisions were reluctant
to divest themselves of controls, then their reluctance was matched
by that of a not insignificant proportion of programme managers to
assume the new responsibilities they were offered. Their
reservations sprang from several sources. First, they experienced
practical difficulties associated with the transition. New
responsibilities meant additional work. But no additional resources
were allocated to undertake it. Managers were given budgets and
asked to comply with their terms. But budgetary responsibility did
not proceed hand in hand with budgetary authority. Professional
officers objected to the imposition of managerial responsibilities.
Their job was to provide advice based on their professional
knowledge, skill and ability. The management of resources was
properly a job for someone else. Many managers schooled in
traditional methods of management and control were personally
reluctant to embrace their new identities as 'risk takers'. As they
saw it, their task was the provision of a quality service albeit with
due regard to cost (see similarly Pearce, 1989a). The new managerial
culture simply did not suit them:-
"The change from the i-dotting, t-crossing manager, 
concerned more with keeping out of trouble, to the 
outcome seeking, risk taking, efficiency conscious 
manager prepared to tolerate an occasional mistake in the 
interest of high achievement, requires a huge change in 
attitude. Some managers have been more successful in
130
this adjustment than others, and some Departments have 
had greater drive towards achieving it than others. 
Devolution may well have been deferred or avoided because 
managers have not felt prepared to let go the reins."
(Bedlington, 1989a, p.81).
Finally, management information systems had not yet become
sufficiently sophisticated to permit either line managers or
corporate service divisions to monitor and assess their managerial
performance. Better information about costs and outputs was the
necessary precondition of delegating more authority to managers
(Keating, 1988b, p.85). Inevitably, however, the new systems took
considerable time to develop. Managers had to know how they were
performing and be given information to support their future planning.
In the absence of relevant management information, these requirements
could only partially be fulfilled:
“It is interesting that, in the early stages, our branch 
for example, went out and put the pressure on managers 
and said, 'Okay, here is the new set of rules, you need 
to play by them.' But it was not long before the pressure
was rebounding back on to my branch in saying, Okay,
if we are playing by these rules, then we want the exact 
information by which we can go.' We have found it very 
hard to deliver. So as far as I am concerned the urgency 
within our organisation and probably within many 
government departments is to adopt reasonably 
sophisticated accounting and other resource systems which 
can provide the management information at a reasonable 
cost."
(House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration, 1989, FMIP Report,
V.McMahon, Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic 
. Affairs, Minutes of Evidence, unpublished, p.60.)
8. Summary
In Australia, the Department of Finance led by example in promoting 
the delegation of managerial responsibility. It introduced a new 
forward estimates system which, by changing the rules of the 
budgetary game, established a firm basis upon which delegation could 
proceed. Then, with the establishment of portfolio budgeting and a 
new running costs system, it delegated substantial numbers of its own 
financial controls to departments. Departments clearly appreciated 
the new financial flexibility which these measures accorded them.
They were, however, much slower in pursuing delegation themselves. 
Within departments, central finance divisions were generally 
reluctant to cede their new authority to operational managers. Their 
reluctance was matched by that of some programme managers who, both 
for personal and technical reasons were unwilling to embrace the new 
financial regime.
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SECTION 2: THE MONITORING OF MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE
"I was speaking to one department head who said to me in 
all seriousness, Jack, if you can't count it, it doesn't 
count."
(Jack Waterford, Deputy Editor, Canberra Times)
1. Introduction
Following their systematic approach to the task of change,
Australia's management reformers, having set planning and budgeting 
structures in place, turned their attention to the concluding 
elements of the planning cycle - monitoring and evaluation. Their 
initial emphasis was on monitoring and their means, performance 
indication. Later their attention turned to evaluation where, as in 
Britain, a new emphasis was placed upon assessing the effectiveness 
of government programmes. The push for evaluation had only just 
begun at the time the evidence for this survey was collected. 
Consequently, the focus of this section will be on performance 
assessment.
Performance assessment was developed under the umbrella of Program 
Management and Budgeting (PMB). PMB required each department and 
agency to specify the objectives of its programmes, to develop 
programme structures which related objectives and expenditure and to 
report to Parliament on the performance of each programme against its 
objectives. Parliamentary reporting was at the heart of the new 
system for, in a significant departure from traditional notions of 
ministerial responsibility, it was in Parliament that the 'new 
managers', would be held to account for their activities.
To assist Parliament in its role as performance auditor, two 
important changes in budgetary documentation were introduced. First, 
a new budget paper was commenced (Budget Paper No. 3 - Portfolio 
Program Estimates) This document presented budget estimates on a 
programme basis and reconciled the estimates with the appropriation 
and outlays presentations contained in Budget Paper No. 1. Next, 
the format of portfolio explanatory notes was changed. Previously 
explanatory notes had been focused almost entirely on inputs. In 
particular they provided brief information on variations in 
expenditure and reported in detail on administrative and salary 
expenditure. Following the introduction of PMB, however, the format 
of the notes was changed so that inputs could be related to programme 
performance and intended programme outcomes. On this basis, an 
assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of each programme 
could be made. In the explanatory notes departments were required to 
specify performance measures, preferably in quantitative form, for
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each programme and to report, in quantitative terms, on the progress 
each year in the achievement of their programmatic objectives.
The explanatory notes were the foundation for scrutiny of budgetary 
estimates and performance by the Estimates committees of the Senate. 
Following the change in format and approach, Senate Estimates 
committees began to show an increasing interest in performance and 
the definition of objectives (Baume, 1990; Cook, 1990). The more 
intensive scrutiny of departmental performance in this external forum 
subsequently provided an important impetus for the adoption of new 
management techniques within departments themselves.
The altered framework for reporting on government performance 
resulted very quickly in a substantial increase in the size and 
quality of information provided to the Parliament. And yet, the 
result with respect to the development of effective performance 
indicators was disappointing (Department of Finance, 1988, p.57; 
Barrett, 1988, p.55; Keating, 1988a, p.78). Methodological, 
organisational and political difficulties combined to lessen their 
usefulness both for the purposes of internal and external 
accountability. In Australia, as in Britain, considerable difficulty 
was experienced in choosing and using quantitative measures with 
which to monitor the effectiveness of governmental action (see 
generally Klein, 1982; Pollitt, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1989; Flynn et 
al., 1988; Carter, 1988, 1991).
2. Methodology
Ideally, performance indicators should permit managers to relate
inputs to outputs, thereby measuring programme efficiency and outputs
to outcomes thereby measuring programme effectiveness.
In Canberra, the principal preoccupation of senior administrators was
with the latter relationship. How, they asked, could the
effectiveness of government programmes be measured ? Officials noted
that several difficulties existed in doing so. Many governmental
purposes, they believed, were of their nature incapable of reduction
to quantitative terms. Programmes designed to change community
attitudes and behaviour provided the quintessential examples.
Government could set in place a comprehensive array of measures
designed to increase community awareness of a particular social
issue, the programme's underlying purpose being to influence
attitudes and standards of behaviour. But without experimental and
control groups, the measurement of attitudinal change presented
formidable difficulties:
"Then there is the technical question of how one measures 
effectiveness in a society that, quite rightly, does not 
allow us to engage in controlled experiments. The best 
example is in our health prevention area, where we are
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trying to change public behaviour in relation to public 
and personal health. We have a national campaign against 
drug abuse but how can we measure whether our campaign is 
actually working ? This is not an avoidance of the issue 
- we'd love to know how it's working. But it's a bugger 
to do because we're not going to isolate one part of the 
community and say we're not going to let you be exposed 
to the campaign so that we can see what would have 
happened otherwise."
(Departmental Secretary)
Next, even if a particular governmental purpose was capable of 
concrete and quantitative definition, how, officials asked, could the 
impact of a specific programme upon the achievement of that purpose 
be isolated from other factors also having an effect ? If, for 
example, the objective of a subsidy programme to industry was to 
achieve a certain and increasing level of import replacement, how 
could the effect of the subsidies per se be isolated from broader 
national and international economic measures and trends which also 
influenced the competitiveness and attractiveness of Australian-made 
products ?
The third problem was the difficulty of designing measures which
would reflect accurately the achievement of a particular outcome.
If, for example, the objective of a social security benefit programme
was the alleviation of poverty, would it be sufficient to judge its
success to observe that benefits paid had risen to a level equal to a
pre-determined poverty line, ■Quite Impart from the fact that poverty
line figures fail to take into account the particular and differing
circumstances of individuals and families, such a measure itself
presumes that the alleviation of poverty can be achieved by monetary
means alone. However,, were poverty to be defined in relative rather
than absolute terms, the accuracy and relevance of monetarily founded
measures would immediately be called into question:
"What about trying to define the requisite amount to live 
on. How is this to be calculated ? If the rate of 
pension is going up against average weekly earnings, 
prices etc. then that is something - but you haven't got 
a starting point. So all you can say is that it is 
better or worse than it was. So you move to the 
Henderson Poverty Line. Then you're in the business of 
looking for something that will give you an answer - but 
you will never find it because performance indicators 
should not be used to give you an answer, but simply to 
point you in a particular direction."
(Assistant Secretary).
The example is also illustrative of a further problem. The accurate 
assessment of outcomes presumes a consensus about a programme's 
purpose. But this consensus may from the outset be questionable. 
Thus, for example, a Labor government with a structural perspective 
on poverty might define the purpose of its income maintenance 
programmes as poverty's reduction. On the other hand a Conservative
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government, with an individualistic perspective on poverty, may
define the purpose of its portfolio of social security measures as
being the setting of income support at a level which will encourage
recipients to seek work. The performance measures one adopts to
assess the success of identical programmes may, therefore, differ
according to the objectives assigned to them:
"As soon as you start thinking about why a programme is 
there, you get a cacophony of different views. It is 
very convenient for the purposes of assessment and 
evaluation to have well known and publicly articulated 
objectives - but these are fiendishly difficult to arrive 
at."
(Assistant Secretary).
By contrast with outcomes and outputs, respondents believed that 
there was little inherent difficulty in measuring inputs such as 
staffing or administrative costs. The only problem here was cost 
attribution. Cost-attribution difficulties occurred when one 
organisational unit played a role in the production of two or more 
significantly different types of output. This was particularly so 
where there were specific staff (or other resources) within the unit 
who were capable of contributing to more than one output. In part 
these difficulties reflected the costs of reliably controlling and 
monitoring the way in which shared resources were used. In practice, 
however, the cost of establishing a recording system which provided 
reliable information of this kind was often considered excessive in 
relation to the benefits to be derived from doing so.
3. Organisation
At senior management level, there was considerable support for the
idea that governmental effectiveness and efficiency should constantly
be monitored. This was blended in the eyes of the new managers with
considerable pride in the degree of progress which had been made in
providing to the Parliament a comprehensive range of performance
measures. Certainly, the quality of managerial information flowing
to the Parliament had improved substantially since the format and
content of the Budget papers and explanatory notes had been revised.
Methodological difficulties were recognised but, at the same time,
there was a strong feeling amongst senior officials that the process
of conceptualising departmental activities in programme terms and
thinking through the manner in which performance could be assessed
had been very beneficial.
"I think we have a good story to tell. It is fair to say 
that we have had enormous difficulty until recently in 
getting the issue of performance indication right.
Originally we were very input oriented. But last year we 
sat down and rewrote the programme structure. The 
rewrite enabled us to revise the performance indicators.
After that they made much more sense."
(First Assistant Secretary)
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However, the vast majority of indicators still represented
intermediate rather than final measures of programme effectiveness:
"It is possible to measure performance in some areas, 
particularly in operations. But we are still mainly 
stuck to process-oriented measures rather than output or 
outcome oriented ones."
(Departmental Secretary)
This was a source both of frustration and contention. The 
frustration was experienced amongst those, particularly in central 
finance divisions, who wished to push the performance indication 
movement further but who were slowed in doing so by the 
methodological problems already described. For them, the solution to 
the difficulties posed lay in the development of greater 
methodological expertise, the use of trial and error to refine 
existing measures and the more effective harnessing and utilisation 
of supporting systems for data collection and analysis.
By contrast, programme managers were the principal critics of
performance assessment. Their criticism took a number of forms.
They criticised the quantitative bias of the performance indicator
movement. To reduce the complex functions of management in which
they were involved to a series of loosely connected quantitative
measures was to over-simplify their tasks:
"Finance tends to be too oriented to numbers...I think 
there is a tendency to concentrate on numbers - they are 
easy to get hold of and easy to use. Whereas things 
which require judgement and therefore which you have 
doubts about, the intuitive things, tend to be 
discounted."
(First Assistant Secretary)
These competing perceptions on the appropriateness of quantification
illustrated a deeper argument. To be effective, performance
indicators had to convey information about the variables to which
they related, that is, input, output or outcome and the interaction
between them. To be genuine indicators, however, they needed also to
say something about the quantum of output-achievement or about the
degree of efficiency, timeliness or some other relevant measure of
quality. This meant that performance indicators had to have a
measurable specificity about them. However, managers reacting
against the drive for quantification stressed performance indicators'
weakness in capturing the complexities of managerial decision making
and the danger of goal displacement (Uhr, 1989, p.157; Nethercote,
1989, p.364; Considine, 1990, pp.175-176):
"There are many examples of resource allocation being 
based on indicators unrelated to outcomes sought. This 
is not necessarily a problem but it becomes one when the 
basis of allocation gives the wrong signals to those 
responsible for client impacts - e.g. allocation based 
on numbers of clients where there is significant 
discretion in relation to service priorities. Similarly
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there are examples of regions being given quotas to meet, 
based on national data, without regard to the 
opportunities and needs that exist within that region." 
(Management Improvement Advisory Committee, 1990, p.vi)
Given these concerns, the critics proposed instead or in addition,
the development of narrative indicators i.e. indicators which
consisted of a descriptive assessment of a programme's performance in
its various facets without reference to any numerical element.
Narrative assessment, however, was also prone to methodological
deficits not least among which was the absence of any objective
benchmarks against which claims about efficiency and effectiveness
could be assessed. Thus, the Department of Finance responded coolly
to the suggestion that client surveys might constitute a promising
surrogate performance measure:
"We do not consider client views should be themselves 
regarded as actual measures of performance. However, we 
believe that such views have an important place in 
information upon which judgements about performance 
should be made and that interpretation of those views 
should be undertaken with care."
(House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration, 1989, FMIP Report, 
Memorandum from Department of Finance, p.S265)
Programme managers frequently criticised the manner in which 
performance indicators were developed. Although departmental 
practice varied, indicators were normally chosen centrally rather 
than at programme level. It was common service divisions that had 
the responsibility, time, capacity and expertise to engage in 
indicator formulation that took the lead. This caused difficulties 
with programme managers who felt that the new techniques were being 
imposed without adequate consultation with them and by 
'number-crunching technocrats' who knew little of managerial 
realities:
"I think that encapsulates one of the problems that 
departments have had in the sense that if they have tried 
to impose performance indicators from the central offices 
and the managers do not feel that they have had any say 
in those performance indicators, but they are being held 
accountable, then clearly they do not own them and 
clearly it can very quickly become a paper exercise where 
you just simply get the information out that will meet 
that performance indicator. Whether the performance 
indicator is regarded as being satisfactory by the 
individual programme manager, what it actually tells you 
about how accountably or how effectively the programme is 
being implemented is not quite clear."
(First Assistant Secretary)
It was in this area, the use of performance indicators to assess and 
improve internal management, that the most significant organisational 
difficulties arose. PMB had done much to improve the quality of 
information going to Parliament and hence to increase external
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accountability. The same information, however, had not proven nearly
as useful in setting managerial direction internally. The Management
Improvement Advisory Committee's report made the point forcefully
(Management Improvement Advisory Committee, 1990). The report, based
on a survey of progress with performance measurement and evaluation
in nine departments, noted that it was difficult to develop case
studies which showed clear links between outcome- oriented
performance information and decision-making within organisations.
However, even recognising this difficulty, its conclusions made
depressing reading:
"Of particular concern to [the Management Improvement 
Advisory Committee] is the lack of evidence of a link 
between performance being reported externally and 
performance information influencing internal decision 
making. For most managers, reporting externally appears 
not to be seen as an important element of the management 
cycle."
(Management Improvement Advisory Committee, 1990, p.ii)
Why should this have been the case ? The evidence already discussed
provides an initial explanation. Where performance measures had been
imposed by the centre rather than devised in consultation with
programme management, there had been a natural reluctance to utilise
them. Given that indicators were successful principally in
determining the efficiency of operations rather than their
effectiveness, managers found them of only limited assistance in
making hard managerial choices such as whether more or less should be
spent on their programmes. Where they were used, indicators remained
an aid to judgement rather than supplanting it:
"It is a bit like pressing the button on a computer. You 
still have to have your paper and pencil calculation in 
hand and then you press. If the information the computer 
provides is in accord with the paper sums, then you act 
on it. But if it is not, then you act on your original 
assessment."
(Deputy Secretary)
There was a more fundamental reason still. Performance measures can 
serve a number of different purposes. They may assist external 
scrutineers better to draw programme managers to account. They may 
provide those formulating government budgets with hard edged 
performance information to assist with the allocation of resources. 
They can also be used to provide guidance to senior managers about 
how units under their control have performed in a delegated 
managerial environment (Pollitt, 1986a, p.163; Walsh, 1989, p.48).
It will not often be the case, however, that a single set of 
indicators can perform all these functions simultaneously. Hence, 
MIAC found that performance measures generally had been designed with 
an eye to satisfying the needs of Parliament. This orientation had 
not necessarily been compatible with the development of indicators 
which managers themselves might have found most useful:
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"performance information is often being developed for 
reporting purposes only, and not for management purposes 
(...external reporting documents still rarely discuss 
results effectively - the listing of performance 
indicators is pervasive)."
(Management Improvement Advisory Committee, 1990, p.v)
Similarly, the report discovered that a cleavage had emerged between 
operational objectives enunciated in corporate plans and budgetary 
related objectives set forth in the explanatory notes. Performance 
indicators developed for the latter, however, did not relate closely 
to those developed for the former.
3. The Politics of Measurement.
The politics of performance measurement added a third dimension to
the story of their introduction. Politicians and senior
administrators were pushed and pulled in qpaifeqy different directions
as the performance indicator movement gained ground.
On the positive side, the presentation of budgetary papers to
Parliament in programme form and the clear specification of
performance targets significantly enhanced the role and influence of
Senate Estimates committees. Previously confined to microscopic
curiosity about departmental inputs, the committees' role and
influence expanded substantially once they were provided with
budgetary papers enabling them to come to terms with programme
outputs and outcomes.
"The estimates are now in program form. No longer do I 
have to sit and listen to ridiculous questions about
paper clips or tea ladies. Now - at least in theory - we
get budget information in budget, program and sub-program 
form.
(Baume, 1990, p.103)
The vigorous questioning of departments about their estimates and the
measures proposed to assess them also had a very positive on
management reform in departments. It was a rare but clear example of
parliamentary accountability at work.
"If you look at the debates that have taken place at 
Senate Estimates Committee, you will find that they have 
pushed us very hard to do it. The whole branch that I am 
responsible for was created as a result of the Department 
being beaten up at Senate Estimates Committee by Peter 
Baume."
(First Assistant Secretary)
On the other hand, both performance measurement and evaluation had 
their political pitfalls (see Flynn et al., 1988, p.36). The 
constant monitoring of programme performance against measurable 
benchmarks and the publication of the results held out the 
possibility that ineffective performance might provide the launching
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pad for political criticism. For this reason some Ministers were
distinctly cautious about indicator development.
"There are difficulties politically in facing up to some 
of the questions that have to be asked. That's always a 
trick...a programme may be the baby of one particular 
minister - do they really want to be told three years 
down the track that it ain't working ? Some of them do 
because they genuinely want to improve things. Others 
don't want to know."
(Departmental Secretary)
As a result of the political pitfalls, careful consideration was
given to the formulation of key indicators of performance. In areas
of particular sensitivity, indicators which provided less contentious
results were chosen over those more accurate but more sensitive:
"In the main, indicators do faithfully reflect what we 
try to do. But one that is different and stands out at 
policy level is where we were going to use pension and 
benefit payments compared to household disposable income 
per capita. That might yield some controversial results 
so we decided instead to use average weekly earnings. We 
need to try and minimise that sort of thing."
(First Assistant Secretary).
There was an inevitable element of political compromise. Indicators 
could not, for all their veneer of objectivity and for all the talk 
of the new accountability be permitted to prejudice the Minister's 
position.
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CHAPTER 7
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The aim of this chapter is to establish a framework for the analysis 
of administrative reform. The framework has two purposes. First, it 
creates a means through which existing literature in the field can be 
surveyed and systematised. Then, in the next chapter, it provides 
the mould into which the substance of this survey's findings can be 
poured. The chapter is heuristic in nature. That is, it derives 
from and utilises the author's own experience of the administrative 
world, and that of others as expressed through their writing, to 
develop a working understanding of administrative reform. This 
working understanding is then complemented and sharpened in Chapter 8 
where a comparison is made between the experience of implementing the 
FMI and the FMIP respectively.
Administrative reform, then, may be considered as having four 
discrete but interconnected aspects. These are its environment, 
content, strategy and dynamics (see similarly Ashford, 1980, Part 2; 
Pettigrew, 1985, p.439; Pettigrew, McKee and Ferlie, 1988, p.300). 
The relationship between these aspects may be represented 
diagrammatically in the following way:
Content
Environment
Dynamics
Strategy
Outcome
Figure 2 :.The Framework of Reform
As a general rule, it is alterations in the environment of the 
administration that provide the initial stimulus for reform. These 
changes then translate into specific reform proposals. Once 
introduced, the internal dynamics of the administration will 
determine what becomes of the reforms. The way these dynamics are 
crystallised depends on the content of the reforms proposed and the 
strategy employed to effect them. Each of these component elements 
will now be elaborated upon.
142
1. Environment
For the purposes of this analysis, the environment within which 
administrative reform takes place is considered as being comprised of 
four overlapping arenas, the economic, social, political and 
administrative (see to similar effect Caiden, 1969, p.164; Leemans, 
1976a, p.15; Self, 1978, p.313; Self, 1985, Ch.2; Guy Peters, 1988, 
pp.40-41). Each is now briefly considered.
(i) The Economic Arena
Economic conditions exercise a formidable influence on administrative 
reform. They loom large in considering the role which the state 
should play in the economy. When the economy is buoyant, public 
attitudes to an expansion in the government's role are more likely to 
be favourable. Conversely, when economic conditions are poor or 
unstable, adverse attitudes can be predicted. In an expansionary 
period, the government's revenue is likely to increase, permitting it 
to accrue additional functions and establish new organs through which 
to conduct them. During economic contraction, governmental activity 
will be cut back and its agencies will be dispersed or disbanded 
(Aucoin, 1981, p.23). Economic circumstances influence the structure 
and composition of the civil service. In recession, for instance, 
there is pressure to reorganise the service to enhance financial 
control and alter patterns of recruitment to attract members with 
financial experience (Argyriades, 1986, p.16). The priority which 
the government accords to efficiency or effectiveness may also be 
altered. During economic contraction, a premium is placed on the 
efficient delivery of public services. During expansion, 
effectiveness becomes the more potent consideration (Corbett, 1990, 
p.295). Contraction, not expansion, appears to provide the more 
forceful impetus for administrative reorganisation. Government acts 
more decisively when the costs of inaction are high than when they 
can be spread or disguised during economic and public sector growth 
(Keeling, 1972, p.81; Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, p.212).
(ii) The Social Arena
The administration's values can be expected, to a greater or lesser 
extent, to reflect those of society. Changes in society's values 
will be reflected in new administrative forms and procedures. There 
are a number of different ways in which this might occur. A change 
in the intellectual climate may generate new views about how public 
administration should be conducted (Savage, 1971, pp.50-52; Chapman 
and Greenaway, 1980, p.194; Spann, 1980, p.13; Davis, 1989, 
pp.173-176). Important social changes will also be reflected in 
changes to the composition and functioning of the civil service.
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Thus, for example, the altered status of women and the increasing 
respect paid to the position of minorities have altered patterns of 
civil service recruitment and promotion (Corbett, 1990, p.296). The 
advent of new technologies too may have a substantial effect on 
existing patterns of organisation and management (see Booth and 
Smith, 1984). Shifts in social attitudes can be expected to result 
in alterations to government policy. These alterations in turn 
engender changes in administrative machinery and practice (Wilenski, 
1988, p.213). Soci&l changes can make a difference to public 
attitudes Co t^te^ per se* When the power of the bureaucracy is under 
attack, for example, one can anticipate that mechanisms to draw it to 
account will emerge high on the reformist agenda.
(iii) The Political Arena
Politics acts as the principal conductor through which wider social 
trends are transformed into agendas for administrative innovation. 
Political parties assume power with a pre-determined attitude to the 
civil service and sometimes, although not frequently, with a well 
formulated blueprint for administrative transformation (Chapman and 
Greenaway, 1980, p.203). The attitudes of the government will, at 
least in part, take their bearings from wider economic and social 
trends (Wilenski, 1988, p.213) Similarly, individual ministers not 
infrequently enter office with a penchant for taking on 'the 
bureaucracy'. Parliament too may prove a potent source of pressure 
and ideas (see generally St. John-Stevas, 1982; Uhr, 1982).
However, politics may not always prove the most reliable of 
transmitters. Government, although recognising the need for 
administrative reform, may choose not to effect it. Thus, reforms 
made necessary by economic change might be seen as transgressing 
political values which the government holds dear. The government may 
conclude that the complexity and cost associated with developing new 
systems would, in the short term, outweigh the benefits of proceeding 
with them. Should the opposition have suggested the need for reform, 
a government may, for tactical reasons, be reluctant to introduce it. 
The government's response might also be diversionary. The more 
intractable the policy problems it faces, the more attractive it 
becomes for it to introduce administrative reform in order to be seen 
to be doing something (March and Olsen, 1989, p.90). Reforms which 
break up the administration create the opportunity for government to 
shift blame from itself on to others (Heffron, 1989, pp.70-71). 
Alternatively, existing programmes may be recombined and repackaged 
as new initiatives.
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(iv) The Administrative Arena
The administration may itself introduce structural and procedural 
change. Whilst not directly responsive to environmental and 
electoral pressures in the same way as the government is, the 
administration too receives contextual messages of many different and 
subtle kinds (Pitt and Smith, 1981, Ch.2; Rose, 1987, pp.211-217). 
Several means exist to translate these into action. New leaders at 
the top of the service who want to make their mark may choose 
administrative reform as one means of doing so. From time to time, 
significant individuals emerge to change the face of existing 
administrative arrangements (see Spann and Curnow, 1975, pp.365-406; 
Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, pp.219-220)*Industrial relations has 
also played its part in engendering reform (Bancroft, 1981, p.143; 
Bancroft, 1983, p.20). Managerial methods which prove successful in 
one agency may quickly spread by example to others.
However, all agencies, and particularly very large ones such as the 
civil service, exhibit considerable inertia. Therefore, it is less 
likely that an administration will act to reform itself than that 
reform will be externally imposed (Downs, 1967, p.197). The civil 
service can, however, move quite rapidly to adjust or block such 
reform. For example, it may put forward counter-proposals or 
reinterpret a new government's intentions in a way more acceptable to 
itself. It may emphasise the human costs or practical difficulties 
associated with the government's proposals. It may say it is acting 
in accordance with the government's will but in practice do very 
little. It may delay implementation or oppose it outright (see 
generally Kellner and Crowther Hunt, 1980, Ch.4; Ponting, 1986, Ch.7; 
Hennessy, 1990, pp.199-206). By the time these and other strategems 
have been exhausted, the initial signal transmitted from the 
environment may have become very weak indeed.
It is relatively easy to describe the arenas of which the 
administrative environment is comprised. It is much more difficult 
to predict the influence that pressures which emanate from them will 
have in engendering administrative innovation. Three additional 
problems should be noted in this regard. The environment, like the 
administration, is not a single entity. So, for example, while the 
administration generally might experience pressure to introduce 
affirmative action programmes in response to altered social 
attitudes, individual agencies with conservative constituencies may 
actively resist the trend. Second, it cannot be assumed that 
contextual pressures themselves will operate in the same direction. 
They may conflict (see Child, 1984, pp.225-229). Third, and 
similarly, it is readily assumed that administrative reform is a 
matter of perfecting the administration to meet environmental
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requirements. However, it may equally be the case that the 
environment itself is imperfect, placing quite contradictory demands 
on the administration and rendering the notion of administrative 
improvement problematic (Offe, 1985, p.303).
(v) Conclusion
In short, ideas, currents and conditions present in the environment 
will exercise an important influence on the management and 
organisation of government. However, the extent to which they do so 
appears likely to be dependent on:
a. the consistency and simultaneity of environmental messages;
b. a perception by the political or administrative leadership that
an existing state of administrative affairs is out of kilter with the 
environment;
c. the leadership's willingness and ability to act on this 
perception;
d. the consonance of the leadership's response.
e. the strategies used to advance the reform.
These last two considerations are dealt with in more detail in the
two following sections.
2. Content
Clearly, the nature and content of a reform programme will be a 
salient factor in determining its acceptability. The closer the 
match between the content of reforms and the normative traditions of 
the target institution, the more likely it is that reform will be 
incorporated. Similarly, the closer the match between the content of 
reforms and the dominant values of the wider society, the more likely 
it is that reform will succeed (Spann, 1979, p.484; Olsen, 1991, 
p. 132). Before examining these two propositions , however, I look 
briefly at the different forms which administrative innovation might 
assume.
(i) Strands in administrative reform
There have been many attempts to disentangle the various strands of
administrative reform (see for example Caiden, 1969, p.35; Leemans, 
1976a, p.29; Dror, 1976, p.129; Hahn Been Lee, 1976, p.118; Spann, 
1979, p.493; Emy and Hughes, 1988, p.350). Wilenski's, however, 
appears the most attractive (Wilenski, 1986, p.169). He defines 
three discrete aims for administrative reform. The first is the 
search for a more equitable administration. An equitable 
administration is one which is just and fair in dealing with its own
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employees and applicants for employment, and with individual citizens 
and groups relying on the services it provides. The second objective 
is for a more democratic administration. A democratic administration 
is one in which ministers make decisions on policy and resource 
allocation as the elected representatives of the people and in which 
the bureaucracy responds openly and flexibly to public influence and 
public scrutiny. The third is the search for a more efficient 
administration. An efficient administration is one which is able to 
meet the needs of modern government effectively and creatively with 
as little waste and misuse of resources as is possible. By focusing 
on the aims of reform, this typology makes explicit the values which 
underlie each reform agenda. At the same time, it recognises that 
reform may also be the product of distinct and sometimes competing 
environmental pressures. So, social, political and administrative 
forces may be seen as driving the equitable, democratic and 
efficiency agendas respectively (Self, 1978, p.313).
To emphasise values is important since it makes clear the fact that 
the pursuit of one reform agenda may conflict with another. For 
example, those who pursue the efficiency agenda may argue that 
reforms concerned with equity, whilst effective in achieving their 
stated objectives, are too expensive to be supported. Those 
concerned with equity, on the other hand, may contend that efficiency 
reforms, whilst important in themselves, can have the effect of 
discriminating against the disadvantaged and may involve the 
imposition of conservative and authoritarian managerial styles 
(Wilenski, 1986, pp.162-164; Yeatman, 1987, pp.358-359). The three 
agendas for reform need not always be in conflict. Increasing the 
openness of the bureaucracy, for example by introducing freedom of 
information legislation, may also enhance the efficiency with which 
it operates (Bell and Watchirs, 1988, pp.300-302; Zifcak, 1986, 
p.316). Nevertheless, the conflicts can clearly be such as to place 
considerable strain on reformist endeavours (see Bryson, 1986).
(ii) Reforms, institutions and society
When administrative reform is introduced it is likely to be 
interpreted according to the dominant frame of thought present in a 
governmental system and through its associated structures, systems 
and relationships of power. This frame of thought will be informed 
by a set of values and attitudes developed and refined over a 
considerable period of time. Reforms proceeding from a different 
frame of reference and embodying a different value stance are likely 
to be firmly resisted, not least because their acceptance would, 
necessarily, involve a realignment of existing patterns of authority.
147
The British administrative system, for example, has been 
characterised by 'the belief that administration is an essentially 
practical activity to be learnt chiefly by experience and best 
carried out within a framework of conventions of behaviour rather 
than of formal rules' (Johnson, 1976, p.294). One consequence of 
this belief has been the absence in Britain of a fully developed 
system of administrative law. This is in stark contrast to the 
extensive codification of administrative practice in many European 
countries and in Australia. Another consequence has been the 
remarkable capacity of Whitehall to reinterpret and subtly revise 
administrative reform proposals in accordance with its current 
perceptions of what is practicable and tolerable (see Kellner and 
Crowther Hunt, 1980, Ch.4).
There are other aspects of the 'Whitehall view' with which 
administrative reformers have also had to contend. There has been 
considerable scepticism regarding the efficacy of organisational 
restructuring; a pervasive belief that reforms are likely to fail; 
and a studied refusal to take long term planning seriously. The 
Financial Management Initiative posed a significant challenge to 
these orthodoxies. Therefore, its success depended not only on 
substantial political backing but also on the achievement of a major 
shift in managerial culture (Metcalfe and Richards, 1984a, p.448).
A similar situation exists with respect to the congruence of reform 
proposals with norms and standards prevalent in the society at large. 
Governmental institutions throw considerable light on the values of 
the society in which they exist, since they are not neutral machines 
but exhibit continuing relationships which have a normative content 
(Johnson, 1975, p.158). Hence, reform proposals which are 
inconsistent with or precede changes in society's values may founder.
In the early 1970s, for example, British governments were reluctant 
to embrace market solutions to their economic problems. This 
reluctance was reflected in the administration where the maintenance 
of centralised control of public expenditure and the presence of a 
highly centralised administrative structure was indicative of its 
dislike of conflict, diversity and inequalities of treatment and 
opportunity. Given this cluster of values, the attempt to introduce 
into government, managerial techniques fashioned in private business 
was unlikely to succeed (Johnson, 1976, p.295). By the end of the 
decade, the tide had begun to turn. The existence of heavy resource 
constraints together with an emerging social preference for the 
private provision of public services had stimulated, within the 
public sector, a new search for efficient and cost-effective methods 
of delivering governmental services (Johnson, 1983, p.177). By the 
mid 1980s, the crisis of confidence in the capacity of government to
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deal effectively with adverse economic circumstances had resulted in 
a widespread reaction against the extension of governmental activity. 
Within government, the faith in institutional engineering which had 
characterised the Fulton era had been replaced by a far narrower 
concentration on making the most efficient use of the limited 
resources available. In this the importation of private sector 
management techniques was playing an important part (Johnson, 1985, 
p.424).
j^)/ Strategy
vJ
The degree to which administrative reform is successful is dependent 
also on the effectiveness of strategies used to achieve it. The 
greater the depth of thought given to implementation strategy, the 
more likely it is that reforms will take root (Wilenski, 1986, 
pp.178-179). There are three different approaches which can be 
utilised to achieve planned change in organisations. These are the 
empirical-rational, normative-educative and power-coercive approaches 
(Chin and Benne, 1985, p.23). The empirical-rational approach 
assumes that organisational actors can be persuaded to change by 
evidence and argument. The normative-educative approach assumes that 
organisational actors can be encouraged to change by altering their 
values, attitudes and ways of relating. The power-coercive approach 
presumes that change will best be effected through the enforcement of 
compliance. Further, the choice of strategy will also vary with the 
scale of the changes proposed. Reforms may be either incremental or 
comprehensive (Dror, 1982, p.135). In matrix form the choice of 
appropriate strategies may be illustrated as follows:
Incremental Comprehensive
Rational Diagnosis and 
Prescription
eg Research 
Evaluation 
Problem Solving
Utopianism and 
Blueprint Development
eg Strategic Planning
Normative Growth and Education
eg T-groups 
Training 
Staff Exchange
Reward and Review
eg Merit Pay
Senior Exec Service
Coercive Coalition Development
eg Contractual apptm/t 
Information Control
Structural Alteration
eg Machinery of Gov/t 
Change 
Legislative Change 
Administrative Decree
Table 1 : Reform Strategies
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The normative-educative approach to change is essentially 
collaborative in nature. The rational-empirical approach may be 
either collaborative or confrontational. The power-coercive approach 
is almost by definition conflictual. Whether a collaborative or 
confrontational strategy for reform is appropriate depends in turn on 
the extent of the administrative difficulties which need to be 
overcome, the time available to implement reform, the institutional 
capabilities of the administrative system and the system's cultural 
expectations (See, similarly, Leemans, 1976a, pp.52-56; Cohen, 1976, 
pp.175-181; Dunphy and Stace, 1988, pp.326-327; Heffron, 1989, 
pp.158-159; Prasser, 1990, pp.189-191).
Where reformers observe a significant gap between an existing and 
desired state of administrative affairs a confrontational strategy 
may be the most appropriate one. Thus, for example, radical shocks 
to public administration such as those delivered by the Thatcher 
Government might be considered appropriate given that the historical 
inefficiency of the administrative system is substantial (March and 
Olsen, 1989, p.106). However, where all that is required is an 
incremental adjustment to existing structures and functions, a 
collaborative strategy is more likely to be suitable (cf. Cohen,
1976, pp.178). The time available to effect reform will also play a 
part in determining strategy. Collaborative strategies require 
considerable time to permit adequate planning, consultation and 
learning to take place. Coercive strategies require less time but 
may engender more forceful resistance (Leemans, 1976a, p.55).
The choice between collaborative and confrontational strategies 
depends too on the relationships of power that exist within the 
target administrative system. Where there are differing views about 
the way to proceed and no one party has a monopoly of relevant 
knowledge or power, it will be more appropriate to enter into 
collaborative action with a view to establishing consensus. In 
Nordic countries, for example, ministers and ministerial departments 
were in competition for influence with powerful statutory 
corporations. They were, therefore, in a weaker position than the 
Thatcher Government, with its more centralised administration, to 
direct reform from the centre. Hence a collaborative rather than 
conflictual strategy was chosen (March and Olsen, 1989, pp.109-110; 
Olsen, 1991, p.140).
Finally, it appears to be better if the strategy chosen conforms to 
the norms and traditions of the system under review. In some 
governmental systems a pattern of co-operation, compromise and trust 
may be well established. In others, sudden and forceful 
interventions may be customary. For example, an attempt to produce 
change through political confrontation and comprehensive structural
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reform would have violated Nordic traditions of proceeding through 
the attainment of shared understandings and the mobilisation of 
widespread commitment. By contrast, there has been in Britain a 
tradition of confrontation, forged through bitter debates about 
nationalisation and denationalisation. This paved the way for 
Thatcherite assaults on the public sector and the promotion of 
policies such as privatisation (March and Olsen, 1989, p.107; cf. 
Chapman, 1982, pp.67-68).
4. Dynamics
The dynamics of administrative reform may be considered at two 
different and successive levels. The first is systemic. There are 
certain characteristics of the administration as a system which may 
enhance its receptiveness to reform. Others may hinder it. The 
second is interactional. The success or failure of reform is 
critically dependent on the outcome of the contest between competing 
actors in the administrative arena. Each of these levels is now 
considered in turn.
(i) The Systemic Level
In recent years, private sector management literature has exhibited a 
fascination with determining precisely which characteristics of a 
company promote innovation and therefore provide it with a 
competitive edge (see for example Porter, 1980; Peters and Waterman, 
1982; Goldsmith and Clutterbuck, 1984; Peters and Austin, 1985). In 
one of the more interesting and sophisticated analyses, Kanter 
proposes that there exists a contrast between integrative and 
segmental organisational structures (Kanter, 1983, p.27).
Integrative organisational systems, which Kanter regards positively, 
foster innovation by treating problems as wholes, by encouraging the 
exchange of ideas as information across organisational boundaries, by 
reducing vertical and hierarchical division and by considering 
multiple perspectives in making organisational decisions. Segmental 
organisations, by contrast, compartmentalise problems and activities, 
are finely divided by levels and functions, treat information as 
owned rather than shared and take decisions on the basis of 
specialism and expertise. Segmentalism detracts from change by 
discouraging organisational actors from seeing problems, and, if they 
are seen, from communicating their perception. Integrative 
structures, on the other hand, foster a unity of vision and hence 
increase insight and create the preconditions for action.
In the public sector, the application of such analyses is somewhat 
more difficult. This is principally because there is no ready
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criterion such as profitability to determine relative degrees of 
success as between departments and because government 
as a whole constitutes a monopoly. Certainly, no neat polar 
categorisation such as Kanter's has yet emerged. Nevertheless, there 
do appear to be a number of criteria against which an administrative 
organisation's receptivity to innovation and change may be assessed. 
These taken together bear a distinct resemblance to several of the 
factors which she has outlined.
Hence, administrative systems which operate formally may be less 
receptive to reform than those which operate informally. So, for 
example, an administrative system which is tightly constrained by its 
constitution and rules may be less open to reform than one where the 
legal framework is less strictly defined. Similarly, a strictly 
hierarchical system is less likely to be receptive to change than 
one which is structured collegially (Thompson, 1969, p.75; March and 
Olsen, 1989, p.111).
Administrative systems whose boundaries are permeable are more likely 
to be receptive to reform than those whose perimeters are 
impenetrable (Thompson, 1967, p.76; Leemans, 1976a, p.20; Hahn Been 
Lee, 1976, p.118). Permeability in this context refers to the ease 
of information flow between the administrative system and its 
environment through, for example, freedom of information legislation 
and to the movement of people through external recruitment.
Administrative systems in which power is concentrated are more likely 
to have reform implemented successfully than those in which power is 
dispersed (Thompson, 1967, p.72; Caiden, 1982, p.86). Goodsell, for 
example, contrasts statist governmental systems with liberal systems 
(Goodsell, 1990, p.341). The statist system, in which power is 
centralised and the civil service organised coherently, can take 
decisive action. The liberal system, in which power is fragmented 
and pluralism dominant, is by contrast likely to generate 
considerable resistance to programmes of change (see also Pollitt, 
1990, p.36). Paradoxically, however, it is systems characterised by 
diversity and disaggregation which are more likely than centralised 
ones to generate innovative ideas (Downs, 1967, p.202; Caiden, 1969, 
p.181).
Administrative systems which are highly professionalised are likely 
to generate change to a greater extent than those in which the role 
of the professional is not so clearly valued (Thompson, 1969, p.69; 
Leemans, 1976a, p.21). Changes in professional knowledge, attitudes 
and values are likely to be reflected in organisational design and 
management. By contrast, where an administration is composed of 
personnel wedded only to the ethos of a particular organisation and
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having no evident external reference points, a potent source of 
creative tension may be removed. For similar reasons, an 
administration which is representative of the composition of the 
wider society may be more open to reform than one which is dominated 
by a narrow elite.
Finally, administrative systems which are large and complex appear 
less likely to embrace change than those which are small and more 
flexible (Downs, 1967, p.196).
(ii) The Interactional Level
A systemic analysis of administrative reform can take the argument 
only so far. Systems limit and constrain. However, they do not 
determine. Ultimately, it is the participants in the administrative 
process who, within established limits, settle the course of reform. 
Reform is the product of myriad choices taken individually and 
collectively. Choice in turn, creates the conditions for 
institutional politics since different segments of the administration 
can and will make different decisions about the way in which reform 
should proceed. March and Olsen have aptly described the interior of 
the administration as an 'ecology of games' (March and Olsen, 1989, 
p.80). In the remainder of this section, the nature of these games 
is explored in more detail.
The fate of any reform proposal may usefully be considered along 
three axes. These are the political, administrative and technical 
axes. The political axis embraces the interaction between 
politicians and administrators. The administrative axis covers the 
interaction between different segments of the administration. The 
technical axis refers to the interrelationship between administrators 
and the technical skills and resources at their disposal. Each of 
these is now considered in turn.
a. The Political Axis
Perhaps the most critical interaction affecting administrative reform 
is that between politicians and administrators. Formally, the 
interaction presents no difficulty. The task of the politician is to 
frame reforms and the task of the administrator is to execute them. 
However, in practice, the roles of the two overlap on a spectrum of 
activity ranging from political leadership at one end to 
administrative performance at the other (see Dunsire, 1973, p.158; 
Brown and Steel, 1979, p.126; Spann, 1979, p.265; Grattan and Weller, 
1981, pp.51ff; Dearlove, 1986, pp.120-123; Guy Peters, 1987, 
pp.258-265; Chapman, 1990, p.203; Thompson, 1990, p.43). This 
overlap, combined with the fact that politicians and administrators
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bring different and sometimes competing perspectives to governmental 
administration, sets the stage for conflicts of interest surrounding 
administrative reform.
There are three typical forms of interaction between politicians and 
administrators which have a particular bearing on administrative 
reform. Each of these derives from the different styles and 
perspectives the two parties bring to their working relationship (see 
Self, 1978, p.153). The first interaction is that of brokerage and 
planning. The modus operandi of politicians is to strike bargains 
and negotiate compromises between a wide diversity of pressure groups 
in the political community. Policies, then, are the product of the 
conciliation and arbitration of competing interests and values. 
However, for administrators, policy development is more akin to 
planning. Administrators are far more likely than politicians to 
have a predilection for orderly preference setting. So, 
administrative reforms aimed at tightening the parameters of policy 
development and enhancing the role of rational planning can meet with 
resistance from politicians who may view such attempts as encroaching 
upon their capacity to broker solutions in the political arena (Self, 
1978, p.157).
The second interaction is that between political discrimination and 
administrative impartiality. Politicians have a natural tendency to 
reward their supporters and punish their opponents, to induce 
potential voters and discard those whose support is no longer 
necessary. This tendency to favouritism may be set against the 
learned propensity of administrators to adjudicate competing claims 
objectively. So, for example, administrative reforms which aim to 
ensure fair and impartial staff selection may be diluted by ministers 
wishing to enhance their ability to promote loyal supporters.
Third, tension may be experienced between the politician's concern to 
exercise political control and the administrator's desire to 
rationalise management by delegating authority. Ministerial 
responsibility acts as a powerful incentive to centralise managerial 
authority. The dictates of administrative efficiency, however, may 
point to the necessity to devolve and decentralise administrative 
responsibility. Thus, administrative reforms which expand the 
parameters of administrative discretion may engender considerable 
opposition from politicians fearful that an erosion of control may 
leave them vulnerable to political criticism (Johnson, 1976, p.292).
In addition to these interactional considerations there are a number 
of other practical differences between the two groups which are of 
considerable importance. Ministers and officials bring different 
spans of attention to administrative reform. Ministerial turnover
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tends to be high. The tenure of officials is of much greater 
duration. Governments change relatively frequently. Officials stay 
in a position to serve governments of whatever complexion. 
Consequently, the desire of politicians to achieve quick results may 
conflict with the wish of administrators to proceed in a more 
measured fashion. The passing of time presents officials with 
considerable opportunity to dilute politically inspired programmes of 
reform and to delay their execution (Kellner and Crowther Hunt, 1980,
p.66).
Politicians and administrators have differing resources and skills 
with which to attempt reform. Ministers' time is at a premium, given 
their multiple commitments to ministry, parliament, party and 
constituency (Grattan and Weller, 1981, p.137). Officials, while 
also taxed, concentrate their attention in only one or perhaps two of 
these arenas. Ministerial staffs are small. The departments they 
administer can be very large indeed. Their different access to 
resources means inevitably that officials are at an advantage in 
pursuing the detail of reform (Wilenski, 1986, p.260). This gap is 
widened by the fact that generally officials possess greater 
administrative expertise than their ministers. The more technical 
are the reforms proposed, the more likely it is that officials will 
exercise greater influence with respect to them (Guy Peters, 1987, 
p.269).
The political axis, then, provides fertile ground for contest both 
with respect to the substance and execution of administrative reform. 
Depending on the degree of conflict which is generated, reform may 
proceed speedily or tardily, be pure or diluted, produce substantial 
change or have only marginal impact. However, despite the 
inevitability of conflict there are several factors in the political 
arena which are likely to provide it with considerable impetus.
»• (i) Reform proceeds best where there is strong political interest 
in and commitment to it (Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, p.204; Gray and 
Jenkins, 1982, p.446; Wilenski 1986, p.176; Hertig, 1986, p.56; 
Prasser, 1990, p.188; Mascarenhas, 1990, pp.319-320). In this, the 
role of the Prime Minister appears to be pivotal (Pollitt, 1983, 
p.143; Aucoin, 1988). Committed ministers may also have a 
significant impact (Likierman, 1982, p.141; Nethercote, 1984b, pp. 
22-23). Without sustained political interest, administrative reforms 
quickly lose their relevance and may be subjected more easily to 
delay and diffraction (Greenaway, 1984, p.5; Kellner and Crowther 
Hunt, 1980, p.77).
(ii) Reform will proceed more effectively where there is an identity
X
of view between ministers and civil servants (Smith and Stanyer,
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1976, p.255; Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, p.184; Greenaway, 1984, 
p.13; Mascarenhas, 1990, p.321). Equally, the course of reform will 
be smoother where government and administration have developed an 
effective rapport (Johnson, 1976, p.291).
(iii) Reforms are more likely to be successful where a government 
remains in power for a considerable time (Caiden, 1969, p.161). A 
longer time horizon expands political attention, redresses the 
temporal imbalance between officials and their ministers and creates 
the conditions for steady and staged implementation (Wilenski, 1986, 
p.178).
(iv) Reform will be better received if there is strong parliamentary 
support for it (Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, p.202). Parliamentary 
support strengthens the hand of ministers in their discussions with 
civil servants. Bipartisan support is particularly helpful 
(Thompson, 1988, p.221). An active system of parliamentary 
sub-committees can also provide substantial impetus to reformist 
activity (Norton, 1981, pp.130ff; Evans, 1982, p.78).
b. The Administrative Axis
Just as there are differences in approach and orientation between 
politicians and administrators, so, institutional cleavages may 
readily be discerned in the administration. Divisions may appear 
along functional, organisational or professional lines. Each of 
these is now dealt with in turn.
Within modem government, three models of administration live in 
uneasy co-existence. These are the legal bureaucratic model, whose 
focus is upon the correct application of pre-existing rules; the 
functional model which concentrates on the achievement of tangible 
results; and the political model whose purpose is to mobilise 
political consensus (Offe, 1985, pp.300- 303, 308). These models are 
each associated with particular functions. These are administration, 
management and diplomacy respectively. Hence, administration is 
concerned with decision- making in accordance with law, rules and 
prescriptions. Management is concerned with the efficient use of 
resources in pursuit of organisational objectives. Diplomacy 
involves the development of policy and the management of the 
political process (see to similar effect Keeling, 1972, Ch.2; 
Rosenbloom, 1986, p.13; Chapman, 1990, p.204; Halligan and Power, 
1990, p.279).
The importance of this functional distinction lies in the fact that 
officials engaged primarily in one or other of these activities are 
likely to view administrative reform through different spectacles.
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Their attitude to it will depend both on the nature of the reform and 
its impact on their particular sphere of influence. However, because 
the values and attitudes informing each sphere are different, an 
attempt to apply precepts relevant to one across the boundaries of 
the others may be greeted with considerable scepticism, if not 
outright opposition. For example, in management, a high premium is 
placed on the formulation of clear, explicit and achievable 
objectives. In diplomacy, objectives tend, for good reason, to be 
specified generally and are complemented by a number of short-term 
and often tacit tactical aims. In administration, great weight is 
placed on procedural regularity and the avoidance of error. In 
management, a willingness to experiment and to take calculated risks 
is an essential attribute. In diplomacy, the capacity to respond 
flexibly to changing circumstances is essential. In administration, 
conformity and consistency is more highly valued than discretion.
The reforms in this study are heavily managerial in orientation. As 
we shall see, their application in the non-managerial spheres was 
subject to concerted criticism.
Differences in perspective may also appear on structural lines. The 
dominant influence on structure is function. Therefore, it has 
generally been the case that senior, middle and junior officials have 
operated predominantly in the diplomatic, administrative and 
managerial arenas respectively (Keeling, 1972, p.109). However, 
administrative organisation may also vary according to the 
geographical area covered, the technical processes undertaken or the 
client group or constituency served. Self, 1978, p.55; Pusey, 1991, 
pp.76-77). For example, reforms formulated in central office may be 
considered by regional staff as giving insufficient weight to the 
special circumstances of locality-based administration. Technical 
experts may consider administrative reform developed for general 
departmental consumption as having little relevance to their 
specialist activities. Where an agency has been 'captured' by its 
client group and the impact of reform upon that group is adverse, the 
agency can be expected to oppose reform vigorously.
Different professional groupings inhabiting the administrative arena 
may also adopt opposing attitudes to reform. Thus, for example, 
lawyers and economists may bring competing ethical considerations to 
bear on the resolution of administrative questions. To lawyers, 
procedural fairness is a primary value. Economists, however, may 
regard the intangible benefits of fair dealing as far outweighed by 
its measurable cost (Bayne, 1988, p.40; Allars, 1991, pp.59-60). 
Conflict may occur between professional and organisational loyalties. 
Reforms which extend hierarchical control, for example, may conflict 
with a professional officer's lateral commitment to professional 
ethics (Cumow, 1975, p.42). Friction can also occur between
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generalist and specialist administrators. Reforms which advance the 
influence of the specialist, for example, may conflict with the 
generalist's belief that only a broad and professionally uncluttered 
background fits an official to sift and evaluate competing arguments 
with appropriate detachment (see Crisp, 1975, p.353; Judge, 1981,
p.12).
Nevertheless, despite the many disputes which may arise within the 
administration when reform is introduced, there do appear to be a 
number of circumstances which, if present, are influential in its 
promotion. The principal among them are the following:
(i) Strong and effective leadership will have the effect of welding 
a strong coalition behind reform proposals (Hetherington, 1975,
p.398; Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, p.217; Cohen, 1982, p.172; 
Greenaway, 1984, p.12; Nethercote, 1984b, p. 22). Similarly, the 
recruitment of sympathetic officials into senior positions will have 
a positive impact on the implementation of change (Chapman and 
Greenaway, 1980, p.199; Wilenski, 1986, p.181).
(ii) Reform initiatives which are not adequately staffed and funded 
may wither on the vine. Officials are unlikely to embrace them 
enthusiastically if they compete for resources with existing 
activities (Wilenski, 1986, p.177).
(iii) The aims of reformers will be advanced if the responsibility 
for reform is located within a new bureaucratic agency (Wilenski, 
1986, p.180). Particularly where the agency has the ear of the Prime 
Minister it can wield considerable persuasive authority in relation 
to other departments and ensure that the goals of reform are pursued 
consistently over time (Beesley, 1983).
(iv) Reform is more likely to be successful where its implementation 
is staged. Too many initiatives introduced simultaneously are likely 
to generate cynicism and fatigue (Lafromboise, 1971).
c. The Technical Axis
Finally, appropriate skills, methods and techniques must be available 
if administrative innovation is to proceed. A number of alternative 
situations may be usefully considered in this regard.
(i) Administrative reforms may require technical capabilities which 
are not yet in existence. So, for example, the development of the 
Financial Management Initiative in Whitehall is reported to have been 
delayed by an absence of qualified accountants (Gray, Jenkins, Flynn 
and Rutherford, 1991, p.54).
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(ii) Technical capabilities may exist but not be used. For 
instance, if the introduction of new technologies is considered too 
complex, too costly, or organisationally too disruptive their 
incorporation may be deferred or shelved altogether (see O'Higgins, 
1984; Margetts, 1991). For instance, the introduction of new 
technology into both the British and Australian departments of social 
security was considerably delayed by industrial disruption.
(iii) Third, new techniques might be introduced but their methodology 
may prove deficient. The introduction of PAR, for example, was 
hampered by the fact that no effective methodology for the conduct of 
its policy analysis had then been perfected (Gray and Jenkins, 1982, 
pp.443-444).
(iv) New technologies may be utilised but their incorporation may be 
slowed due to their incompatibility with organisational culture. 
Computerised communication, for example, may undermine well 
established hierarchical relationships in the civil service. If it 
did so, its introduction would be resisted and plans for reform which 
depended on its existence may be upset (Campbell, 1984, p.83).
Conclusion
In this Chapter I have examined the process of administrative reform. 
In doing so, I have developed a framework for understanding its 
character and dynamics. The framework is a product both of my own 
administrative experience and of a comprehensive examination of the 
relevant literature. In the next chapter, I explore its relevance 
and utility by relating it to the implementation of the FMI and the 
FMIP.
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CHAPTER 8
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN PRACTICE
One of the key objectives of this study was to determine and analyse 
those factors which are influential in affecting the course of 
administrative reform. The comparison undertaken in this chapter is 
designed to meet that aim. Thus far, two separate stories have been 
told. In one the development, demise and metamorphosis of 
Whitehall's Financial Management Initiative has been traced. In the 
other, the birth and evolution of Canberra's FMIP has unfolded.
Here, the two stories will be combined with a view to identifying 
more clearly the similarities and differences between them. From 
this comparison, a clearer understanding of the factors which 
promote and retard administrative reform will emerge. In order to 
link theory and practice, the discussion follows closely the 
framework for the analysis of administrative reform developed in the
previous chapter. In this way, the conclusions of this research can
be added to and integrated with the existing stock of knowledge
outlined there in order to provide a more complete picture of
administrative reform's characteristics and exigencies.
1. The Environment for Reform
"I believe it is probably true that fortune is the 
arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half 
or so to be controlled by ourselves."
- Machiavelli, The Prince
Fortune, in the form of largely uncontrollable shifts in the 
environment within which a government operates, plays an influential 
part in creating the impetus for administrative innovation. In the 
framework, this administrative environment was defined as being 
comprised of four interlocking arenas - the economic, social, 
political and administrative. Conceptually these arenas are easily 
separated. In practice it is far more difficult to determine the 
role and influence which the pressures emanating from each, and the 
interaction between them, have in generating the momentum for reform. 
Given this qualification, there is, nevertheless, a number of general 
observations which can properly be made regarding the impact of these 
contextual forces upon the development of the FMI and the FMIP 
respectively. The main ones are as follows.
The international recession was clearly of major significance in 
shaping the administrative reform programmes of the 1980s. The 
recession drove both British and Australian governments to reduce the 
rate of growth in public expenditure and to make heavy cuts in many 
areas of governmental activity. The governmental machine did not
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escape this more general trend. Both the Thatcher and Hawke 
governments introduced cash-limited expenditure, reduced the number 
of civil servants, and attached new and more stringent conditions to 
public sector employment. Whitehall and Canberra then found 
themselves caught between public pressure to maintain, if not 
increase, existing services and governmental pressure to achieve ever 
greater economies. This circle could be squared only if the machine 
itself could be made more efficient and effective. It followed 
logically that the principal thrust of administrative reform in 
succeeding years would be towards the improvement of managerial 
performance.
The reform agenda was also fashioned by significant shifts in social 
and economic thinking. In Britain, the Keynesian welfare state 
consensus was superseded during the 1970s and early 1980s by a 
neo-liberal, monetarist alternative at the heart of which was a deep 
and abiding suspicion of government. New right think tanks 
proliferated espousing the view that too much government was bad 
because it prejudiced individual freedom, crowded out private 
enterprise and fostered bureaucratic gigantism and inertia. 
Bureaucrats themselves were held responsible for the excessive growth 
of government and had, therefore, to be tamed. To do so, it was 
essential to apply the successful precepts of business management to 
governmental activity. Both the FMI and the Next Steps drew much of 
their inspiration from this conviction. In Australia, the picture 
was similar although the advance of 'new right' thinking there was 
less relentless. Rapid economic decline propelled the Australian 
Government to look with increasing urgency for new economic 
solutions. As it embraced the monetarist alternative, so also its 
views of its own role were transformed. Its faith in the market 
increased and confidence in state intervention declined 
correspondingly. Economic rationalism, the Australian variant of new 
right thinking, stepped into the space vacated by welfare statism. 
Encapsulated within it were a clutch of managerial ideas designed to 
make the public sector more rational and more efficient.
The new economic imperatives and social ideas were reflected in 
political platforms. Both the Hawke and Thatcher governments placed 
bureaucratic reform high in their priorities. The Thatcher 
administration, consistent with its concern to reduce the size of the 
public sector and expand the scope for private economic initiative, 
went to the people with a popular manifesto commitment to cut 
bureaucracy and root out waste and mismanagement. The Hawke 
Government developed a somewhat more sophisticated agenda mixing 
democratic, egalitarian and efficiency reforms. This was a more 
liberal programme but its purpose, no less than that of the Thatcher
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Government, was to transform the manner in which government was run.
Within the two administrations, the pressure for change was also felt 
acutely. Here, the principal motivator for reform was poverty. The 
decline in revenues and public expenditure translated not only into 
cuts in programmes but also into cuts in staff and other 
administrative costs. Officials were forced to accept, in a way they 
had not previously done, that resources were scarce and were likely 
to remain so. Instead of assuming that new initiatives would be 
funded from steady, incremental increases in their budgets, officials 
had either to shelve such plans or trade off some part of their 
existing operations in order to finance their new projects. They 
also recognised that the impact of the cuts could be mitigated if 
existing resources were utilised more effectively. Hence, there 
appeared to be a greater openness in the administration to managerial 
reorgani sat ion.
The most significant thing about these contextual influences was the 
degree of consistency between them. As we observed in the previous 
chapter, it cannot always be assumed that contextual pressures will 
operate in the same direction. Where they pull against each other, 
the content of administrative reform may be considered problematic 
and its progress may be retarded. Britain and Australia, for 
example, had experienced recessions in the past. Yet previous 
economic downturns had not been sufficient, in and of themselves, to 
generate the momentum required for wholesale administrative change 
(see for example Fry, 1981, Ch.10). However, in the early 1980s, the 
economic recession coincided with sympathetic alterations in the 
intellectual climate and with the rise of governments of conspicuous 
strength and determination. This created an environment in which 
there was general agreement as to the direction of reform and in 
which the forces propelling it were very strong indeed (see similarly 
Pollitt, 1986a, pp.158-159; 1986b, pp.318-319).
In the present case, the impetus was such that, despite the differing 
political complexions of Hawke and Thatcher governments, the content 
of their administrative reform programmes tended, over time, to 
converge. The Thatcher Government was ideologically committed to 
recasting the civil service in the image of the private sector. Its 
focus was on the achievement of economy and to a lesser extent 
efficiency. The Hawke Government rejected the private sector analogy 
and yet was equally committed to improving public sector 
effectiveness not only by making it more efficient but also by 
ensuring that it was more equitable and democratic. Nevertheless, as 
economic conditions deteriorated sharply in Australia and economic 
rationalism assumed a new dominance in the intellectual sphere, the 
democratic and equity agendas were progressively eclipsed. The
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Government, like its British counterpart, placed a new and vigorous 
emphasis on the attainment of managerial efficiency and the 
importation of private sector management techniques became more 
prevalent. Political differences, it seemed, counted for little in 
the context of economic and social changes of very considerable 
magnitude.
However, one important difference relating to the method of 
introducing the programme should be noted. In Britain, the FMI was 
an initiative developed principally within the administration to 
temper the excesses of the Thatcherite zeal to tame public 
bureaucracy. It was the administration's means of replacing 
indiscriminate attack with more considered intervention. The FMI 
provided a framework within which more rational decisions to 
economise could be made. As such it was essentially defensive in 
nature. By contrast, in Australia it was the Cabinet, at least in 
early years, which drove the public sector reforms. It wished to 
replace the pathologies of the existing bureaucratic system with what 
it saw as a fairer and more rational means of conducting the business 
of government. The broader reform programme, then, was shaped 
primarily by politicians and their political advisers rather than by 
administrators themselves.
In summary, formidable economic and social forces coalesced and 
exerted considerable pressure to change the administrations in 
Whitehall and Canberra. Responding to these pressures, the Thatcher 
and Hawke governments embarked on ambitious programmes of reform, 
designed to attune their administrations to their new and straitened 
circumstances. It was a task which the two Prime Ministers pursued 
with considerable vigour albeit from opposite political standpoints. 
Despite this, the differences between the two governments' approaches 
were, in time, outweighed by their similarities in an environment 
which was powerfully conducive to managerial innovation.
2. The Content of Reform
"I also believe that the one who adapts his policy to the 
times prospers, and likewise that the one whose policy 
clashes with the demands of the times does not."
- Machiavelli, The Prince
Given the magnitude of the changes contemplated by government, one 
might have expected that, within the administration, there would have 
been major conflicts of principle and philosophy surrounding them.
It was interesting, however, that neither in Canberra nor Whitehall 
could arguments about fundamentals be heard except at the margin. In 
Australia, for example, the core debates between bureaucratic 
reformers and their critics occurred principally in the pages of
163
journals of public administration. There leading academics critical 
of the new corporate management framework were relentless in their 
criticism of Canberra's economic rationalist leadership. It 
responded in kind (see for instance Considine, 1988, 1990; Paterson, 
1988; Keating, 1989; Nethercote, 1989). But, in bureaucratic 
offices, arguments with respect to managerial reform were conducted 
at a far more pragmatic level. There was in fact little disagreement 
in either country that managerial reform was necessary. The debate, 
where it occurred, was not about its appropriateness but about its 
form and the limits of its applicability. Why was the content of the 
two management reform programmes accepted so readily? A number of 
explanations may be advanced.
Administrators in both Whitehall and Canberra were made more amenable 
to managerial reform by the familiarity of its prescriptions. In 
neither country was accountable management a new concept. It had 
been tried previously in Britain with limited but nonetheless 
perceptible success. Its repackaging in the Thatcher era came as no 
surprise. Similarly, in Australia, both the Coombs and Reid reports 
had advanced the merits of the idea. Similarly, the Department of 
Finance had for some years been advancing the case for it. In short, 
Whitehall and Canberra were both familiar with the managerialists' 
prescriptions for administrative reform. This familiarisation paved 
the way for their introduction in the 1980s and lessened the 
intensity of the internal debate which then ensued.
In Canberra, the incorporation of the new reforms was, in addition, 
facilitated by the fact that its senior officials seemed less 
sceptical both about their content and their chances of success. 
During the 1980s the senior ranks of the Canberra bureaucracy had 
been peopled increasingly by officials with economics and business 
administration qualifications. Fiscal restraint and managerial 
improvement were the bread and butter of their professional 
backgrounds. Britain's senior ranks by contrast remained occupied 
principally by generalist administrators. Among these officials 
there was a deeply inculcated mistrust of specialists and 
specialities. In the early part of the decade at least, a 
condescending if not dismissive attitude to management and service 
delivery was still prevalent. Therefore it was only to be expected 
that, in the first instance, the FMIP would fall on more fertile 
ground in Canberra than in Whitehall.
The Australian situation also differed in another important way. The 
Australian public service reform programme was a comprehensive one. 
Under Peter Wilenski's guidance, the programme had been designed not 
only to improve managerial efficiency but also to increase the 
responsiveness of the administration to political demands and to make
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its working conditions better and fairer. Because of this, its 
announcement was generally welcomed by civil servants in Canberra.
It was considered a thoughtful response to the issues at hand.
Senior officials recognised that the reforms would involve some 
painful readjustment. The pain, however, was mixed with gain, making 
the total portfolio generally acceptable. In Britain, the civil 
service felt itself immediately under attack. Reforms such as the 
FMI were commonly interpreted in that light and hence the resistance 
to their introduction was somewhat greater.
However, in both countries the acceptance of managerial reform was 
encouraged by its congruence with trends in wider society (see 
Chapman, 1988, pp.178-80). There had been a substantial 
transformation in the climate of public opinion in the 1980s. Now, 
it was smaller rather than larger government which was favoured. 
'Bureaucracy' loomed large as a problem to be solved. In the new 
entrepreneurial world, critics constantly contrasted public sector 
inefficiency with private sector initiative. Politicians and 
administrators responded to this climate. They melded well 
established administrative formulae with business management 
techniques and applied the hybrid to administrations which, by virtue 
of their appreciation of these trends, were already keenly aware that 
some action had to be taken not only to improve their efficiency but 
also their standing.
The content of administrative reforms, then, influences their 
acceptability in two different ways. The more that reforms are 
congruent with the norms of the target administration, the more 
likely it is that they will be welcomed. In Australia, civil service 
reorganisation was greeted more favourably than in Britain because 
many senior civil servants had professional backgrounds inclining 
them to favour the changes and because the changes offered them 
tangible rewards. The acceptability of reforms is also enhanced 
where their content is congruent with wider social trends. In both 
countries, managerialism was more favourably received because it was
consistent with the perception in the wider community that government
was a problem in urgent need of a solution.
3. The Strategy of Reform
''One man proceeds with circumspection, another 
impetuously; one uses violence, another stratagem....and 
yet everyone, for all this diversity of method can reach
his objective  This results from nothing else except
the extent to which their methods are or are not suited 
to the nature of the times."
- Machiavelli, The Prince
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In very broad terms, the strategies adopted to implement 
administrative reforms may be classed either as collaborative or 
conflictual. The Thatcher Government's approach was unwaveringly 
conflictual. No quarter was given in her drive to bring the public 
sector to heel. Prime Minister Hawke, by contrast, was a consensus 
politician. Reared in industrial relations, he sought actively to 
achieve negotiated agreements when matters were in dispute. Where 
collaboration was possible, it was the method he preferred. The 
Australian public service reform programme was the product of 
extensive consultation and analysis and, as such, capitalised upon a 
mood for change within the administration itself. Consequently, the 
FMIP, as a component of that programme, was generally better 
received than its British counterpart. The FMI, by contrast, was 
seen by many civil servants simply as a more sophisticated method of 
dressing up Mrs Thatcher's desire to make wholesale cuts in public 
expenditure. Hence, its acceptance was retarded.
However, as the necessity for reform became more urgent in Australia, 
collaboration gave way to coercion. When economic conditions 
worsened towards the end of Hawke's second term, the Government 
decided that time was at a premium and broke with the consensual 
mould. The legislative measures it introduced in late 1986 were 
harsh and met stiff resistance from the union movement. Its dramatic 
Bastille Day departmental reorganisation was announced three days 
after the 1987 election with virtually no prior consultation. From 
this point relations between the Government and the public service 
became more strained. However, the pace of reform increased 
considerably.
A preference for conflictual over collaborative strategies was just 
one of the important strategic differences which emerged between the 
two administrations. There are two others which should be noted 
since they each had an important bearing on the progress of the FMI 
and the FMIP respectively. The Australian case clearly demonstrated 
the importance which attaches to having supportive and consistent 
leadership. The top officials in the Department of Finance remained 
in place throughout the first five years of the FMIP's life. The 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary were its most articulate advocates. 
Just as importantly, the Resource Management and Improvement Branch 
in the Department, the branch responsible for taking the programme to 
the field, had the same leadership through these years. Its head 
emphasised continuously that he was there 'for the long haul' and 
after seven years he had made a very substantial contribution to the 
FMIP's progress.
\ /
In Whitehall the situation was quiteo 'different. There, the 
leadership of the Treasury, the MPO and the Financial Management Unit
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changed frequently. The Treasury Deputy Secretary responsible for 
public expenditure policy and management reform was replaced one year 
after the FMI began. The Second Permanent Secretary of the MPO left 
at about the same stage to be replaced by an official whose attitude 
to managerial improvement was ambivalent. The FMU was phased out to 
be replaced by the JMU. The JMU was later re-incorporated into the 
Treasury. These constant changes diminished departmental confidence 
in central leadership and, at the centre itself, detracted from the 
adoption and presentation of a clear and unambiguous position towards 
the managerial changes. By contrast it was interesting to observe 
that, with the Next Steps, a project manager of high status was 
appointed, a project manager who was granted an indefinite term of 
office and who had a wide brief to bring about the more radical 
management changes embraced by that programme.
The civil service leadership in Australia was also more willing than 
its Whitehall counterpart to take risks in pursuing reform. In the 
event, these risks yielded greater rewards. With respect to 
delegation, for example, the Ministry of Finance led the reform 
process by delegating many of its important input controls. It was 
willing to risk short-term losses in the form of expenditure overruns 
in order to obtain long-term gains in budgetary and managerial 
effectiveness. Its attitude established the essential preconditions 
for further managerial delegation within departments. Further, as it 
became apparent that many departments were less willing to follow its 
lead by transfering financial authority from their centre to 
operational managers, the Ministry publicly criticised this inaction. 
In Britain, by contrast, the Treasury was, during the FMI years, very 
cautious in its attitude to the delegation of financial controls.
Its consistent position was that departments would need first to 
demonstrate the viability of their new managerial arrangements and 
their supporting financial information systems before any wholesale 
transfer of controls could be contemplated. Consequently, the 
progress of delegation slowed and departmental confidence in 
Treasury's bona fides all but evaporated. Only with the Next Steps, 
which itself involved considerable risk, was serious interest in the 
prospects for delegation revived.
4. The Dynamics of Reform
"It should be borne in mind that there is nothing more 
difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, and more 
dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a 
state's constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all 
those who prospered under the old order, and only 
lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would 
prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly 
from fear of their adversaries and partly because men are 
generally incredulous, never really trusting new things 
unless they have tested them by experience. In
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consequence, whenever those who oppose the changes can do 
so, they attack vigorously, and the defence made by 
others is weak. So both the innovator and his friends 
come to grief."
- Machiavelli, The Prince
(i) The Interactional Level
In the last chapter, I proposed that the success or failure of any 
particular administrative reform is critically dependent on the 
outcome of interactions between competing actors in the 
administrative arena. These interactions generally take place along 
three different axes, the political, the administrative and the 
technical. Each axis is now examined with particular reference to 
the dynamics surrounding the implementation of the FMI and the FMIP.
a. The Political Axis
The interaction between politicians and administrators played a 
central part determining the fate of the two management reform 
programmes. Both ministers and civil servants regarded management 
reform as important. Both agreed that planning, budgeting and 
evaluating needed urgent attention. However, in the process of 
realising their aims, administrators and politicians brought quite 
different perspectives and interests to bear. Where these 
conflicted, the process of reform became significantly more 
difficult. In Chapter 8, I identified three forms of interaction 
between ministers and administrators which bear directly on 
administrative reform. In this study two of these, the contrast 
between brokerage and planning and control and delegation, assumed 
particular significance.
Ministers in both countries differed from officials in that their 
instinctive preference was to negotiate rather than design solutions 
to governmental problems. For this reason, managerial changes 
designed to make governmental decision-making more rational gained 
little currency with Ministers whose mode of operation tended to be 
pragmatic, tactical and opportunistic. For example, in Australia, 
Ministers exhibited little enthusiasm for corporate planning. 
Corporate planning depended on the clear delineation of objectives 
against which performance could be assessed. Officials observed, 
however, that Ministers were reluctant to specify their objectives 
clearly. Corporate planning depended on a rational ordering of 
preferences. Ministers rarely ranked their priorities in this way. 
Corporate planning worked in the long term. Ministers, officials 
remarked ruefully, operated within a much more limited time horizon. 
Similarly in Britain, top management systems, where they were
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utilised at all, were seldom employed by Ministers to make their 
planning and budgeting decisions more rational. Much to the chagrin 
of officials the systems did, however, provide Ministers with 
information on the basis of which to launch sporadic forays into the 
administrative arena, searching for cuts or questioning the 
justification for activities which struck them as curious or 
unnecessary. This unsystematic intervention, which was perfectly 
understandable in political terms, was not at all in accord with the 
administrators' aim of engaging Ministers in a more considered 
process of deploying staff and allocating resources.
Similarly, reforms designed to make managerial performance 
transparent created further difficulties for Ministers who, whilst 
willing to take credit for success, were less prepared to accept 
criticism for failure and who, at all times, wished to preserve 
maximum freedom of manoeuvre. When this study was conducted, both 
performance measurement and programme evaluation were at an early 
stage of development. Nevertheless, senior officials were already 
acutely aware of Ministerial sensitivity in relation to them. In 
Australia, for example, where evaluation and performance assessment 
were heavily promoted by the central departments, officials hoped 
that Ministers would be sufficiently relaxed to accept occasional 
failure as the price of more general success. There was, 
nevertheless, considerable nervousness about Ministerial reaction and 
some adjustment made to measures chosen and terms of reference set to 
cater for Ministerial sensitivity.
Next, Ministers wished to hold a tight rein on departmental activity. 
In contrast, management reformers advocated the widespread delegation 
of managerial authority. The formal responsibility of Ministers to 
account to Parliament for each and every action of their 
administration was reflected in their preference for concentrating 
decision making at the apex of departments. It was also reflected in 
the assertion of their right to involve themselves in matters of 
administration whenever political circumstances dictated that they 
should do so. For example, under the FMI, officials always perceived 
delegation as contingent upon Ministerial intervention. They were 
acutely aware that their best carefully crafted plans could quickly 
be laid to waste by the next parliamentary question, the next 
Ombudsman's inquiry or the next funding imperative. Their response 
to delegation was tempered by these realities. Further, Treasury 
officials took advantage of this situation to cloak their financial 
reservations about delegation in the guise of a concern with 
ministerial responsibility. They argued that extensive central 
controls were still required to ensure that the Minister's position 
was protected. The cause of delegation was considerably advanced 
with the creation of agencies under the Next Steps. Nevertheless,
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the tension between ministerial control and administrative 
rationalisation remained. Officials were concerned that as agencies 
failed to reach the performance targets set in their framework 
agreements, Ministers might choose to abandon their arm's length 
relationship with agencies and intervene from the centre to rectify 
their managerial defects. Should they do this, the managerial 
rationale for agencies would soon be undermined.
Ministers and officials, then, brought different operational styles 
to bear upon administrative reform. They also differed in the degree 
of attention they could devote to it. With certain notable 
exceptions, Ministers were generally uninterested in the process, 
beyond setting the parameters within which it would proceed.
Officials were much more closely involved although their interest too 
varied directly with the proximity of their connection to operational 
management. There were several practical impediments which stood in 
the path of greater ministerial engagement. Few Ministers entered 
office with managerial qualifications or experience. Officials 
mentioned frequently that Ministers felt themselves unsuited to 
assume managerial responsibilities. In both countries there was a 
high rate of ministerial turnover. This meant that Ministers had 
little time to familiarise themselves with departmental operations. 
Officials often remarked that Ministers' extensive commitments to 
Parliament, party and constituency constrained their willingness and 
ability to accord management a higher priority.
Consequently, administrative reform was left largely in the hands of 
officials. This did not matter where particular innovations involved 
no assumption that Ministers would be involved. However, with 
reforms such as top management systems, the engagement of ministerial 
attention was a necessary precondition for success. There, the 
unwillingness or inability of Ministers to allocate sufficient time 
detracted considerably from the systems' effectiveness. More 
generally, it was apparent that some degree of ministerial interest 
in management reform was required even if only to call officials to 
account for its progress. When even this was lacking, the interest 
of officials waned correspondingly.
Each of the preceding factors acted as a constraint on the progress 
of the FMI and the FMIP. Nevertheless, during the study period 
managerialism made considerable advances in both Whitehall and 
Canberra. In the political arena there were a number of pressures 
which serve to explain why this was so. The first, and perhaps the 
most important one, was that the political will to achieve managerial 
change in both countries was considerable. The interest and 
commitment of the two Prime Ministers was particularly significant. 
Mrs Thatcher was aggressive in her pursuit of greater administrative
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efficiency and called her senior officials to account with respect to 
it. Mr Hawke, even though more consensual in style, was nevertheless 
actively involved in the search for better government and was 
prepared to embrace and insist on radical change where he was 
persuaded of its necessity. The role of individual ministers was 
also of considerable importance. For example, Michael Heseltine made 
the case for and introduced MINIS in Whitehall. His seemingly 
unquenchable interest in managerial issues was reflected in the 
progress which managerial initiatives made in the departments for 
which he was responsible. Similarly, John Dawkins, as Minister for 
Finance in Australia, pushed the FMIP very strongly and broke down 
many obstacles in its path. The converse was also true. In those 
departments where Ministers were quite uninterested in managerial 
improvement, the progress of reform tended to be slow.
Both governments were considerably assisted in their prosecution of 
reform by the fact that each remained in office for a decade. The 
Thatcher and Hawke governments commenced the process of reform early 
in their terms. They then pressed and renewed it consistently. The 
length of both governments' tenure provided administrators with 
little prospect that their opposition to reform might be rewarded 
when a new government of different political complexion was elected. 
More importantly, long terms of office created the conditions in 
which not only structural but also attitudinal change could commence. 
Administrators believed that over a period of ten or more years under 
governments committed to administrative innovation, a new generation 
of managerially-oriented administrators would emerge whose influence 
and actions would, in turn, be felt for many more years to come.
Political will and extended tenure were clear advantages which the 
British and Australian governments possessed in common in pursuing 
their programmes of administrative improvement. There were also, 
however, important contrasts between their experience. These 
revealed two other factors in the political arena which were also 
influential facilitating managerial innovation. In Australia, the 
development of a strong coalition between political and bureaucratic 
leaders was a decisive factor in the promotion of administrative 
reform. Through a series of key appointments, the Hawke Government 
did much to ensure that the momentum for change would run strongly 
from the outset. The appointment of John Dawkins, Peter Wilenski and 
Michael Keating to influential positions was particularly critical in 
this regard. Each had a clear vision about how the business of 
government should be conducted. Each was fully committed to 
implementing that vision. The creation of the Senior Executive 
Service gave the Government additional flexibility to appoint 
managerially minded executives. Several senior Ministers had been 
closely involved in drafting administrative reform proposals while in
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opposition. They too were then in a position to press forward with 
managerial reform in their own departments. The Thatcher Government, 
by contrast, was limited in its capacity to promote sympathetic 
administrators to propel the changes it desired. Consequently, it 
was much slower to generate the coalition necessary to generate a 
comparable momentum for change.
The interest and involvement of the Parliament was also an important 
factor in encouraging administrative reorganisation. In Britain, the 
FMI was subjected to parliamentary inquiry only once in its first 
five years of operation. The Next Steps provoked four inquiries in 
its first three years. Those in Whitehall were clear that the 
pressure which was brought to bear by parliamentary scrutiny of the 
Next Steps acted to speed and cement its progress. By contrast, the 
FMI's advance was made considerably weaker for the lack of it. 
Similarly, in Australia, the Senate Estimates Committees played their 
part in advancing managerial reform. With the advent of programme 
budgeting the committees had been able to question departmental 
officers not only about their expenditure but also about their 
performance. They took to this role with considerable enthusiasm. 
Through intensive, public questioning they placed strong pressure on 
departments to proceed with reform and improve the quality of their 
administration.
In summary, ministers and administrators brought different, 
perspectives, styles and capacities to the task of administrative 
reform. These, in turn, generated conflicts between the two parties 
which retarded the progress of both the FMI and the FMIP. Even so, 
managerial reform made significant progress. In this, political 
will, extended tenure, effective coalition building and parliamentary 
support played a critical part.
b. The Administrative Axis
By attempting to change the rules in accordance with which public 
administration was conducted, the FMI and the FMIP set their 
respective administrations alight with competitions for power and 
influence. In both Canberra and Whitehall the character of these 
intra-bureaucratic contests was remarkably similar. -la*Chapter 8y«£— 
suggested that cleavages within the administration may emerge on 
structural, functional and professional lines. In examining the 
experience of the FMI and the FMIP it was the first two of these 
divisions which were most clearly displayed. Each is now considered 
in turn.
Structurally, the major conflict which became apparent in both 
Whitehall and Canberra was that between the Treasury and spending
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departments. In relation to the FMI, this particularly bitter 
manifestation of inter departmental competition grew from and 
intensified further many decades of antagonism between the two 
parties. Even before the ink on the FMI's charter had dried the 
different sides had formulated competing views of its fundamental 
purposes. For Treasury, the FMI was principally a mechanism of 
financial control. For departments it was an opportunity better to 
marshal, manage and perhaps expand their resources. This perceptual 
cleavage was reflected clearly in the many arguments that broke out 
between the Treasury and departments regarding the nature, purpose, 
extent and limits of managerial delegation. The continuing failure 
to resolve these arguments impeded the initiative's progress to such 
an extent that only much more radical, structural intervention, in 
the form of the Next Steps, could rekindle civil service interest in 
the possibilities for managerial change.
In Australia, by contrast, the Department of Finance broke the 
traditional pattern of relationships by itself acting as the engine 
of financial delegation. It led by example, introducing portfolio 
budgeting and a new running costs system each of which effected a 
substantial decrease in its control of departmental inputs. The quid 
pro quo was that departments were required to play a much larger role 
in monitoring their own performance by establishing performance 
indicators and engaging in regular programme evaluation. They were 
also required to expose their results to external scrutiny to a much 
greater extent than they had previously done. However, despite the 
clear leadership which the Department had exercised, the longstanding 
suspicions which had formerly existed between centre and periphery 
nevertheless persisted. So, departmental officials were quick to 
observe and complain that Finance supply division officials, many of 
whom were still locked into traditional methods of control, acted in 
a manner which contradicted the intentions of the department's 
leadership. While delegation made clear advances in relation to 
running costs, centre and periphery still contended in much the same 
way over programme expenditure. Portfolio budgeting was only partly 
implemented. Operational officials argued strongly that there was an 
inherent contradiction between the imposition by Finance of 
across-the-board efficiency savings and the creation of greater 
budgetary flexibility.
An almost identical structural divide opened up within departments.
In both Whitehall and Canberra, the resistance of central finance 
divisions to ceding financial and establishments control to 
operational managers was often intense. Central finance managers 
were reluctant to delegate their decision- making authority until 
operational managers had demonstrated their capacity to manage their 
resources responsibly. However, operational managers found it
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difficult to exhibit this capacity until they were provided with the 
authority to do so. Similarly, while there was a general 
willingness, particularly in Australia, to provide managers with 
greater power to transfer funds between expenditure heads, 
considerably greater resistance was experienced with respect to the 
delegation of more important resourcing functions. For example, 
central finance managers argued that their accumulated expertise was 
still necessary if activities such as recruitment, accommodation and 
purchasing were to be performed effectively.
Functionally, the principal cleavage which emerged was that between 
officials engaged in policy and management respectively. In both 
Whitehall and Canberra these very different disciplines proved to be 
difficult and ultimately incompatible bedfellows. In Whitehall, for 
example, policy officials resisted what they perceived as the 
application of simplistic managerial formulae to the complex tasks of 
policy development and analysis. Their work, essentially diplomatic 
in nature, did not bend easily to the objectives-targets- performance 
model of analysis which was so central to the managerial approach. 
Objectives, policy officials argued, were inherently difficult to 
define since they changed constantly in response to political and 
social circumstances. Evaluation was problematic since so many 
factors intervened between a policy's introduction and the outcomes 
which ensued. Above all, policy development was regarded not by the 
officials engaged in it as a rational process. Rationality, however, 
was at the heart of the new managerialist push. In the event, 
management reformers succeeded in subjecting the productivity of 
policy divisions and the efficiency of programme delivery to greater 
scrutiny. But their impact on the way in which policy was 
formulated, synthesised and assessed remained negligible.
In summary, differences in perspective and competitions for influence 
emerged quickly and forcefully amongst major bureaucratic groupings 
in Whitehall and Canberra. The splits which occurred were similar in 
both countries. In neither was reform simply imposed. Rather its 
progress depended upon the arduous and patient negotiation of 
differences between all parties affected by it. The constant 
bargaining did not engender stagnation. The two management reform 
programmes made clear gains in both countries. The gains, however, 
were considerably greater in the Australian case. Several reasons 
may be advanced to explain this.
In Australia, the introduction of the FMIP was facilitated by the 
fact that, in general, the senior management of the public service 
was committed to it. Three factors in particular had combined to 
produce this result. First, the Hawke Government had, very early in 
its term, appointed to senior positions individuals, both from within
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and outside the civil service, with a clear and public commitment to 
managerial reorganisation.
Secondly, within the Senior Executive Service, the officials favoured 
for promotion were those with a professional background either in 
economics or business management. Thirdly, these factors were 
combined with what appeared to be a natural, generational shift in 
power and influence at senior executive level. The mandarins who had 
dominated Canberra for several decades retired, making way for the 
promotion of a new, much younger breed of managerial technocrats. In 
Britain none of these factors was present to a significant degree. 
Over time, the Government appointed permanent secretaries with an 
active rather than detached attitude to their responsibilities. But, 
except in an advisory capacity, no outside appointments were made to 
senior ranks. Further, it was not seen as desirable to appoint to 
top positions officials with specialist qualifications. Authority 
remained firmly in the hands of generalist administrators. There was 
some evidence of a generational shift as the graduate trainees of the 
Fulton era attained administrative maturity. However, because, on 
average, officials in Britain received promotions much later in their 
careers than did their Australian counterparts, its influence was yet 
to be fully experienced. In Australia, the Government's reforms 
produced an influential cadre of senior officials who shared in large 
measure the values and aspirations of managerialism and who were 
committed to act upon them. In Whitehall, there was sympathy for the 
cause but commitment was still another matter. Only with the 
appointment of agency chief executives after public advertisement did 
this appear likely to change.
The progress of the FMIP was facilitated considerably by the division 
of authority which had earlier taken place between the Treasury, 
which bore overall responsibility for economic policy and the 
Department of Finance, whose brief was to allocate and control public 
expenditure. This separation permitted the department to pursue 
management reform more or less free of the strictures imposed by the 
Treasury's proper and traditional concentration on macro-economic 
management. Consequently, it was much more able than its British 
counterpart to concentrate on pursuing managerial reform for its own 
sake rather than seeing it always in the context of and as a further 
means of reducing the burden of taxation. The Department of Finance 
was not a new agency in the sense that Wilenski (1986, p.180) 
conceived it. This was to its advantage. Its new leadership was 
able to use existing powers and patterns of relating to prosecute 
reform in a way no new agency could have done.
By restructuring the rules of budgetary negotiation, the department 
set in place an essential precondition for the fulfilment of the
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FMIP's objectives. It established a new system of forward estimates. 
The estimates would no longer be arrived at after bitter haggling 
between Finance and departments. Rather, the Cabinet established the 
rules according to which estimates would be determined and the 
department automatically updated them in accordance with those rules. 
The estimates represented an authoritative baseline for budget 
deliberations. They removed from the field the possibility that the 
delegation of managerial authority would result in ever greater 
demands for increased public expenditure.
A similar restructuring may now take place in Britain. The creation 
of Next Steps agencies requires that planning and budgeting methods 
be overhauled. The Treasury has already imposed tight constraints on 
agency bidding. In this new financial environment, delegation may 
well be more successful.
In Whitehall, the development of the FMI was clearly hampered by the 
perception that it lacked relevance. The ready acceptance of top 
management systems, for example, was substantially prejudiced by the 
fact that they paralleled rather than enhanced existing resource 
allocation mechanisms. Lacking the cutting edge which direct 
resource implications would have given them, they were quickly 
relegated to secondary status as officials soon found that their 
interests in protecting or advancing their budgetary positions were 
not significantly influenced by the new and time-consuming 
techniques. Similarly, in Australia, corporate planning was 
marginalised, finding a permanent home neither in facilitating policy 
development nor in establishing new foundations for budgetary 
negotiation. By contrast, however, Australia's programme budgeting 
system supplemented the existing system of line item budgeting. 
Programme budget statements were presented to Parliament and formed 
the basis for intensive scrutiny and questioning by Senate Estimates 
committees. Programme budgeting locked into the existing machinery 
for expenditure control. In so doing, it assumed immediate import.
In summary, the introduction of the FMI and the FMIP opened up 
structural and functional conflicts in Whitehall and Canberra. These 
significantly retarded the progress of the two initiatives. 
Nevertheless, particularly in Australia, there were a number of 
factors in the administrative arena which served to advance the 
progress of reform. The support of the senior civil service, the 
division of authority between the Treasury and the Department of 
Finance, the restructuring of the rules of budgetary negotiation and 
the locking of new reforms into existing financial machinery each 
made a major contribution in this regard.
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c. The Technical Axis
Neither the FMI nor the FMIP was hampered significantly in its 
development by technical difficulties. The technical resources for 
their successful execution were generally present. Some, however, 
required refinement and others could profitably have been provided in 
greater measure. Although not, by comparison with political and 
administrative factors, playing a major role in determining the 
course of the two reform programmes, there were a number of technical 
issues which had an effect on the manner in which the programmes 
developed. These are now briefly considered.
Senior officials both in Whitehall and Canberra made it clear that 
neither the FMI nor the FMIP could have proceeded with nearly the 
same degree of facility in the absence of computerisation. The 
opportunities provided by information technology and the revolution 
in communications had provided dramatic new opportunities to deliver 
public services differently (Butler, 1990, p.10). In management, it 
was computerisation alone which permitted the development of the 
complex, disaggregated management and financial information systems 
which underpinned the delegation of managerial authority. In Britain 
the implementation of the Fulton reforms had been significantly 
retarded because the implementation of accountable management had 
relied for its success on the utilisation of much slower and more 
cumbersome paper-based management information systems. By contrast, 
the new data processing technology provided operational managers of 
the 1980s with the means to take charge of and monitor the resources 
at their disposal.
The successful prosecution of both programmes depended not only on 
the presence of appropriate technology but also on the effective 
design of management information systems. Both in Britain and 
Australia, the lack of appropriately designed and tested management 
information systems constituted a significant impediment to the 
effective delegation of managerial authority. As these systems 
became more sophisticated, delegation could proceed more effectively. 
This was one area in which the FMI made significant advances.
Although it was widely argued that the FMI had become bogged down in 
a morass of system development, respondents in this survey conceded 
that without the FMI's intensive concentration on the development of 
new management and financial information systems, one essential 
bridge to the Next Steps may not have been built.
Finally, where the methodology associated with particular innovations 
was complex, its ready acceptance and utilisation was made 
considerably more difficult. In Canberra and Whitehall performance 
indication presented administrators with substantial practical and
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conceptual problems. Substantial progress was made with 
process-related indicators but it was an altogether more difficult 
task to measure programme outcomes. This was because it was rarely, 
if ever, that a direct and uncontaminated link could be made between 
specific governmental interventions and subsequent alterations in 
economic or social behaviour. The resolution of methodological 
problems surrounding performance indication consumed a great deal of 
time and generated intense disagreement. This was particularly the 
case where officials responsible for advancing performance indication 
were reluctant to acknowledge the technical limitations of their 
craft. Their lack of flexibility on this issue had the effect of 
prejudicing a wider acceptance within the administration of the need 
to monitor performance.
(ii) The Institutional Level
The interactions which have been considered thus far do much to 
illuminate the dynamics of administrative reform. However, the 
analysis would be incomplete without a consideration of the systemic 
constraints within which these interactions took place. For it is 
only one part of the story, although a critical one, to assert that 
the FMIP took hold more rapidly than the FMI because particular 
individuals and groups acted and interacted in the way that they did. 
Their behaviour, in turn, was framed and moulded by the structures 
and systems of which the actors were part. During the present study 
it became evident that institutional conditions in Canberra permitted 
considerably more freedom of manoeuvre to Australian administrators 
than was available to officials in Whitehall. The chapter concludes, 
therefore, with a discussion of three systemic differences which 
appeared to be of particular importance in this regard.
a. Ministerial Responsibility and Control
In Australia, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility exercises a 
less forceful influence on the activity of politicians and 
administrators than it does in Britain (see Emy, 1976, p.34; Emy,
1978, pp.246-249; Self, 1978, p.321; Finn, 1990, pp.46-48; Kellow, 
1990, pp.73-74). There are several factors which contribute to this 
difference. Australia has a well developed tradition of conducting 
government business through statutory corporations. This has 
produced a general acceptance of the principle that officials as well 
as ministers may be held accountable for the actions of government 
(Wettenhall, 1990, p.7). Australian government is federal rather 
than unitary in character. Responsibility for its conduct is divided 
between the Commonwealth and six State governments. Further, many 
governmental functions are undertaken jointly by the Commonwealth and 
the States. Consequently, the responsibility of ministers for the
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outcomes of policy is often blurred. This makes it more difficult 
for the Parliament to hold them to account for their actions. In 
Australia, ministers are bound much more tightly to party than 
Parliament. A minister whose standing with party or even party 
faction is high therefore has little to fear from parliamentary 
sanction. Moreover, party discipline is more easily exercised in 
Canberra's relatively small legislature than it can be at 
Westminster.
Ministerial control over departments is also weaker in Australia 
(Butler, 1973, Ch.4). Australian geography militates against 
effective ministerial supervision. With vast distances to cover 
between Canberra and their electorates, ministers spend only a small 
proportion of their time in their departmental offices. Rarely 
resident in Canberra, their time is even further curtailed by their 
extensive parliamentary and party commitments (Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration, 1976, p.60; Grattan and Weller, 
1981, Ch.3). Therefore, the task of running departments falls more 
heavily upon the shoulders of the departmental secretary.
The relative weakness of ministerial responsibility and control had 
three important consequences for the managerial reforms considered 
here. First, Ministers were rarely, if ever, involved in the 
execution of management reform in their departments. Their 
participation was neither expected nor invited. The very 
considerable effort which went into involving Ministers in management 
in Whitehall was hardly present in Canberra. Secondly, the latitude 
thereby afforded to officials permitted them considerable autonomy in 
determining the direction which reform would take. Consequently, 
delegation was pursued with considerable enthusiasm. The fact that 
it might conflict with traditional canons of ministerial 
responsibility was seldom discussed. Where it was, the reformers 
argued that it was the convention and not the reforms which should be 
forced to adapt (Holmes, 1989, pp.45-46; Management Improvement 
Advisory Committee, 1990, p.2). Thirdly, because in Australia a 
more relaxed attitude was taken to the prospect of parliamentary 
sanction, the margin for error available to officials appeared to be 
greater. Consequently, managerial reform in Canberra could be 
approached somewhat more boldly than the more cautious atmosphere of 
Whitehall would allow.
b. Federal Government
In Australia's federal system the range of responsibilities exercised 
by Canberra's officials is limited. Most service delivery 
operations, and hence the most employment and managerially intensive 
activities, are administered not by the Commonwealth but by the
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States. The federal bureaucracy consists, in essence, of a cluster 
of policy-oriented departments whose functions, if not their fields, 
are broadly similar. Further, given the isolated position and 
isolative atmosphere of the federal capital, relationships between 
senior officials are very close. Everyone knows what everyone else 
is doing. The two factors together produce a unity of purpose, 
activity and attitude which is far less attainable in Whitehall where 
the functions of government are diverse and its officials numerous.
These differences too had important implications for the management 
of change. Canberra's smaller size meant that the enterprise of 
reform, although still difficult, was made considerably more 
manageable. The consistency between departmental functions allowed 
similar approaches to reform to be adopted. The integration between 
networks of officials and their commonality of view meant that 
reforms, once accepted, would quickly gain ground.
c. Openness
Britain's administration is widely perceived as a closed one. Until 
the middle of the 1970s, government in Canberra was similarly 
regarded. In 1976, however, the Fraser Government in Australia 
introduced a comprehensive new system of administrative law. A new 
position of Ombudsman was created, judicial review of administrative 
action was made more accessible, an administrative appeals tribunal 
was established to review decisions of governmental officials on 
their merits and freedom of information legislation was enacted.
These measures have subsequently played a very important role in 
opening the Commonwealth Government to wider scrutiny (see, for 
example, Griffiths, 1985; Pearce, 1989b).
Not long before, a strong system of Senate investigatory committees 
had been established. These legislative and general purpose 
committees examined Government policy and performance in eight broad 
subject areas. The committees were given wide powers to call 
evidence, publicise their findings extensively and provide a 
significant forum for public participation in the legislative 
process. The investigatory committees were complemented by Senate 
Estimates committees which, during the 1980s were accorded ample 
power to examine departmental officials about their managerial 
performance. Strengthening parliamentary review did much to expose 
the workings of government to a wider audience.
New managerial reforms in the 1980s added to this trend.
Document a t i on on the performance of departmental programmes was 
substantially enhanced with the introduction of programme budgeting. 
Annual reporting requirements were altered to provide parliament and
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the public with much more information on departmental structures, 
functions, procedures, and personnel. Most importantly, personnel 
practices were changed, encouraging the frequent exchange of 
officials between private and public sectors and establishing 
competitive recruitment. Under the Hawke Government the boundaries 
of the Commonwealth bureaucracy became much more permeable.
The openness created by these measures then acted to facilitate the 
introduction and acceptance of new administrative reforms. For 
example, the new administrative law did much to challenge 
discriminatory practices in government. This in turn paved the way 
for the introduction of equal opportunity and affirmative action 
programmes under the Hawke administration. These legal reforms also 
accustomed both officials and the public to the notion that permanent 
officers as well as ministers could and should be held publicly 
accountable for their actions. One important argument against the 
delegation of managerial authority was thereby removed (Thompson, 
1988, p.222). The requirement that Government agencies report in 
detail to Parliament on their performance enhanced its role in the 
review of governmental activity. This, in turn, placed pressure on 
officials to demonstrate yearly improvements in the effectiveness of 
their management. Officials in Canberra thought it only natural to 
carry the debate about administrative reform into the wider 
community. By doing so, they created a broader public expectation 
that the administration would change. Finally, as noted previously, 
the personnel reforms that were introduced were enormously 
influential in creating a senior civil service that was committed to 
managerial change. In Whitehall, none of these factors was present 
to nearly the same degree.
Both Britain and Australia have Westminster systems of government.
In saying this, however, one should not ignore the fact that there 
are many subtle differences in the way in which they are structured 
and run. In the present study, it was apparent that institutional 
arrangements as well as political and administrative interactions had 
an important bearing on the outcomes of administrative reform. 
Canberra's administration was characterised by greater flexibility, 
cohesion and openness than its Whitehall counterpart. In Kanter's 
(1983) terms, it was closer to the integrative rather than the 
segmental end of the organisational spectrum. As such, it provided a 
setting which, to a greater extent than in Whitehall, was conducive 
to managerial innovation.
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Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, the major findings of this comparative study have 
been presented. They may, in conclusion, be summarised as follows.
1. The general deterioration in economic conditions, combined with
significant changes in social and economic thinking, provided the 
British and Australian managerial reforms of the 1980s with very 
considerable momentum.
2. This momentum was such that, despite their differing political
complexions, the Thatcher and Hawke governments pursued 
administrative reform agendas which, in very many respects, were 
similar.
3. The content of the two reform programmes was familiar and
broadly consistent with larger shifts in social values. Because of 
this, the natural resistance of the administration to managerial 
innovation was weakened.
4. The introduction of the FMIP was facilitated by the fact that
the Hawke Government adopted a collaborative rather than conflictual 
approach to civil service reform. In addition, Canberra's 
bureaucrats were more willing than their counterparts in Whitehall to 
take risks. This yielded them greater rewards.
5. In both countries a clear and persistent determination by the
Prime Minister to change the face of the administration acted as a
powerful incentive to innovation.
6. In practice, however, significant attitudinal differences 
emerged between Ministers and senior officials with respect to the 
managerial reforms which had been proposed. Consequently, in both 
countries, the attempt to make Ministers more managerially minded 
floundered and fell.
7. In Australia, the commitment to reform demonstrated by the 
administrative leadership contrasted markedly with the more diffident 
attitude exhibited by senior officials in Whitehall. The fact that 
managerial reform was high on Canberra's bureaucratic agenda provided 
considerable encouragement for its development.
8. Even so, in both countries major cleavages within the 
administration were apparent. Principal among these was the division 
in attitude between Treasury and spending departments.
The Treasury in Britain acted in a fashion calculated to retard the 
managerial (as opposed to the control) objectives of the FMI.
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However, Canberra's Department of Finance worked in advance of 
departments, thus engendering conflict when their performance fell 
short of its expectations.
9. The weakness of ministerial responsibility and control in 
Canberra relative to that in Whitehall meant that reforms whose 
purpose was to delegate managerial authority were more readily 
accommodated there than in Britain.
10. Finally, the openness and permeability of the Australian 
administrative system enhanced Canberra's propensity and capacity to 
change. In particular, the Hawke Government's importation and 
encouragement of a new cadre of economic and business oriented senior 
officials made a major difference to the progress of the reformist 
endeavour.
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PART III
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
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CHAPTER 9
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this final chapter, I step back from the practice of 
administrative reform in order to develop a broader, more theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon. In doing so, I offer three 
alternative models to explain it. These models are then related to 
the evidence obtained in this study. From this analysis, I draw a 
number of conclusions about how administrative reform might best be 
understood.
SECTION ONE: MODELS FOR REFORM
In this section, three different models of administrative reform are 
considered. In the first, organisational reform is perceived as the 
product of the purposeful intervention of organisational leaders. 
Second, organisational reform is seen as the product of political 
interaction between competing interest groups inhabiting the 
organisational terrain. Third, administrative reform is understood 
as the product of deep shifts in the substructure of organisational 
perception and interaction. Each of these alternatives is now 
examined in turn.
1. Model One - Purposeful Intervention
The first model of administrative reform is derived from 
decision-making theory. Taking its bearings from the work of Simon 
(1976), the model is synoptic. Simon proposes that an effective 
decision-maker determines his or her objectives, lists the 
alternative strategies of achieving the objectives, determines the 
consequences which flow from each of the strategies, compares the 
different sets of consequences and then chooses the most effective 
strategy (Simon, 1976, p.67). By analogy, administrative leaders who 
wish to effect change in their organisations will adopt a rational 
and staged process of execution. They will recognise the need for 
change, diagnose the problem, examine the alternatives, develop a 
strategy and then implement it (see, for example, Glueck, 1980, 
pp.55-57; Dessler, 1986, p.445). Change is composed of specific, 
identifiable interventions. It proceeds in logical and sequential 
stages. It presumes that leaders propose and that subordinates 
execute. The whole organisation is seen as a unit and it is only the 
leader, representing the organisation as a whole, whose behaviour 
requires consideration. Individual processes of choice and change 
are projected on to the organisation (March and Simon, 1958, 
pp. 137-142). Implementation proceeds from top to bottom and from
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centre to periphery (Schon, 1971, p.135). Reform is not negotiated 
but managed.
Applied more specifically to administrative reform, this rational 
model accords the government primacy in the task of reform. The 
political leadership determines what is desired, analyses the methods 
available to it, selects the most appropriate combination of reforms 
to achieve the objective and implements them. In this task, the 
administration occupies a subordinate position. Its role is 
instrumental. It exists to effect the administrative changes the 
government desires. Changes in administrative apparatus and 
operation follow from changes in political leadership.
Administrative leaders advise but it is Cabinet's or a minister's 
task to decide. In the process of administrative reorganisation, the 
government is sovereign (Olsen, 1988, p.239; March and Olsen, 1989, 
p.113).
Within organisational theory, the purposeful actor model has been 
under sustained attack. There are several grounds on which it may 
justifiably be criticised. Rationality, critics argue, is not 
complete but is bounded. It is constrained by imperfect information, 
competing organisational loyalties and unconscious skills, habits and 
reflexes which determine more or less automatically the leadership's 
performance and decisions (Cyert and March, 1963, pp.114-127;
Allison, 1971, pp.72-88). Nor is rationality unitary. An 
organisation, which is composed of differing political coalitions, 
can generate competing rationalities each of which is the product of 
the perspective of its proponents (Allison, 1971, pp.162-180; Ham and 
Hill, 1984, pp.77-79). Leaders' goals may be mixed or ambiguous and 
for good reason (Baier, March and Saetren, 1988, pp.160-161). 
Therefore, both the goals and instruments of change may conflict. 
Further, the model presumes a unidirectional relationship between the 
agents of change and their organisation. In practice, however, 
leaders' goals change in the course of introducing deliberate 
innovation, or in the course of normal institutional drift. The 
actions they take affect the preferences which spawned them. New 
intentions are discovered as experience demonstrates the truth or 
falsehood of their initial premises (March and Olsen, 1989, p.66).
In the face of these criticisms, many writers have retreated from 
this model (see Bryman, 1983, pp.391-395). However, it is by no 
means dead. It re-emerges from time to time in new and more 
sophisticated guises. Thus, for example, in a study of nine large 
private companies, Quinn detected a method of strategic activity 
which he described as 'logical incrementalism' (Quinn, 1989, p.20; 
Quinn, 1990, p.96). Logical incrementalism is manifested in a 
purposive but evolutionary process of organisational development.
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Strategy is formed by managers who, while ensuring that the core of 
their business is strong, engage constantly in small scale 
experimentation to advance their knowledge. Perpetually scanning the 
organisational environment, these executives gamer ideas for 
experimentation which is then conducted on a small scale. Each 
successful outcome adds to the store of the organisation's strategic 
knowledge and suggests further areas of experimental activity 
consistent with overall organisational objectives. Where there is 
conflict, it is contained at the margin. The gradualism of 
incremental adaptation provides ample scope for organisational 
learning and mutes criticism by permitting executives to point to 
successful demonstration results. Executives, then, muddle through 
but with a purpose.
2. Model Two - Institutional Negotiation
If the model of purposeful intervention represents a somewhat 
idealised conception of choice and change then the second model, that 
of institutional negotiation, is decidedly practical in bent. Just 
as Simon's synoptic conception of decision making made way for the 
development of Lindblom's pragmatic alternative (see Lindblom, 1965, 
1973), so the theories of rationally planned and executed change 
opened the door for the development of new, more political, 
understandings of organisational dynamics. In Model 2, organisations 
are considered as coalitions of participants whose values and goals 
often conflict. The minimum common ground of agreement, 
organisational goals, are the result of intensive processes of 
bargaining and negotiation. These processes do not cease as soon as 
the coalition is formed and goals are established. They operate 
continuously, moderating strategy and mediating conflict which itself 
is endemic (Cyert and March, 1963, p.43). Change, then, is the 
product of negotiation and bargaining between competing institutional 
interests.
Two concepts are central to understanding the institutional 
framework. The first is power. Model 2 presumes that organisational 
actors achieve their objectives through the exercise of power 
(Dalton, 1959, pp.263-264). However, they exercise power only in 
relation to the pursuit of collective objectives. The organisation 
therefore sets the framework within which relations of power develop 
(Crozier, 1964, pp.163-164). So, whereas rational planning is 
informed implicitly by a search for efficiency, the institutional 
model is informed by the search, within certain organisational 
parameters, for negotiated and binding agreements between competing 
interests. The second concept is perception. It is assumed that the 
different actors and interests in the organisational arena will 
perceive organisational goals, tasks and processes differently. Each
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will act more or less rationally on the basis of their perceptions. 
However, because organisational actors construct their realities 
differently it is inevitable that conflict will occur.
Organisational change then is the product of confrontation between 
competing rationalities employed by organisational actors each using 
the sources of power which are available to them (see generally 
Pfeffer, 1981; Lee and Lawrence, 1988).
'Garbage can' theorists lie at the far end of this spectrum.
According to these theorists, the explicit choices of actors and the 
consequent coherence of choices are often lost in contextually 
dependent flows of problems, solutions, people and choices.
Solutions are linked to problems and decision-makers to choices not 
by force of logic but by their simultaneity. Problems are worked 
upon in the context of some choice, but choices are made only when 
the shifting combinations of problems, solutions and decision-makers 
happen to make action possible (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1988, 
pp.296-299). Administrative reorganisations are similarly 
characterised. They too are a 'garbage can' consisting of 
contextually specific combinations of people, choice opportunities, 
problems and solutions. Their course is determined less by the 
content of reform proposals themselves, or the effort put into their 
execution, than by the happenstance of political attention, the 
configuration of relevant interests and the idiosyncratic resolution 
of competing definitions of the problem situation. Because of the 
problematic nature of change, attempts at comprehensive reform are 
likely to fail. However, changes engendered by less visible and more 
partial means may prove more durable (March and Olsen, 1989, p.94).
Model 2 conceptualises change not in analytical but in process terms. 
The organisation is a structured arena of competition between 
organisational actors. Each actor, or interest of which the actor is 
a part, construes the organisation differently and uses the various 
sources of power available to them to advance their understandings 
and their interests. Each actor behaves 'rationally' in the sense 
that they act more or less logically to advance their cause. But 
because these rationalities conflict, the outcome of change is 
uncertain. Change, if and when it occurs, is likely to be the 
product of incremental advance engendered by persistent and difficult 
negotiation between competing actors. Purposive action, of the kind 
envisaged in Model 1, occurs only where the organisation's dominant 
coalition is in a position to enforce its vision upon those with whom 
it is in conflict. Rationality, if the term is to be used, is best 
understood in retrospective rather than prospective terms. It can 
explain, with the benefit of hindsight, what has happened but does 
not provide a ready methodology for planning and action.
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Model 2 significantly advances our understanding of organisational 
realities. However, it too has its limitations. By focusing on the 
interminable bargaining between organisational sub groups it fails 
satisfactorily to explain why and how major reforms do sometimes 
occur. It concentrates almost exclusively on the internal dynamics 
of change, giving too little weight to the role which external 
contingencies may play in provoking and maintaining the pressure for 
reform. The model dwells on relations of power within the 
organisation but does not sufficiently take account of structures and 
rules as constraints on such relations and as factors predisposing it 
to stasis or change. It proposes that power and perception are 
crucial elements in the process of change but does not explain how 
shifts in power or perception might occur.
3. Model Three: Appreciative Shift
The third model of organisational reform proceeds on the assumption 
that enduring organisational change is the product of collective 
organisational learning (see Cyert and March, 1963, pp.123-125;
Schon, 1971, p.109; Crozier and Friedberg, 1980, p.221; Starbuck, 
Greve and Hedberg, 1991, p.785). Reform takes root only where an 
organisation has developed and incorporated new collective capacities 
for knowing, communicating, relating and acting. The appreciative 
model introduces into the discussion a third conception of 
rationality. The rational model previously discussed postulates an 
analytical rationality. The institutional approach proposes an a 
posteriori and incremental rationality. The appreciative model by 
contrast introduces a rationality founded in individual and 
collective intuition, interpretation and action (see, more generally, 
Fay, 1975, pp.70-92; Harmon and Mayer, 1986, pp.282-316).
On this view, the coherence an individual accords to an organisation 
depends primarily on his or her intuitive understanding of it. An 
organisation is comprehended not primarily through reason, logic and 
analysis but rather through the appreciation of form, pattern and 
synthesis (Vickers, 1983, pp.36ff). The individual, in knowing a 
situation and making judgements about action, proceeds largely on the 
basis of a series of learned and tacit norms (Polanyi, 1967, 
pp.1-25). The norms are sensed negatively rather than positively. 
They are appreciated only where elements in the decision-making 
environment are experienced as misfit. Fit, in this context, is 
neither positively known nor derivable. It is constituted in the 
individual's appreciative system by the absence of misfit. The 
individual's appreciative system is developed through experience and 
in particular through experience gleaned from human communication.
It is composed of sets of cognitive schemata which structure the
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individual' s perception of a situation and the meaning and value 
he/she accords to it (Vickers, 1983, p.67).
Elaborating this theme in the managerial context, Schon, following a 
study of several professions, proposed that professionals engage 
constantly in a process of reflection in action (Schon, 1983, 
pp.49ff). They frame their reality, act on the basis of their 
framing, alter the situation which has been framed and are 
transformed by their apprehensions of the changes they have wrought. 
They engage constantly in dialectical inquiry with the situation of 
which they are part.
"A manager approaches a circumstance with a set of tacit 
criteria which are activated when some specific action is 
found to be inconsistent with one of them. A particular 
action arises from the interplay between these tacit 
norms, these 'oughts', and critical reactions to them 
given the context within which the manager takes 
himself/herself to be called upon to perform. Action may 
conform to the norm or go beyond it and, in so doing, 
contribute to its development or demise."
(Mangham and Pye, 1991, pp.24-25)
Managers, then, constitute a special case of the professional in 
reflective conversation with his or her environment (Schon, 1983, 
p.242; Mangham and Pye, 1991, pp.20-26). This is because the 
organisation of which they are a part constitutes both the object of 
their inquiry and their forum for action. The organisation is a 
store of collectively accumulated knowledge. This knowledge is not 
only factual in nature but consists of ideology, myth, symbol, story 
and patterns of behaviour. It is made manifest in the organisation's 
goals, structures, rules, procedures, technologies, history and 
methods of interaction. Thus, when managers face new and problematic 
situations they draw both on personal and organisational knowledge to 
found their appreciations and interventions. In comprehending the 
consequences of their actions they act as the vehicle both for 
individual and collective learning. From this learning new 
organisational appreciations and syntheses emerge.
The extent to which an organisation changes in response to new 
learning depends on its structure and patterns of behaviour. As the 
work of Bums and Stalker (1961) and more recently Kanter (1983) 
suggests, some structures and behavioural patterns facilitate 
reflection and adaptation more than others. These structures and 
patterns may be considered as the organisation's learning system.
The character of the learning system in turn influences strongly the 
scope and direction of the manager's reflection in action.
These observations, which proceed from the individual to the 
collective, mesh well with analyses of organisational culture which
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operate in the opposite direction. Schein, for example, proposes
that the term culture -
"should be reserved for the deeper level of basic 
assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an 
organisation, that operate unconsciously, and that define 
in a basic 'taken for granted' fashion an organisation's 
view of itself and its environment. These assumptions 
and beliefs are learned responses to a group's problems 
of survival in its external environment and its problems 
of internal integration. They come to be taken for 
granted because they solve those problems repeatedly and 
reliably."
(Schein, 1985, p.6)
Similarly, Handy proposes that organisational culture consists of 
sets of implicit norms and values which are in turn reflected in 
different structures and differing interactional systems. 
Organisations differ in their atmosphere, modus operandi, enthusiasm, 
degrees of individual freedom and choice of personality. Each of 
these is an aspect of the organisation's particular culture (Handy, 
1985a, p.196; Handy 1985b, pp.9-14). In the administrative context, 
Metcalfe and Richards propose that culture consists of an amalgam of 
'taken for granted' attitudes, values, beliefs and assumptions held 
by civil servants about their role and responsibilities (Metcalfe and 
Richards, 1984a, p.442; Metcalfe and Richards, 1987a, pp.15-16).
They argue that to be successful, administrative reform requires not 
only 'political clout but cultural change'. For this, changes in 
civil servants' capacities, commitments and understandings are 
essential prerequisites.
Cultural analysis has been important in demonstrating that the 
ability of individual organisational actors to experiment and to 
learn will always be constrained by their membership of the 
organisation and by the constraints and 'rationality' of that 
organisation's learned responses to problematic situations. 
Individuals accept and internalise the cultural traits, attitudes, 
norms and characteristic values of the organisation they have 
entered. This subsequently determines their perceptions of reality 
and even their emotional reactions to it thus guiding their choice of 
objectives and their means of action.
Like the vast body of precedent in law, with the myriad stories it 
contains, the culture of the organisation, with its edifice of 
accumulated experience, acts as a powerful force for integration and 
stasis. This presents a problem for any theory of change since 
significant reform must first overcome the 'dynamic conservatism' 
inherent in the organisation and embedded in its culture. How then 
might change occur?
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Borrowing from the philosophy of science, one may invoke the idea of 
paradigm shift to explain dramatic changes in the organisational 
ground (Kuhn, 1971, pp.43-51). Although culture, in the sense that 
Schein describes, exercises a powerful influence on the perceptions 
and behaviour of organisational actors, it does not determine them. 
Each actor brings to the organisation his/her own appreciative system 
which accords, to a greater or lesser extent, with that of the system 
of which they are part. But each actor still possesses some degree 
of freedom. In responding to his/her situation, several choices are 
always possible. The choice among them will depend on individual 
reason, capacity, and resources. A creative tension is established 
between individual and organisational appreciation (Kaufman, 1971, 
pp.42-44; Schon, 1971, p.159).
Normally this tension is contained by the self-perpetuating qualities 
inherent in organisational precedent, experience and patterns of 
mutual expectation. However, the exclusion by the existing culture 
of divergent modes of reasoning and behaviour nevertheless result in 
the establishment of oppositional organisational sub-cultures in 
pockets of the organisation least satisfied with accepted attitudes, 
analyses and methods. By making different choices in their sphere of 
operation, these sub-cultures contribute to incremental advance. In 
provoking the development of different individual schemata and 
organisational response systems, they pave the way for more radical 
re- interpretations. These, however, do not occur except in response 
to crisis (Crozier, 1964, pp.195-198). In organisations crises will 
occur when the organisation's learned responses to its problems of 
survival are no longer adequate to deal with substantial shifts in 
its extra organisational context. The changes may be in the 
organisation's physical, institutional, technical, social or 
intellectual environment. Whichever is the case, crisis provokes an 
instantaneous demand for new theory.
Competing appreciative systems, whether developed within or outside 
the organisation then clamour for attention. Dissenting views and 
individuals act as the vanguard for reform and reintegration. 
Eventually the old paradigm is displaced, whether due to externally 
driven crises, shifts in leadership or the superior explanatory 
properties of the new appreciative systems themselves (Brunsson,
1985, pp.180-181). The newly dominant paradigm then spawns major 
changes to the organisation's methods of reasoning, relating, 
communicating and acting which are more consonant with its external 
environment.
The evolutionary/revolutionary cycle is consistent with the finding 
in a number of recent private sector studies that corporate strategy 
and change proceed not in incremental and linear fashion but
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according to a pattern of stability followed by rupture (see, for 
example, Mintzberg and Waters, 1982, pp.491-499; Pettigrew, 1985, 
pp.445-449; Johnson, 1987, pp.248- 265; Tushman, Newman and 
Romanelli, 1991, p.783; Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg, 1991, p.786). 
Schon (1971, p.115) argues similarly that change in the public sector 
results from the replacement of one set of 'ideas in good currency' 
with another. In this context, single programmes of administrative 
reform are seen as having importance not because of their content or 
because of the specific structural and procedural changes they effect 
but rather because, by moving and shaking existing structures, they 
create new opportunities for collective learning and hence enduring 
change to occur (Kaufman, 1971, p.55; March and Olsen, 1989, p.94).
Despite its intellectual elegance and intuitive appeal, this third 
model also leaves room for criticism. By relying so heavily on 
external motivators for change, it underplays the role which key 
actors and factions in organisations can play in effecting reform.
By focusing so strongly on the explanatory power of new systems of 
thought, it accords too little attention to the power of institutions 
to suppress them. By concentrating exclusively on appreciation, it 
presumes that structures will fall in the face of new insights. In 
practice their replacement may be considerably more difficult.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Each of the models of change described proceeds from a particular 
conception of rational behaviour. In the first, synoptic rationality 
is dominant. In the second, an institutional logic is present. In
the third, it is an appreciative perspective which commands 
attention. The synoptic view assumes that an organisation acts as 
one in setting the course for change. The institutional view sees 
the organisation as an aggregation of interests not all of which are 
in harmony. The appreciative perspective regards the organisation as 
a cultural construct built from the normative, cognitive and 
behavioural experience of its members.
From these competing conceptions flow different conclusions as to the 
nature of reform. On a synoptic view, reform is seen as measured, 
if lengthy, transition from one organisational form to another. The
institutional view, by contrast, regards reform as the product of
negotiation and conflict between competing actors with different 
reform agendas and differential sources of power to utilise in their 
pursuit. The appreciative view understands reform as the acquisition 
of new interpretations and capacities.
In each model, the method of achieving reform is distinct. Under the 
synoptic model, leadership imposes reform on the organisation. In
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the institutional model, reform proceeds through a pluralist process 
of bargaining. In the appreciative framework, reform is effected 
through individual and organisational learning. In the remainder of 
the chapter, the evidence garnered in this study will be examined 
further with a view to exploring the applicability of the three 
models which have now been outlined.
SECTION TWO: REFLECTIONS ON PRACTICE
1. Model One - Purposeful Intervention
Both the Thatcher and Hawke governments entered office with bold 
plans to change the face of public administration. The British 
Government was bent on recasting its civil service in the image of 
the private sector. The Australian Government's first priority was 
to make the administration significantly more responsive to political 
direction. Possessing considerable political determination and 
public support, each was in a commanding position from which to 
introduce its reform programmes and in this they met with some 
immediate successes. Both governments were able to cut public 
expenditure, to insist that new methods be adopted to control it, to 
reorganise the machinery of government, to reduce public service 
numbers, to insist that wage demands be moderated and to demand that 
management in the civil service be made more efficient. In 
Australia, the Government widened further the sphere in which it 
could take autonomous action by setting the key elements of its 
reform programme in legislation.
However, the two governments' successes tended to be complete only in 
those spheres in which they had the authority and capacity to act 
alone. Once having formulated their programmes and established 
certain basic preconditions for their introduction, each government's 
scope for autonomous action during implementation was diminished. 
Given their other pressing demands, the time, attention and skill 
which Ministers could devote to administrative reform was limited.
The resources available to Ministers to supervise and pursue the 
details of implementation were dwarfed by those contained in the 
administration. Consequently, having mapped the parameters of 
reform, each government had to leave it to the administration to 
interpret, carry and resource the process of execution. From that 
moment, the responsibility for implementation became a joint one.
In Model 1 terms this would not have mattered if the administration 
had acted as the faithful instrument of government policy or if the 
interests of government and administration had coincided. Neither in 
Britain nor in Australia did these presumptions necessarily hold
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true. In Britain the civil service at all levels was demoralised by 
and reacted adversely to the government's belligerent and belittling 
attacks. Greater harmony existed between the two parties in 
Canberra. Nevertheless, one explicit objective of the Australian 
government's reform programmes was to reduce the power of the civil 
service and augment the power of the ministry. This the civil 
service could confidently be expected to resist.
More relevantly, both governments intended that the civil service 
should be made more efficient. However many different meanings could 
be attributed to this goal. In Whitehall, to take the clearest 
example, efficiency for the Government meant that the public sector 
should operate more economically and be run more like business. For 
many in the civil service, however, the business analogy was 
inappropriate. The pursuit of efficiency there might with equal 
force be defined as enhancing the machine's capacity to respond to 
shifts in the political and policy environment or, at the other end 
of the spectrum, ensuring the provision of high quality service. 
Similarly, depending on the interpretation placed on efficiency, 
different means might readily be adopted to achieve it. Taking 
Britain again, the Government never seriously considered measures to 
improve Whitehall's analytical capabilities. The administration, in 
its turn, was diffident about managerial improvement.
As soon, then, as responsibility for administrative reform was 
shared, cracks began to appear as both politicians and administrators 
sought to impress their stamp upon it. Deeper within the 
bureaucracy, many more divisions soon emerged as reform moved from 
the level of principle to practice. The administration was not 
characterised by unity of purpose nor did it possess the unitary and 
tightly disciplined organisation necessary for it to effect change in 
the way Model 1 suggests. By contrast, the contested nature of 
reform was immediately suggestive of the second model proposed.
2. Model Two - Institutional Negotiation
The competitions for influence which were observed in Whitehall and 
Canberra took place on both structural and functional lines. 
Government itself, and the departments of which it was constituted, 
was comprised of definable sub-units, each of which performed 
different but interrelated functions. In the political arena, the 
most significant divisions which emerged were between:
- the Government and the civil service; and
- individual ministers and their departmental officials.
In the administrative arena the most significant divisions occurred 
between:
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- central finance departments and spending departments;
- central finance divisions and operating divisions;
- policy divisions and central finance divisions; and
- policy divisions and operating divisions.
The relationship between each set of parties had three important and 
characteristic aspects. First, each party interpreted organisational 
events from their particular perspective. These perspectives were 
fashioned, among other things, by the information at their disposal, 
their understanding of their role and their standing in the 
administration. Ministers, for example, saw the introduction of top 
management systems as a reform that offered them the prospect of 
obtaining a clear and comprehensive picture of their departments.
Once having this picture, they were better placed to intervene in 
order to advance their political and policy agenda. Officials, on 
the other hand, considered the systems to be a means of obtaining a 
more considered allocation of departmental resources. Given 
appropriate information, they, together with Ministers, would be in a 
better position to set clear priorities and apply their resources 
consistently with them. Similarly, central finance departments 
viewed delegation primarily as a means of making managers at all 
levels much more conscious of the costs of their activities. 
Departmental officials, on the other hand, saw the process as the 
long overdue recognition of their right to manage their financial 
affairs more independently.
Second, the reforms threatened to upset the parties' traditional 
patterns of relating. Each had something to gain and each had 
something to lose from the changes which were proposed. Disputation 
therefore became inevitable. Hence, officials were concerned that 
top management systems, by providing the means through which 
Ministers could enter the management arena carried with it the danger 
that departmental administration might become more rather than less 
political. Equally, Ministers were concerned that the injection of 
rational management practice into the political arena might limit the 
room available for tactical manoeuvre. Similarly, if the 
departmental perspective on delegation prevailed, central finance 
departments stood to lose a measure of control over public 
expenditure. Equally, if the Treasury view prevailed, departments 
feared that they would be bound more closely, even though more 
subtly, to its yoke than they had been previously.
Third, and more generally, the interactions between the parties took 
place in an environment of severe resource constraint. The scarcity 
of resources intensified the competition for their control. 
Accordingly, both Ministers and officials were keen to exercise 
greater influence over the distribution of departmental funds. Each
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wished to ensure that new reforms, such as top management systems, 
gave them the maximum scope to do so. Similarly, central finance 
departments were extremely reluctant to countenance management 
reforms which would blunt their drive for expenditure reduction. 
Departments and agencies by contrast saw in the reforms an 
opportunity to mount a more effective case for increases in 
expenditure.
The existence of these preconditions set in train a complex and 
interrelated series of contests between the relevant parties. Each 
brought to bear what power it had to produce the outcome which it 
considered desirable. The degree of power which each party was able 
to exert in turn was affected by three critical factors - political 
legitimacy, financial authority and administrative indispensability 
(see Hickson and McCullough 1980, pp.41-55). For example, the two 
governments were able to insist that management reform be pursued 
because they had an electoral mandate to do so, because 
constitutionally they had the authority to so and because their 
parliaments encouraged them to do so. Each of these factors enhanced 
their legitimacy.
Central finance departments were able largely to dictate the manner 
in which financial reforms would be implemented because parliament 
placed upon them the responsibility for ensuring money was expended 
in terms it had approved, because it was their responsibility to 
ensure that public expenditure remained within predetermined 
parameters and because they had the constitutional and administrative 
authority to determine how far their own controls of financial 
management could be delegated. Policy divisions were able 
successfully to resist the incursions of management reformers because 
they acted as Ministers' gatekeepers. They were, therefore, in a 
strong position to argue that they should not be subjected to 
managerial techniques which they believed lessened their political 
responsiveness and value. Their indispensability, therefore, 
fortified their perspective.
It was because power could be harnessed more effectively by some 
parties than others that management reform moved forward rather than 
breaking apart. More particularly it was because there was a strong 
coincidence of interest between parliament, government and finance 
departments that the managerial movement proved forceful. The 
process of reform observed here did not resemble the model proposed 
by the 'garbage can' theorists. Rather the key actors' intentions 
and their power combined to give reform a positive momentum.
The model of institutional negotiation, then, does much to explain 
the course taken by the FMI and the FMIP respectively. However, it
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still concentrated too heavily on the machinations of competing 
actors. In doing so, it gives insufficient weight to the influence 
of ideas. This is considered in Model 3.
3- Model Three - Appreciative Shift.
The third model proposed that administrative reform is best 
understood as the outcome of changes in the way an organisation is 
appreciated. Lasting reform will, therefore, take place only where 
the participants in an organisation learn to reason, relate to and 
feel differently about it. Administrations are transformed only when 
the old stories through which they have understood the organisation 
are replaced with new ones which have greater predictive and 
explanatory power.
There is not space here either to define or examine in detail the 
competing and complex interpretations of public administration which 
have vied for attention in this last decade of reform. Nor would the 
methodology employed in this research have permitted it. For this, 
it would need to have been more ethnographic in nature. However, 
there have been three consistent themes which have coursed through 
this study. These can serve, at least in an introductory way, to 
illustrate the much deeper currents which, over many years, exerted a 
powerful influence upon attempts to alter the practice of management 
in government. The themes relate to three polarities: politics and 
management; efficiency and effectiveness; and control and delegation 
(see similarly Aucoin, 1990).
(i) Politics and Management
"The other difficulty is politics. Clearly what we're on 
about is trying to make rational decisions and some 
politicians would prefer an approach to decision-making 
which reflects other criteria than rational ones. They 
would justify it by giving extra weight to particular 
values but often it's just alliances and allegiances - 
you couldn't say it reflected due process.”
(Departmental Secretary)
Whether explicitly or implicitly, the new managerialism sought to 
change political behaviour. The management reformers believed that 
if government were conducted more rationally and its organisation 
structured more systematically, the public interest would be far 
better served. This was not an argument which took hold among 
managerially minded administrators alone. It gained, in Australia, 
considerable credence among Ministers themselves - at least in the 
abstract.
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The criticisms of political behaviour are well known and of long 
standing (see, for example, Heady, 1973, Ch.6; Grattan and Weller, 
1981, Ch.4; Barnett, 1982, Ch.2; Ponting, 1986, Ch.2; Ponting, 1989, 
Ch.2). Politicians are notoriously ambitious. They frequently place 
the question of personal and political advantage above broader social 
considerations. They thrive on publicity. Important governmental 
policies which do not attract popular attention may therefore be 
neglected. Their time horizon is usually no longer than the next 
election. Decisions generating short-term benefits are preferred 
over those whose results may be more lasting but credit for which 
will be taken by the next government. They wish always to gamer 
political support. Therefore, they tend to defer to the advances of 
powerful interests sometimes to the neglect of those more deserving. 
They are in competition not only with the opposition but with their 
Cabinet colleagues. Consequently, departmental interests may on 
occasions be harnessed in the service of some larger more 
Machiavellian agenda. The basic question asked by ministers is not 
'what good will this do?' but 'how will this work to my political 
advantage?.'
By locking Ministers into a particular, more rational, method of 
arriving at their decisions, the management reformers clearly aspired 
to alter some of this behaviour. If only Ministers could be 
persuaded to set their objectives, rank their priorities, allocate 
resources accordingly, evaluate the effectiveness of their policies 
etc. surely government would become an altogether more scientific and 
less capricious exercise? The approach was not limited in its 
application to Ministers alone. Policy officials, and in this 
category most of the senior echelons of the civil service could be 
included, understood and constructed their work in similarly 
political terms. Their task was to protect and advance the 
Minister's interests. Nevertheless, managerialists asked, would not 
the quality of their advice also be enhanced if it were subjected to 
greater methodological rigour?
At issue here were two quite different ways of seeing the 
administrative world: the political and the scientific. The major 
impediment to the ascent of the managerial vision was the dominance 
of the political one - and of the administrative edifice which had 
grown to support it.
"We had constructed a system in which advising Ministers 
in relation to policy, adapting policy, the business of 
politics, was actually setting the context for the 
running of departments. This created a serious systemic 
and cultural block.”
(Deputy Secretary)
199
The incompatibility between the two visions was clearly displayed in
Whitehall and Canberra as Ministers acted with great persistence to
defeat the expectations of their managerial minders. Politicians,
despite the existence of the methodological constraints heaped upon
them by corporate planning, programme budgeting, performance
measurement etc., could not or would not act in rational fashion.
Nor did they act like those models of enterprise, private sector
executives. One Minister explained quite clearly why not:
"The businessman is after 'market share' and 'bottom 
line' for his corporation. So are Ministers. But in our 
parliamentary form of Government... their 'market shares' 
are different. Both consist of votes to be garnered.
Throughout most of the critiques of the way in which the 
Whitehall village is managed runs a strong vein of 
impatience with the propensity of Ministers to engage in
pork barrel politics But if ICI's share price were
determined by the number of marginal constituencies in 
which the great corporation contrived to operate, its 
boardroom would be similarly motivated.”
(Bruce-Gardyne, 1986, p.235)
Beneath this exchange lay a much more fundamental and important clash 
of perspectives. For managerialists conceived of politics in essence 
as a process through which a succession of identifiable political 
goals were defined, pursued and attained. Assuming that government's 
objectives could be established and ranked, they argued, it ought to 
be possible to decide, according to pre-determined and rationally 
derived criteria, which of a number of alternative methods of 
achieving them would be most efficient. By making proper choices 
between meansr the output and performance of government could be 
enhanced considerably.
However, it is equally possible to understand politics as the process 
through which society's governing norms, standards and relations are 
developed and sustained. On this view the purpose of administrative 
decision-making is not efficiently to produce tangible outputs in the 
form of benefits and services. Rather its aim is to regulate and 
maintain a dynamic balance between divergent and competing social 
forces and actors over time (Vickers, 1983, p.31 and see to similar 
effect Arendt, 1958, Ch.5; Habermas, 1971, Ch.5; Beiner, 1983, Ch.2; 
Offe, 1985, p.308). If politics is viewed in this way, a number of 
seemingly intractable difficulties which lay in the path of 
management reform become more readily explicable.
Management reformers proceeded as if government could be regarded as 
a unitary actor with coherent and stable preferences and objectives. 
In practice, however, a multitude of complex, value-laden and 
conflicting societal demands press in upon the administration 
generating within it an impressive but bewildering array of competing 
purposes incapable of easy reconciliation (Johnson, 1983, p.190;
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Gregory, 1987, p.123; and see, more generally, Braybrooke and 
Lindblom, 1970, pp.225-244).
The application of 'rational' modes of analysis to administrative 
decision-making is plainly of assistance in determining which of a 
number of competing means is best suited to the achievement of 
agreed-upon ends. However, it cannot, as a number of perceptive 
administrators pointed out, provide guidance on which of many 
competing ends should be preferred (Crick, 1982, p.109; Dror, 1979, 
pp.270-274).
Even where the ends of political action can clearly be identified, 
the effect of pursuing them can rarely if ever be predicted with 
certainty. In conditions of environmental flux and change, of 
constantly altering patterns of social interaction, technique alone 
cannot guarantee the achievement of the outcomes which are desired. 
Judgements, however incomplete the information on which they are 
based, must be made about how the existing balance between society's 
interests should and will be altered as the result of governmental 
intervention. These, as policy officials averred, must also be 
capable of constant adjustment. In making them, political criteria 
such as justice and fairness may ultimately be a better guide to 
action than is rationality alone (Elster, 1991, pp.122ff).
Because politics consists of the regulation of social relationships, 
the criterion of efficiency cannot be the only one against which the 
effectiveness of government should be judged. Other procedural 
values such as impartiality, equity, and participation, which relate 
specifically to the quality of relating, need equally to be 
considered. The dictates of efficiency may lead to the supply of a 
handsome governmental product. But the efficient provision of 
governmental services is but one step along the road to achieving a 
more desirable social compact. If, then, this equilibrium is upset 
by the neglect of other ethical and procedural values, the broader 
purposes of governmental intervention may well be defeated.
In the final analysis, then, what Ministers and their policy 
officials had to decide was whether managerial prescriptions and 
methods told them more convincing and more functional stories about 
the process of governing than did their existing ones. At the time 
of writing there was little evidence, either in theory or practice, 
that they did. Consequently, in neither country did the managerial 
paradigm exercise a significant influence beyond the sphere of 
operational administration.
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(ii) Efficiency and Effectiveness
"The culture of this place is to get a job done.
Management, efficiency - that's all very interesting, 
frightfully interesting but we're here to get a job 
done."
(First Assistant Secretary)
A second perceptual dislocation could readily be observed between two 
broad classes of official. The first class assumed a generally 
positive stance towards governmental functions. They were confident 
that, given adequate resources, their departments could deliver 
services of both quality and social value. Their mission was to 
ensure that, as far as possible, departmental clients received what 
they deserved and were treated in a manner to which they were 
entitled. The second category took a generally negative attitude to 
the provision of government services. These, they believed, should 
have a residual rather than positive character. Their mission was to 
ensure that money was spent sparingly and with particular regard to 
the achievement of economy and efficiency.
This difference in perception was similar to that noted below between 
Treasury and departmental officials. But the divide was also 
apparent on other dimensions. Hence, those whose service careers had 
embraced not only contractionary but also expansionary years were 
more likely than newer officials to assume a positive stance towards 
government (see Pusey, 1991, pp.160-169). Officials whose 
professional and career backgrounds had in recent years been in 
economics or commerce were more likely than those with backgrounds in 
say health or welfare to adopt the first. The closer an official's 
work came to the point at which services were delivered, the more 
probable it was that issues of quality as well as quantity would 
assume much greater importance.
Mistrust between the two parties ran high. Management reformers were
seen by those concerned with the delivery of programmes as being
preoccupied with cutting costs and stripping programmes. With their
exclusive concentration on efficiency they devalued the traditional
canons of public service:
"If the entire system of financial management .is driven 
by a requirement to cut costs, reform will be unable to 
effectively perform the functions of improving equity, 
efficacy, effectiveness and productivity in public sector 
activity."
(Labor Resource Centre, 1989, p.43)
By contrast, these same staff were seen by the new managerialists as 
insufficiently concerned with cost and motivated constantly by the 
desire to increase their expenditure not in response to need but 
rather to camouflage the defects in their managerial performance.
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They were the budget maximising bureaucrats of the public choice 
textbooks.
This debate contained in microcosm many elements of arguments which 
were occurring in the wider community over the role which government 
should be expected to play in social and economic affairs. The new 
political establishment which ascended to power in the 1980s placed 
great emphasis on reducing public expenditure and increasing private 
enterprise. Civil servants, they argued, had possessed no incentive 
to be efficient; they could simply persuade their Minister that the 
Treasury's allocation had been insufficient. The delivery of 
services had also been deficient as senior civil servants had 
regarded the task of management as beneath them. All this would need 
to change. It was less not more services that were required and 
increased efficiency would make up the shortfall.
These competing visions waged war at macro and micro levels across 
the entire spectrum of public administration. Retiring public 
servants rebuked Thatcherism for its lack of concern with civil 
service ethics, morale and commitment to quality (Bancroft 1980, 
1981). Junior officers let out heartfelt and bitter cries, where 
despite their best endeavours, there was no way in which their 
clients' needs could be met (see Bradshaw, 1982, p.112; McKnight, 
1985, p.39). The two allied groups set obstacles in the path of 
managerialism not because they condoned inefficiency but because it 
seemed a distraction from more pressing, important and traditional 
demands. They also opposed it because, at a far deeper level, it 
represented a fundamental threat to their construction of their 
administrative world, their work and themselves (see in particular 
Metcalfe and Richards, 1987b, pp.71-72; and more generally Annan, 
1990, Ch.26).
(iii) Control and Delegation
"Treasury is fascinating in all this because they never 
really trust departments to manage themselves or their 
budgets well. They are not in the business of devolving 
power over money and manpower to independent baronies.
They may be keen on the figment of that but in reality
they are not...They are not going to cease second
guessing, they are not going to cease asking their 
idiotic questions, they will not cease to intervene when 
the Chief Secretary is pressing for overnight cuts in 
Cabinet - they won t shed the habits of a lifetime."
(Peter Hennessy, personal interview)
Since Gladstone, the story of Treasury's role in relation to public
expenditure had been one of a steady and powerful increase in control
(Bridges, 1964, Ch.3; Roseveare, 1969, Ch.10; Drewry and Butcher, 
1988, pp.39-41; Hennessy, 1990, pp.69-78). This trend towards the
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centralisation of financial control occurred no less in Australia 
than in Britain (Hawker, Smith and Weller, 1979, p.124; Whitwell, 
1986, Ch.1). As the Treasury's control expanded, there developed 
also among officials a whole series of sympathetic attitudes and 
practices. There were two organising principles which guided 
Treasury officials' interpretation of their organisation and their 
role. In the interests of the taxpayer, the Treasury's prime 
function should be to save money not to spend it. To achieve this, 
it should be Treasury, with its broad perspective and formidable 
talent, which should itself act as the final arbiter of expenditure 
claims (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981, pp.41-42).
H.M. Treasury's 'Public Expenditure Manual' encapsulates this world 
view (H.M. Treasury, 1983). The manual is given to each new 
Treasury recruit not only for the purpose of introducing them to 
Treasury and its functions but also to establish from the outset the 
attitudes which new officials are expected to adopt. Treasury 
control, it affirms, is better described as a 'complex of
administrative practice - natural rather than planned, empiric rather
than theoretical' (see too, Roseveare, 1969, p.288). Learning is by 
experience. The correct outlook is critical. That outlook consists 
primarily in understanding that spending departments will not 
necessarily have the same objectives as the Treasury. This is 
because the department and the Treasury represent different 
interests. The department's aim is to maximise its expenditure to 
get its job done. The Treasury, on the other hand, represents the 
force of restraint (see Young and Sloman, 1984, p.41).
The most obvious message which leaps from the manual's pages is that
Treasury officials should be extremely reluctant to place their trust
in departmental officials, even those of the financial variety. They
should scrutinise everything and rely on nothing. For example,
officials should never accept the argument that a proposal represents
the only feasible course of action. It may be better to do nothing.
They should not turn a blind eye to departmental mistakes. These
should be corrected courteously and the goodwill added to the
official's credit balance for future use. Officers should never give
the impression that concessions are in their personal gift.
Discussions should be conducted without prejudice to final decisions.
Links should always be sought between the issue at hand and other
areas of negotiation where difficulties are being experienced.
Concessions in present negotiations may be obtained in return for
benefits provided in others. A welter of similar advice confirms
Treasury's reputation as the 'most political of departments:
"Above all, never let your department believe that you 
may be a soft touch. Be firm, fair, and wherever you 
can, constructive."
(H.M. Treasury, 1983, p.35)
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The FMI, the FMIP and the Next Steps marked a very significant 
departure from Gladstonian values. By countenancing greater 
devolution of financial authority, they posed a fundamental challenge 
to existing practice and precedent. Should departments now be 
permitted to usurp Treasury's role as the guardian of taxpayers' 
interests? Should trust now replace mistrust as the essential 
operating principle? Should Treasury now be monitor rather than 
supervisor? The questions are somewhat extreme - although all were 
certainly asked. There had been, since Fulton, a widening 
recognition that more delegation from Treasury was desirable (Young 
and Sloman, 1984, p.52). Even so, the concerted nature of the 
devolutionary drive in the 1980s inevitably generated within the 
Treasury new and fundamental questions about whether and to what 
extent the traditional Treasury view could and ought to be sustained.
"It's extraordinary the way in which we have very 
brilliantly since the year 1919 developed and constructed 
a centralised civil service based on a myriad of rules 
and procedures for managing people and systems which are 
laid down by the Treasury. Historically, I hold the same 
job as have many of my predecessors who ran what is 
called the establishments and organisation part of the 
Treasury. And from there flowed forth the rules and 
regulations which governed people's behaviour in all 
sorts of walks and fissures of life. From the north of 
Scotland to Cornwall, the civil service had books they 
looked up to see what the rules were, the rules invented 
by clever chaps here and it was all given...It was in 
1919 that the committee I chair every month, which is 
that of all the chief personnel and establishments people 
was invented and I still chair it as my predecessor in 
1919 did. This has been a process of socialisation for 
70 years, encouraged by both world wars, which was bound 
at some stage to succumb to a gradual process of
delegation and devolution I believe this would have
happened without the Next Steps initiative but the Next 
Steps has impelled it forward faster than it might 
otherwise have been pressed...We shall then go through 
that period and assessments will be made at some point in 
the future as to whether or not that has been effective.
Still, I think we have to go through it and make it 
work.”
(Treasury Deputy Secretary)
The magnitude of the change involved in moving from a public 
expenditure system based on control to one founded on delegation was, 
as this official's response illustrates clearly, very great indeed. 
For change on this view was not as simple as the introduction of new 
systems. Nor, if the official's view is accepted, was the process 
concluded with the implementation of new programmes of reform. 
Instead, each reform programme itself formed part of and constituted 
one further step in a much wider intellectual, psychological and 
social re-appraisal of existing institutional arrangements. In the 
collective bureaucratic mind, then, new ways of seeing took much 
longer to take hold than did the individual reforms undertaken in 
their name (see Pollitt, 1984, p.4; Ponting, 1989, pp.13, 45).
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Summary and Conclusion
The foregoing discussion should not lead the reader to the conclusion 
that any single model of administrative reform provides a completely 
satisfactory explanation of the interactions which have been 
observed. Rather, each can and has made its contribution to our 
understanding of the reform process. As with an onion, when each 
explanation is peeled away it reveals beneath yet deeper insights 
into how an administration is changed.
In short, successful reform requires one set of solutions to the 
problem of organisational survival to be replaced with another. For 
a new solution to develop there must first be a recognition that the 
existing solution is inadequate. This occurs when a new political or 
administrative leadership perceives that the current pattern of 
administration is no longer in fit with wider economic, social or 
technological trends. In response, the new leadership devises and 
introduces a programme of administrative reform which it believes 
will provide a more effective answer to the questions which have been 
posed by the alterations in its context (Model 1).
However, a simple instruction to change will not be sufficient to 
ensure a programme's acceptance. The programme must first be 
appropriate to the circumstances. Then a change in the balance of 
administrative power is required. The alternative programme must be 
advocated, officials must be persuaded to adopt it, and if persuasion 
is insufficient, advocates must possess sufficient power to ensure 
that it takes root (Model 2).
Yet not even when new structures and systems are in place will the 
task of reform be complete. New solutions will not be embedded until 
the administration's encompassing interpretative system is trans­
formed. Only when administrators see things anew and learn to act in 
accordance with their insights can lasting change occur (Model 3).
Finally, I return to the fundamental question which prompted this 
research. That was 'why does administrative reform appear so often 
to fail?' The answer, I suggest, lies in the fact that organisations, 
like individuals, cling with great tenacity to the ideologies, myths, 
metaphors and symbols which give their existence its meaning. To the 
external observer it may be obvious that new organisational stories
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are required to post new directions. Inside the administration, 
however, many new proposals will come and go, many battles will be 
won and lost, and many painful reassessments will have to be made 
before a novel account achieves, however temporarily, its new pre­
eminence:
"It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of 
making them more essential than mere confrontations of 
interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these 
conflicts, these contradictions, a new power relation 
must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a 
reform. If at the base there has not been the work of 
thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, 
that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, 
whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be 
swamped, digested by modes of behaviour and institutions 
that will always be the same."
(Foucault, 1988, p.156)
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APPENDIX ONE
ACCESS AND METHOD
Introduction
Whitehall is well known for its inwardness and secrecy. Until 
recently, Canberra lagged little behind in this respect. Yet in 
order to complete this work it was imperative that I obtain access to 
key officials in both administrative capitals. This presented 
immediate and formidable problems. Very few academic researchers had 
been successful in obtaining the requisite degree of access. Even 
fewer had been successful in doing so in two different countries. 
These problems were magnified by the fact that simple interviewing, 
although most useful, would not provide the richness of experiential 
source material upon which participant observation normally relies. 
For this, an opportunity to work alongside the officials for a 
consistent period of time would be necessary. The fact that I was 
successful in this endeavour is attributable as much to good fortune 
as to good management. In the remainder of this appendix I describe 
first the way in which I tackled the problem of access. Then I 
outline the design of the research and the sources and methods I used 
in undertaking it.
1. Access
Before embarking upon this particular journey, I had attempted 
without success to pursue other lines of inquiry. These had met with 
several rejections. My concerted efforts to observe the processes of 
the Griffiths inquiry into the National Health Service was but one of 
these. As I reflected on this experience it seemed to me that the 
problems I was having related not only to the understandable desire 
of commissions of inquiry and other similar bodies to preserve their 
discretion and hence their room for manoeuvre but also to the method 
of my approach. Letters, however polite and detailed, followed by 
telephone calls, however tactful and persistent, did not seem to be 
sufficient to break down the initial barriers between researcher and 
subject. I was completely unknown. Without more, my subjects had no 
means of assessing what my agenda was and what my hidden agendas 
might be. The LSE letterhead and a detailed curriculum vitae 
seemingly did little to advance my cause.
I harked back then to my own experience as an administrator. When 
approached, I would certainly see researchers if their proposals held 
a high degree of interest for me. Otherwise I would generally be too 
busy unless either I knew them personally or they had been referred
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to me by my colleagues. It was from the notion of referral that 
almost everything else in this research was subsequently to flow.
Before the process of referral could occur initial contact had to be 
made. I had by this time resolved that, despite the very 
considerable difficulties I had encountered, I should aim to study 
the FMI. To do so, I would somehow have to meet its bureaucratic 
progenitors. So I joined the Royal Institute of Public 
Administration. I started attending conferences. I went to seminars 
given by officials at the LSE and elsewhere. I asked questions. I 
stayed for drinks. I put myself in the way of those who might be or 
become involved. Fortunately, after several months, this new 
approach bore fruit. I made a statement from the floor at a CIPFA 
conference on 'Management in Government' in which I was gently 
critical of some aspects of the paper which had just been delivered 
by Sir John Cassels, then head of the Management and Personnel 
Office. The statement was well received. I discussed it with 
Cassels afterwards. I told him I wanted to do research on the FMI.
He appeared open to the suggestion and referred me to Sandy Russell, 
the Head of the Financial Management Unit. We discussed his work at 
length. We went to lunch. He felt his work was important, as it 
was. He was attracted to the prospect that someone would tell the 
story. After several weeks delay during which he cleared the matter 
with his superiors, he agreed to let me work with the Financial 
Management Unit. Several months of painstaking courtship had, 
therefore, borne fruit. At any point, Cassels or Russell could have 
said no. They did not. I was fortunate in striking two men who had 
sufficient confidence in what they were doing to believe that its 
worth was self-evident and that, ultimately, it would withstand 
intensive academic scrutiny.
From that point, referral became critical. From the time I entered 
Whitehall until the time I left it I never approached a person for 
information or interview without having first been introduced in 
person, by telephone or in writing by someone I already knew and 
with whom I had developed a positive relationship. This strategy 
yielded formidable results. No longer was I unknown and untried. I 
came with personal references. As my network of contacts expanded so 
also did my opportunities to pick and choose the particular officials 
I felt would be important to my work. Not everyone saw me. But a 
sufficient number did in a sufficient range of positions and 
departments to permit me to obtain a suitably comprehensive picture 
of the personalities and processes that I was studying.
I tackled the Australian end in precisely the same way. I met 
Malcolm Holmes, the official in charge of implementing the FMIP, over 
drinks at a conference in Melbourne. I had gone to the conference
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with this specific purpose in mind. He was anxious to learn about 
the FMI and very interested in my proposal to conduct a comparative 
study. The Australian officials were generally more open than those 
in Whitehall although, in the event, I could hardly complain about 
the latter. It was not long, therefore, before I obtained official 
approval to work for a time in the Resource Management and 
Improvement Branch of the Department of Finance in Canberra. From 
that point, once again, my network expanded rapidly.
In summary, I obtained access by working with and not against the 
grain of administrative functioning. Within the administration, 
networks of influence and friendship are all important. By tapping 
and utilising them I was able to succeed in my research purposes in a 
way which I do not think would have been possible had I adopted 
other, more formal, methods of approach.
2. Design
In order to make the comparison between Whitehall and Canberra 
effective, I sought to frame my experience of the two administrations 
in as similar a manner as possible. The specific points of 
similarity were as follows:
(i) In each administration I worked in the unit which bore 
principal responsibility for the carriage of reform. In Whitehall I 
was situated in the Treasury/MPO Financial Management Unit. In 
Canberra I was placed in the Resource Management and Advisory Branch 
of the Department of Finance. In both places I reported directly to 
the leader of the implementation team. In both I had my own desk and 
liberal access to all team members. I tried very hard to become one 
of them.
(ii) My research was conducted in comparable departments.
Working with the implementation teams I was in a convenient position 
to extend my reach to the departments by which they were sponsored. 
Therefore, I focused considerable attention on the Treasury and the 
Department of Finance respectively. Beyond this, I felt it important 
to observe the progress of the reforms in departments having quite a 
different character. In Whitehall I chose the Department of Social 
Security and the Department of Industry as it then was. The first 
was a service delivery department. The second focused on the 
development of policy and the provision of targeted financial 
assistance. I replicated this in Canberra. There again I selected 
the Department of Social Security and the Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce. My interviews and contacts were not 
confined to these departments. I received co-operation and 
assistance from a number of officials in other departments with whom
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I had made contact along the way. However, my primary focus was on 
these three departments and it was there that I conducted my study in 
depth.
(iii) Within departments I sought, as far as possible, to interview 
officials who occupied similar positions in the two countries. Thus, 
for example, in both countries I spoke with the Deputy Head of the 
Treasury, the principal finance officers of each of the four 
departments, the Director of the Social Security regional 
organisation, with the policy under secretary responsible for the 
automotive industry and so on. There were of course limits to the 
extent to which this could be done but I felt it important that I 
should try.
The major difference between the two case studies was the time that I 
was able to devote to them. My study of Whitehall was extensive. I 
was a member of the Financial Management Unit for almost six months. 
When I returned to examine the Next Steps, I conducted interviews 
over a further period of six weeks. In Canberra I was a member of 
the Resource Management and Improvement Branch for four weeks, 
returning to Canberra for another week to complete interviews with 
officials I had missed on the first occasion. I was, therefore, much 
more the participant observer in Britain than in Australia where the 
formal interview was my principal modus vivendi.
3. Sources
The sources of my information may broadly be classified into three - 
interviews, internal documentation and conferences and meetings.
These categories, however, do not by any means capture the richness 
of experiences and the material in which I was immersed. Being part 
of the implementation teams meant that I was constantly discussing 
with members the issues and problems that they faced. Some of my 
most important insights were obtained not through formal interviews 
but over lunch, at the Christmas party, in a fleeting conversation in 
the corridor, on the way home on the Underground. Anecdotes, 
attitudes, personalities and competing administrative ideologies all 
informed my work and provided me with a 'feel' for events which then 
formed the basis for my more formal inquiries.
(i) Interviews
I conducted seventy-three formal interviews with sixty-three 
interviewees. Forty-one of the interviewees were in Whitehall and 
twenty-two in Canberra. All of the interviews were tape recorded. I 
recognised that if the interviews were taped there may be some 
lessening of candour. Nevertheless, as those who have undertaken
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such interviews will appreciate, it is extremely difficult to conduct 
an effective interview when one is at the same time attempting to 
write down the interviewees' answers in detail. Tape-recording also 
provided me with the opportunity to reflect at length on the 
responses I received. What was lost in candour might therefore be 
made up, at least in part, in accuracy and thoughtfulness.
The interviews were conducted on 'Chatham House' rules. That is, in 
return for providing me with their answers, I provided interviewees 
with an assurance that their remarks, while quotable, would not be 
attributed. This assurance was sufficient in each case to obtain 
their permission for the tape recorder to be used. Most interviewees 
appeared very frank in their responses. My impression was that the 
tape recorder did not, except in a very small number of cases, unduly 
inhibit the discussion.
I adopted a general interview guide approach to interviewing (Quinn 
Patton 1990 pp.283-284). That is, each interview followed a 
carefully sequenced format. Within that format, however, there was 
considerable scope to pursue lines of inquiry which seemed 
particularly interesting and relevant. As far as possible, I sought 
to get away from a formal, stilted question-and-answer mode and 
instead to substitute a more conversational and interactive style of 
relating. In summary the format which I adopted was as follows:
Introduction: This embraced an initial statement by me
about who I was, what my study was, how and why I was undertaking it, 
what conditions with respect to confidentiality would apply.
Sequence: Next, I outlined the fields in which I had an
interest and the sequence in which I would tackle those fields. 
Sometimes, interviewees had requested this information in advance. 
Where this request was made, I provided them with a brief written 
outline of the kinds of questions to which I expected an answer.
Role: Then I questioned the interviewee with
respect to his/her interaction with the FMI. The purpose of this 
questioning was to determine how, precisely, the interviewee was 
affected by the initiative and to enable me to make a preliminary 
assessment of the person's stance in relation to it.
Substance: In the main part of the session I took the
interviewee sequentially through the key components of the two 
initiatives. These were top management systems, delegated budgetary 
control and policy evaluation. My purpose was to obtain the person's 
view of the impact, progress and worth of each of the components. 
Then, in relation to each, I sought to establish the interviewees' 
opinion as to the key factors which favoured the reforms and those 
which acted as obstacles to them. An important part of this 
questioning was my attempt to ascertain the interviewee's sense of 
how the other parties involved perceived the reforms and how they
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acted in response to their perceptions. Finally, as it became 
clearer that successful reform involved appreciative as well as 
structural adjustment, I posed questions more directly on this 
subject.
Conclusion: Having completed this sequence, I invited
interviewees to provide me with any additional observations or 
comments which they felt might be relevant. This general discussion 
often yielded useful insights. In elite interviewing, it is just as 
important, if not more so, to allow the subject to establish the 
parameters of inquiry as it is for the researcher to do so (Dexter, 
1981, p.5). The concluding portion of the interview presented an 
opportunity for this process to occur.
(ii) File Material
In both capitals I was fortunate in obtaining access to a large part 
of the relevant documentary material. In Whitehall it was understood 
that I should not see files classified as Top Secret and Secret but, 
given that this was an administrative reform, few if any of these 
files existed. I was permitted to photocopy documents subject to 
clearing them in advance with the Directors of the Financial 
Management Unit and Resource Management and Improvement Branch 
respectively. Where permission was refused, I was generally able to 
take written notes. Because I was located in the implementation 
units, it was to their files that I principally referred. In 
departments, I requested access to documents where appropriate and my 
requests were usually met. However, I did not have the relatively 
free rein in departments that I did at the centre.
The central documentation was voluminous. Therefore, I had to be 
selective. I adopted the same approach to documents as I had in my 
interviews. That is, I focused on files which directly concerned the 
implementation of the three principal components of each programme of 
reform. I supplemented this with a search of the files that tracked 
the progress of the two initiatives more generally, which considered 
obstacles to progress and which set down plans about how their 
execution should proceed. Third, there were also files which 
contained the record of ministerial, top management and 
inter-departmental communications and meetings. These were of 
particular assistance since the deferential tone of correspondence at 
junior levels tended to give way to more robust commentary in senior 
echelons.
(iii) Meetings and Training Programmes
As part of the implementation team, I attended a wide range of 
meetings particularly in Whitehall. Generally, the meetings at which
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I was present fell into three categories. First, there were meetings 
of the team and its working groups. Second, the teams met regularly 
with departmental representatives to discuss progress, to iron out 
difficulties and to plan for the future. Third, the teams organised 
regular education and training programmes for departmental officials. 
Attendance at these meetings allowed me to observe at first hand some 
of the interactions which my interviewees described. This gave the I 
interactions an immediacy which was important in sharpening my 
perceptions of the politics of reform process.
The meetings also served a number of other very important functions. 
First, they were often addressed by very senior officials. By 
listening to them and observing their reactions to questioning, I was 
able to broaden my own appreciation of the way in which 
administrative reform was regarded at the top. I was also able to 
put faces on and ascribe personalities to a number of people who I 
knew, through the documentation, were playing an important part in 
charting the initiatives' course. Second, meeting breaks provided me 
with a host of opportunities to speak with people involved in the 
reforms. Thus, while my formal interviews numbered only seventy, 
these were supplemented in forums such as this by many hundreds of 
informal discussions. Third, meetings constituted the principal 
forum through which I could broaden my contact network. Many 
officials found themselves assailed at such meetings and were then 
prevailed upon to grant me a subsequent interview. I took notes of 
the proceedings of each meeting at the time and where my informal 
discussions disclosed some new material or insights I appended a 
brief record of them.
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APPENDIX TWO
SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS
WHITEHALL
Interviewee Date Position
Eric Arnold 30 January 
15 November
1984
1990
Consultant, Peat Marwick
Ann Bowtell 9 January 1991 Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Health
Ian Beesley 8 February 1984 Under Secretary, 
Efficiency Unit
Joyce Blow 1 February 1984 Under Secretary, 
Department of Industry
Chris Bond 3 February 1984 Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Industry
Patricia Brown 10 January 
18 March
1984
1985
Under Secretary, 
HM Treasury
Eric Caines 26 January 
20 March
1984
1985
Under Secretary, 
Department of Health and 
Social Security
Ann Chant 2 February 1984 Principal,
Department of Health and 
Social Security
Kit Chivers 16 February 
27 November
1984
1990
Assistant Secretary, 
HM Treasury
Norman Clarke 15 February 1984 Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Health and 
Social Security
Barry Collins 25 January 1984 Consultant, Peat Marwick
John Corneille 1 February 1984 Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Industry
Ron Cooper 16 February 1984 Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Industry
Ernest Dinn 9 February 1984 Principal,
Department of Health and 
Social Security
Diana Goldsworthy 21 December 1990 Principal,
Office of the Minister 
for the Civil Service
Peter Hennessy 17 February 1984 Journalist
Keith Holt 31 January 1984 Principal,
Department of Industry
Geoffrey Hulme 15 February 1984 Under Secretary, 
Department of Health and
Social Security
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John Jones 9 February 1984 Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Health and 
Social Security
David Jamieson 19 November 1990 Principal, 
HM Treasury
Chris Joubert 20 January 1984 Assistant Secretary, 
Efficiency Unit
Peter Kemp 20 December 1990 Second Permanent 
Secretary, Office of the 
Minister for the Civil 
Service
Peter Le Cheminant 23 February 1984 Deputy Secretary, 
Management and Personnel 
Office
R. Mountfield 16 February 1984 Under Secretary, 
Department of Industry
John Mayne 22 November 
20 March
1983
1985
Deputy Secretary, 
Management and Personnel 
Office
Nicholas Montague 20 November 1990 Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Social 
Security
Sir Geoffrey Otton 23 February 1984 Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Social 
Security
Hayden Phillips 4 May 1991 Deputy Secretary, 
HM Treasury
William Plowden 25 March 1985 Director General, 
RIPA
Sue Richards 21 November 
3 May
1990
1991
Author and Consultant
Arthur Russell 3 February 1984 Under Secretary, 
Department of Industry
(Sandy) Russell 17 January 1984 Under Secretary, 
Management and Personnel 
Office
28 November 1990
Paul Rayner 27 November 1990 Under Secretary, 
HM Treasury
P. Regan 20 February 1984 Under Secretary, 
Department of Health and 
Social Security
R. Tilney 2 February 1984 Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Health and 
Social Security
Bill St. Clair 27 November 1990 Under Secretary, 
HM Treasury
David Smith 2 May 1991
216
Under Secretary, 
Department of Trade and 
Industry
R. W. Simpson 1 February 1984 Principal,
Department of Industry
Richard Wilding 16 February 1984 Deputy Secretary, 
HM Treasury
Michael Whippman 10 February 1984 Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Health and 
Social Security
DHSS Local
Office Managers 22 February 1984 Interviewed as a Group
CANBERRA
David Bassman 10 October 1990 Branch Manager, 
Department of Finance
Pat Barrett 26 September 1990 Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Finance
Andrew Bain 4 October 1990 First Assistant Secretary 
Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce 
(DITAC)
John Bowdler 24 September 
31 May
1990
1991
Deputy Secretary,
Department of Social Security
Glen Carlos 11 October 1990 Assistant Secretary, 
DITAC
Bruce Cutty 10 October 1990 Branch Head, 
Department of Finance
Owen Donald 3 October 1990 First Assistant Secretary 
Department of Social Security
Malcolm Farrow 4 October 1990 First Assistant Secretary 
DITAC
Stuart Hamilton 31 May 1991 Secretary, Department of 
Community Services and Health
Andrew Herscovic 24 September 1990 First Assistant Secretary 
Department of Social Security
Malcolm Holmes 17 September 
12 October
1990
1990
First Assistant Secretary 
Department of Finance
Norman Holcroft 17 September 1990 Assistant Secretary, 
Department of Finance
Michael Keating 26 September 1990 Secretary,
Department of Finance
Peter Kirby 11 June 1991 Deputy Secretary, 
Department of Employment, 
Education and Training
Phil Lansdowne 11 October 1990 Branch Head, 
DITAC
Peter McGuinness 4 October 1990 Branch Head, 
DITAC
John McMahon 15 November 1990 Regional Manager,
Department of Social Security
Jim Moore 1 October 1990 Branch Head
Department of Social Security
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Rob Palfreyman 
David Rowlands 
Jack Waterford 
Brian Wraith
4 October 1990 First Assistant Secretary
DITAC
24 September 1990 Assistant Secretary,
Department of Social Security
31 May 1991 Deputy Editor,
The Canberra Times
24 September 1984 First Assistant Secretary
Department of Social Security
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